SoftBank Group — Company History

Financial history 1982–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1981
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
1998 · TYO: 9984
Founder
Son Masayoshi
Former names
Japan SoftBank (1981–1990) · SoftBank (1990–2015)
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$49.3B (¥7.8tn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$31.6B (¥5tn)
SoftBank Group: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1981From software distribution to internet investment

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1982 · unconsolidated
Revenue$9M
Net income
Net margin
FY2000 · consolidated
Revenue$3.9B
Net income$78M
Net margin2%
  1. 1981Japan SoftBank established at Yonbancho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo
  2. 1982Monthly Oh! PC and Oh! MZ launched; entry into publishing
  3. 1983Omori Yasuhiko becomes president; Son moves to chairman
  4. 1985Revenue reaches ¥11.5bn in the fifth year
  5. 1986Son Masayoshi returns to the presidency
  6. 1990Renamed SoftBank
  7. 1994Shares registered over the counter with the JSDA
  8. 1995First unsecured straight bond issued; twelve tranches by Nov 1996
  9. 1996Yahoo Japan set up as a joint venture with Yahoo Inc.
  10. 1997Deteriorating results at the acquired companies surface
  11. 1998Listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
  12. 1999Converted into a pure holding company
  13. 2000Invests in Alibaba.com; sells down holdings to cut debt; buys Nippon Credit Bank

Across its first two decades SoftBank moved from wholesaling packaged software for personal computers to holding stakes in the companies that would run the internet, and it financed that shift almost entirely with borrowed money and market capital rather than its own earnings. At the peak of the dot-com bubble the group was worth $185.6B (¥20tn) on paper; when the valuation collapsed in the same year, it had to sell down the assets it had spent the 1990s buying.

A founding that filled the gap in software distribution, and an entry into publishing

In September 1981 the 24-year-old Son Masayoshi (孫正義) established Japan SoftBank at Yonbancho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, and began wholesaling packaged software for personal computers. The company's founding ground is the city of Fukuoka. Personal computers were spreading and the range of software was widening, yet almost no business existed to carry goods from makers to retail shops, so a user had to trawl several microcomputer shops before reaching the title they wanted. Son designed the business as an intermediate distributor that would deliver software the way a bookshop delivers a book. He narrowed his options to a handful of industries on the criteria of low capital and high growth, hired staff, and spent a year and a half studying the market and the technology before committing to the founding. In May 1982 the company launched the monthly magazines Oh! PC and Oh! MZ, entering publishing.

The founding capital was the $453,412 (¥100m) Son had earned from the patent on an automatic translation device he developed while studying in the United States. Software could not serve as collateral, so no bank would lend to a distribution business at its founding, and the loan was executed only against personal guarantees from Sharp's Sasaki Tadashi (佐々木正) and others. To make up for his lack of managerial experience, in 1983 Son brought in Omori Yasuhiko (大森康彦), formerly of Japan Guard Security, as president, and stepped back to become chairman. Revenue grew from $9.2M (¥2bn) in the second year to $18.9M (¥5bn) in the third and $31.6M (¥8bn) in the fourth, reaching $48.2M (¥12bn) in the fifth, the year ended December 1985. Oh! PC, launched the year after incorporation, also succeeded, and publishing grew into a pillar of the business alongside wholesaling. Son returned to the presidency in 1986.

Flotation, and buying an information network

In July 1990 the company changed its name to SoftBank, and in July 1994 it registered its shares with the Japan Securities Dealers Association and went public. Using the fundraising power that flotation gave it as a lever, from December that year it moved on the American trade-show operator Comdex and the Silicon Valley IT publisher Ziff-Davis. The acquisitions were funded with bonds: beginning with a first unsecured straight bond of $106.3M (¥10bn) in February 1995, it issued twelve tranches totalling $2.0B (¥220bn) by November 1996. Piling large acquisitions on borrowings one after another swelled interest-bearing debt to a scale greater than its revenue. In January 1998 it listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.

On 11 January 1996 SoftBank established Yahoo Japan Corporation as a joint venture with Yahoo of the United States, capitalised at $1.8M (¥200m). SoftBank held 60 per cent, or $1.1M (¥120m), and Yahoo Corporation 40 per cent, or $735,497 (¥80m); Son Masayoshi himself took the post of representative director and president. The business was defined as providing a Japanese-language information search service within Japan and operating a mirror site — an irregular joint venture in which the brand and the technology were borrowed from the American Yahoo while SoftBank held the capital and the management. In April the same year it put a further $91.9M (¥10bn) or so into Yahoo itself in the United States, becoming a larger shareholder than the founders. The American Yahoo was at that point no more than a venture with five or six employees and monthly revenue in the tens of millions of yen.

The market voiced concern that the run of acquisitions was draining the company's financial strength, and in August 1996 the question was put directly: could it stand the strain of one purchase after another? Son Masayoshi replied that there was nothing to worry about, arguing that the acquisitions were not expensive purchases and that he was not chasing easy gains. In the autumn of 1997 the deteriorating results of the acquired companies came to the surface, and clouds gathered over Son's expansionary line. Criticism also gathered around an acquisition scheme that used a company Son owned personally; Son said that the responsibility for the shadowed parts is mine as well, while stating plainly that the acquisitions would continue. Even in November that year the company had got through only by financial contrivance, and with the acquired businesses worsening nothing could be taken for granted.

The internet bubble, and shrinking the balance sheet in the collapse

In October 1999 SoftBank converted into a pure holding company, reorganising itself to hold and oversee the shares of its operating companies. In February 2000 it invested in Alibaba.com Corporation, making it an affiliate and taking a stake that would later become the group's largest unrealised asset. At the peak of the internet bubble, the surge in the American Yahoo's share price briefly lifted SoftBank's market capitalisation to $185.6B (¥20tn). Most of that valuation rested on unrealised gains related to Yahoo, and the gap with the profit its businesses actually generated was wide. Less than six years after the 1994 flotation, a software wholesaler had turned into an investment company with one of the largest market capitalisations in the world.

The fall in share prices from the spring of 2000 pushed many of its investees into crisis. SoftBank selected and sold the holdings that had appreciated, using the proceeds to shrink interest-bearing debt while clearing out the assets it had accumulated through the 1990s. In parallel it went ahead with the purchase of Nippon Credit Bank, which had failed, been nationalised and been dealt with using public money. Concerns were raised from the outset that a group centred on an investment company owning a bank would turn it into an in-house lender concentrating credit on affiliated firms. In September 2000 President Homma (本間) of Nippon Credit Bank took his own life, and the wind turned against SoftBank after the acquisition.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2001Into a telecoms operator, through ADSL and a mobile-carrier buyout

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2001 · consolidated
Revenue$3.3B
Net income$301M
Net margin9.2%
FY2016 · consolidated
Revenue$81.6B
Net income$4.4B
Net margin5.3%
  1. 2001Yahoo! BB commercial service launched by BB Technology
  2. 2004Japan Telecom made a subsidiary; entry into fixed-line telecoms
  3. 2005Fukuoka Daiei Hawks made a subsidiary
  4. 2006Broadband business turns profitable in the year ended March
  5. 2006Vodafone's Japanese arm made a subsidiary; entry into mobile
  6. 2010The “SoftBank Next 30-Year Vision” announced
  7. 2011¥250bn invested in building out mobile base stations
  8. 2012Operating profit of ¥675.2bn, about ten times the Vodafone-era level
  9. 2012Agreement announced to take 70 per cent of Sprint
  10. 2013Sprint made a subsidiary for about $21.6bn
  11. 2015Four domestic telecoms units merge; renamed SoftBank Group in July
  12. 2016Part of the Alibaba holding sold to fund the next acquisition
  13. 2016ARM made a subsidiary for about ¥3.3 trillion

From 2001 SoftBank stopped being only an investor and began building a carrier of its own, absorbing losses on ADSL that ran to more than twice the revenue of the business before buying Japan Telecom, Vodafone's Japanese arm and Sprint. By 2016 it had turned the cash its mobile business threw off into the largest acquisition a Japanese company had ever made — the British chip designer ARM — and swapped its core business again.

Front-loaded investment in broadband, and a move into fixed-line telecoms

In September 2001 BB Technology, a SoftBank subsidiary, launched the commercial Yahoo! BB service under the Yahoo brand, taking the group into broadband. Internet access at the time ran mainly over ISDN, which was slow and expensive. ADSL was emerging as a technology that delivered high speed at low cost over existing telephone lines. SoftBank enclosed users en masse by handing out modems free in the street — the so-called parasol squads — by saturating television with advertising, and by giving gift vouchers to subscribers. It was deliberate front-loaded investment, made in full knowledge that losses would widen, on the premise that once subscribers passed a certain number the business would break through its break-even point.

In the first year of entry, the year ended March 2002, the broadband infrastructure business recorded revenue of $58.3M (¥7bn) against an operating loss of $142.9M (¥18bn). In the following year, ended March 2003, the loss widened to $829.9M (¥96bn) on revenue of $344.2M (¥40bn), and capital expenditure reached $663.4M (¥77bn). Son Masayoshi said at the time: On a monthly basis we will start turning profitable at some point during fiscal 2002. It depends on how much we spend on promotion, but if we win a million-odd users we ought to be able to break through the break-even point. The crossover actually came in the fifth year, the year ended March 2006, with revenue of $2.3B (¥267bn) and operating profit of $177.2M (¥21bn).

In July 2004 SoftBank made the fixed-line carrier Japan Telecom a subsidiary. Japan Telecom had come under Britain's Vodafone as its largest shareholder in 2001, then had its mobile arm separated off, and was struggling in a fixed-line market where NTT held the advantage. The acquisition brought in a corporate customer base and an optical-fibre network, and immediately afterwards SoftBank launched cut-price fixed-line telephony, competing with NTT head-on on call charges. In January 2005 it made the Fukuoka Daiei Hawks a subsidiary. Daiei, rebuilding under the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan, was being pressed to sell a baseball club that was popular but unprofitable. SoftBank was not seen as the favourite at first, but Son Masayoshi invoked the tie of having spent his boyhood in Fukuoka and settled the negotiation by buying the club's franchise rights outright.

Becoming a mobile carrier, and expanding into North America

In April 2006 SoftBank made the Japanese arm of Britain's Vodafone a subsidiary and entered the mobile phone business as a new operator. The total acquisition cost was about $15.0B (¥1.75tn), most of it raised through a leveraged buyout. By arranging a non-recourse loan secured on the assets of the Japanese company being acquired, SoftBank could execute an enormous investment while limiting the effect on its own balance sheet. Son Masayoshi had repeatedly declared in public his intention to enter the mobile market, saying he would get in whatever the timing or the method. The experience of running a telecoms business, gained through the Japan Telecom acquisition, provided the footing for this entry.

From the end of 2011 it put $3.1B (¥250bn) into building out and reinforcing mobile base stations, closing the gap in network quality with its rivals. Operating profit for the year ended March 2012 reached $8.5B (¥675bn), roughly ten times the level at the time of the Vodafone acquisition, and net interest-bearing debt shrank from about $21.5B (¥2.5tn) at the end of June 2006 to $10.0B (¥800bn) by the end of June 2012. A path had opened to repay the heavy borrowings taken on at the acquisition out of the cash the mobile business generated, creating the financial headroom for the next large purchase. In April 2015 the four companies SoftBank Mobile, SoftBank BB, SoftBank Telecom and Ymobile merged, and in July that year the holding company renamed itself SoftBank Group.

Looking abroad for its next growth, SoftBank considered Asia first, but China's major mobile operators were state-owned and could not be bought, and India was ruled out because monthly revenue per subscription was around two dollars, so it settled on the United States, where revenue levels were closer to Japan's. On 15 October 2012 it announced a deal to acquire 70 per cent of Sprint's shares for $20.1bn. When America's Dish Network made a counter-proposal in April 2013, SoftBank raised the total to $21.6bn and won approval at an extraordinary general meeting on 25 June. On 11 July that year it completed the purchase of about 78 per cent of Sprint for roughly $21.6bn in all, making it a subsidiary and becoming the world's third-largest mobile phone company by revenue, with some 97 million subscriptions.

Into semiconductor design: the ARM acquisition as a turning point

In September 2016 SoftBank Group made the British semiconductor design company ARM a subsidiary. The offer price was 1,700 pence a share, a 43 per cent premium to the closing price of 15 July 2016. The total came to about £24bn, or roughly $30.3B (¥3.3tn), surpassing JT's purchase of Gallaher of Britain as the largest acquisition ever made by a Japanese company. ARM manufactures no semiconductors: it is a fabless company that licenses its designs to others, and 95 per cent of the smartphones sold worldwide carried chips based on those designs. Its operating margin for the year ended December 2015 was 51.6 per cent, above the 25 per cent of the leader, Intel. The money was found from the just under $9.2B (¥1tn) raised that June through sales of Alibaba and GungHo shares and other disposals.

Son Masayoshi placed the aim of the acquisition in seizing the design layer for an age in which semiconductors would be embedded in every device, saying that within twenty years ARM would ship something like a trillion chips a year and draw in the data of the planet. People think SoftBank is a mobile company, but that is only the last ten years, he also said, showing his intention to swap out the core business and lead the next transformation. Of the $30.3B (¥3.3tn) price he remarked that it was only three trillion yen. The ARM business did not settle down financially for some time after the acquisition, however: in the year ended March 2020 it recorded an operating loss of $400.8M (¥43bn) on revenue of $1.9B (¥206bn).

Read the full history in Japanese →


2017The Vision Fund, and the turn into an investment holding company

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2017 · consolidated
Revenue$79.4B
Net income$12.7B
Net margin16%
FY2026 · consolidated
Revenue$49.3B
Net income$31.6B
Net margin64.1%
  1. 2017SoftBank Vision Fund 1 begins operating with over $93bn at first closing
  2. 2018SoftBank Corp. lists on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
  3. 2019SoftBank Vision Fund 2 begins operating, funded 96 per cent in-house
  4. 2020Elliott Management demands a ¥2.2 trillion buyback and more outside directors
  5. 2020¥4.5 trillion asset-sale and buyback programme announced after a 17 per cent one-day fall
  6. 2020Net loss attributable to owners of the parent of ¥961.5bn
  7. 2020Sprint leaves the group on completion of its merger with T-Mobile
  8. 2020Contract announced to sell ARM to Nvidia for up to $40bn
  9. 2021Net income attributable to owners of the parent of ¥4.988 trillion
  10. 2021The US Federal Trade Commission sues to block the ARM sale
  11. 2022The ARM sale contract is terminated; Alibaba drops out of the affiliates
  12. 2023ARM lists on the Nasdaq, closing 25 per cent above the offer price
  13. 2025The Stargate Project announced with OpenAI, Oracle and MGX
  14. 2025Acquisition of Ampere Computing announced for $6.5bn

From 2017 SoftBank Group reorganised itself around investment: two Vision Funds, a profit and loss that now tracked the share prices of the portfolio rather than any business it ran, and a shareholder base that began demanding the discount to net asset value be closed. By 2025 the concentration had narrowed to a single subject — OpenAI and the computing infrastructure behind it — with revenue reaching $49.3B (¥7.8tn) in the year ended March 2026.

A ¥10 trillion fund, and results that move with share prices

In May 2017 the SoftBank Vision Fund 1, investing mainly in technology companies, began operating. At its first closing on the 20th of that month it had gathered more than $93bn, about $92.7B (¥10.4tn). Committed capital eventually reached $98.6bn, made up of $33.1bn from SoftBank Group and $65.5bn from outside investors led by Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF), so that external money accounted for around two-thirds. SoftBank Group contributed about $8.2bn of its own share in kind, in ARM shares. Where conventional venture capital funds ran hundreds of billions of yen, this was a fund of a different order of magnitude, putting billions of dollars into a single company — Uber, ByteDance, WeWork.

In October 2019 the SoftBank Vision Fund 2 began operating. External money did not come to SVF2, however: of its $59.8bn of committed capital, $57.2bn came from SoftBank Group and only $2.6bn from outside investors. SoftBank Group's share, about a third in SVF1, rose to 96 per cent in SVF2. The form reverted from managing money entrusted by others to investing its own, so that changes in the value of the investees fed through almost directly into the group's profit and loss. As at the year ended March 2024, SVF1's cumulative investment was $102.0bn for a cumulative gain of $16.7bn, while SVF2 showed a loss of $19.3bn on $52.4bn invested.

As the fund business grew in weight, consolidated net profit and loss swung with the share prices of the investees. The year ended March 2021 produced net income attributable to owners of the parent of $45.4B (¥4.99tn), while the year ended March 2022 turned to a net loss of $13.0B (¥1.71tn) and the year ended March 2023 to a net loss of $6.9B (¥970bn). The crisis at the shared-office operator WeWork, and the losses booked when its IPO was pulled, were emblematic of this structure. A further net loss of $1.5B (¥228bn) followed in the year ended March 2024, before the year ended March 2025 returned net income of $7.7B (¥1.15tn) — results moving by hundreds of billions of yen from one quarter to the next.

Shrinking the balance sheet in the pandemic, and a ¥2.5 trillion buyback

In February 2020 it emerged that Elliott Management of the United States had acquired SoftBank Group shares and was demanding a buyback of up to $20bn, about $20.6B (¥2.2tn), along with an increase in the number of outside directors. The company's shares were then trading below the value of the holdings it owned, such as its Alibaba stake: against a share price of ¥4,621 on 18 May 2020, shareholder value per share calculated from the value of those holdings was estimated at about ¥10,300. Elliott built its position that year to around $3bn, and later, as the buybacks proceeded, disposed of almost all of it.

On 19 March 2020 SoftBank Group's share price fell more than 17 per cent in a single day, and had roughly halved over a month. On the 23rd the company announced that it would sell and monetise up to $42.1B (¥4.5tn) ($41bn) of its assets, applying the proceeds to buybacks of up to $18.7B (¥2tn) and to reducing interest-bearing debt. Together with the $4.7B (¥500bn) announced on 13 March, the buyback programme came to $23.4B (¥2.5tn) in all, a scale equivalent to acquiring and cancelling 45 per cent of the shares in issue. The asset sales were planned over four quarters. After the announcement the shares were bid to the daily limit, rising ¥500 from the previous Friday's close to ¥3,187. As at December 2020 the company reported that $14.0B (¥1.5tn) of the $23.4B (¥2.5tn) had been executed.

For the year ended March 2020, write-downs at the Vision Fund and other items produced a net loss attributable to owners of the parent of $9.0B (¥962bn) on revenue of $49.1B (¥5.24tn) — the largest deficit in the company's history at that point. It was thus carrying out a large-scale buyback while posting a net loss, with the money coming from selling holdings such as its Alibaba shares. Those Alibaba sales proceeded in stages, and in August 2022 SoftBank Group's voting interest in Alibaba fell below 20 per cent, so Alibaba was removed from the scope of affiliates. Twenty-two years after the February 2000 investment, the group's largest unrealised asset had passed outside the consolidation.

The failed ARM sale, and concentrated investment in AI infrastructure

On 14 September 2020 SoftBank Group announced a contract to sell its entire holding in ARM to Nvidia of the United States for up to $40bn. The consideration combined cash and Nvidia shares, and on completion SoftBank expected to hold about 6.7 to 8.1 per cent of Nvidia's shares in issue. ARM's customers, however, included Qualcomm and Apple, competitors of Nvidia, and doubts about its neutrality were raised from the outset. In December 2021 the US Federal Trade Commission sued under antitrust law to block the deal, calling ARM the Switzerland of the semiconductor industry in its complaint. On 8 February 2022 the two companies agreed to terminate the contract, citing regulatory obstacles; the $1.25bn deposit carried no obligation to refund and was recognised as a gain.

ARM listed on its own on the Nasdaq in September 2023. Its closing price on the first day was $63.59, 25 per cent above the offer price, giving a market capitalisation of $65.2bn, about $68.3B (¥9.6tn). That was roughly three times the $30.3B (¥3.3tn) paid in 2016, and SoftBank Group continued to hold about 90 per cent of the shares. By August 2024 ARM's market capitalisation had grown to some $165.0B (¥25tn). Revenue at the ARM business also expanded, from $2.3B (¥300bn) in the year ended March 2022 to $2.7B (¥382bn) and then $3.1B (¥464bn) in the year ended March 2024, with headcount rising to 6,928.

In January 2025 SoftBank Group announced the Stargate Project, to build AI infrastructure for the American AI research and development company OpenAI and its affiliates. The plan is to invest $500bn over the following four years, of which $100bn is to be committed immediately. The initial backers were four parties — SoftBank Group, OpenAI, Oracle and MGX — with SoftBank Group responsible for the finance and OpenAI for the operations. In March the same year it agreed to invest up to a further $40bn in OpenAI, and on the 20th of that month announced the acquisition of Ampere Computing, an American designer of server CPUs, for $6.5bn in total. Son Masayoshi said: The future of artificial super intelligence requires unprecedented computing power.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

The turning points, read in full: what was at stake, what was chosen and what the revenue did around it. The Japanese edition is the edition of record and carries the sourced dossier behind each decision — background, options weighed, outcome — linked under every decision.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1981

Key decision · 1981

Founding Japan SoftBank and starting a PC software wholesale business (1981)

A 23-year-old who exploited a gap in distribution, backed by the credit of the business establishment

The core of this founding lies less in spotting the gap in software distribution than in the fact that a 23-year-old founder set up a business to exploit that gap while backing it with the credit of the business establishment. Son Masayoshi had set himself the task of one invention a day while studying in the United States, wringing out 250 ideas, and on returning to Japan spent a year and a half examining several industries before narrowing down to PC software distribution. For an ordinary student to sell a patent to the head of a large corporation, and out of that connection to draw a personal guarantee from a Sharp vice-president and the recruitment of an experienced manager, is closer to careful design than to inspiration. A new company with neither a sales network nor a brand could get makers and retailers to grant it the position of wholesaler only because of that backing of credit.

Within a few years of incorporation revenue reached the ten-billion-yen scale, and the wholesaler's position between software houses and retail shops was secure. What Son gained here was not only the immediate margin on distribution. It was a trading network binding retailers and software houses across the country, and the practices of raising the money to keep it turning. The company that renamed itself SoftBank in 1990, and after the 1994 over-the-counter registration moved on to acquiring and investing in American ventures, had that trading network and that credit, built in its founding years, as its base. The distance is long from a small hypothesis about distributing PC software like books to a company betting on ventures worldwide in the capital markets, but the founding pattern — making up for youth with the credit of the establishment, and taking a gap by the shortest route — recurs again and again afterwards.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1996

Key decision · 1996

Establishing Yahoo Japan as a joint venture with Yahoo of the United States (1996)

One share picked up from an information network decided the company's value

The core of this decision lies less in launching a search portal in Japan than in concentrating capital on a tiny venture with no track record, on the strength of nothing but the conviction gained from an information network. Neither the $1.8M (¥200m) of 1995 nor the $91.9M (¥10bn) of 1996 could be explained by working backwards from the size of the business at the time. SoftBank could commit it because, beyond the information network built through the Ziff-Davis acquisition, it could see the shape of the technology that would come next. The logic of betting not on an acquired company's profits but on the information one picks up from it bore fruit here.

Equally weighty is that this single episode determined the value of the group itself. SoftBank's market capitalisation in the dot-com period rested not on its own businesses but on unrealised gains related to Yahoo, and that valuation swung as the share price turned. The fact that a stake picked up for $1.8M (¥200m) turned into trillions of yen of unrealised gain shows Son Masayoshi's nose as an investor, and at the same time carried the danger of entrusting corporate value to another company's share price. The bet on an unknown company found at the far end of an information network can be seen as having shaped the SoftBank that followed for a long time to come.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2001

Key decision · 2001

Entering ADSL, and the Yahoo! BB crisis (2001)

A company that could tolerate losses at twice its revenue

The core of this decision was not simply entering the ADSL business, but tolerating losses of more than twice revenue for several years on end. An ordinary company, facing its first net loss since listing and outside voices saying there was nothing for it but to break the company up, would naturally have throttled back the investment. Son Masayoshi did not, because he had a calculation that the profit and loss would certainly reverse once the single measure of subscriber numbers had been piled up high enough, and he concentrated resources on that single point. Whether investment could be sustained in the middle of the crisis was the dividing line of the bet.

Equally weighty is that the pattern acquired during this crisis governed SoftBank for a long time afterwards. Take share first, accepting losses, and recover later — the thinking established with ADSL was repeated in the competition for mobile subscribers and in PayPay's lavish giveaways. The experience of enduring losses at twice revenue can be seen as having forged SoftBank's competitive style itself: concentrating capital to seize share.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2016

Key decision · 2016

Buying ARM: a ¥3.3 trillion bet on the IoT and AI age, the largest M&A ever by a Japanese company (2016)

Betting ¥3.3 trillion on a profitable company in an unrelated field

What makes this acquisition interesting is that a company whose businesses were telecoms and investment put its largest sum ever, $30.3B (¥3.3tn), into semiconductors — an unrelated field — and into a profitable, high-quality company rather than a loss-making one. What Son was looking at was not the results in front of him but a future thirty years out in which IoT and AI would change the world. If an age was coming in which semiconductors would be embedded in every device, the company holding their design would occupy the position of a tollgate. The ARM acquisition was a bet on getting to that tollgate first.

Ironically, SoftBank once tried to let ARM go and failed, and as a result gained its greatest fruit. When the sale to Nvidia collapsed, the ARM left in its hands roughly tripled in value amid the AI boom that followed ChatGPT, and its listing delivered the unrealised gain. To the question of whether $30.3B (¥3.3tn) was expensive or cheap, Son answered seven years after the acquisition with the words only three trillion yen. The ARM acquisition, alongside the formation of the Vision Fund the following year, was the starting point of SoftBank remaking itself into an investment company betting on AI.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2017

Key decision · 2017

Forming the SoftBank Vision Fund (2017)

From operating company to investment company

The core of this decision lies less in betting on AI as a field than in remaking the company, using other people's capital as a lever, into one of the largest investors in the world. The scale of $98.6bn was far beyond what SoftBank could ever reach on its own strength. Precisely because most of it was gathered from outside, with Saudi oil money as the mainstay, investments of billions of dollars in a single company became possible. This design, drawing in roughly three times its own money from outside, means that when it works it captures enormous returns on a small commitment of its own, and that scale can be extended without limit so long as the ability to find investees and raise money holds. The investor's face that Son Masayoshi had been strengthening since the ARM acquisition reached one complete form here.

Other people's capital as a lever, however, bares its teeth the moment external money stops coming. When the outside providers stayed away from SVF2, SoftBank had to bear more than 90 per cent itself, and was placed in a position where the price movements of its investees shook the group's results directly. The write-down on WeWork was the first proof of that fragility. As a third face after the software distribution of its founding years and the telecoms business of the 2000s, SoftBank moved towards being a company that entrusts its performance to the record of an investment fund. From a company that earns through operations to one that rises and falls on the skill of its investing — the move of 2017 sits at that dividing line.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2025

Key decision · 2025

The huge investment in OpenAI and the Stargate AI infrastructure (2025)

An all-in bet on the information revolution

The core of this decision is that it fixed OpenAI and AI infrastructure as the true prize of the information revolution and concentrated SoftBank Group's capital there. Having turned itself into an investment company through the ARM acquisition and the Vision Fund, it poured capital into a single field through two entrances: a direct stake in a model developer, and the funding of Stargate, which carries the computing base beneath it. The investment in OpenAI alone swelled to a cumulative $64.6bn in less than a year, and consolidated net profit exceeding ¥5 trillion for the year ended March 2026 shows what that concentration looks like when it works.

Concentration, however, is also the abandonment of diversification. So long as the value of OpenAI and of AI infrastructure keeps rising, valuation gains enrich the group's results; if the AI boom cools, losses rebound along the same path. Moreover, a substantial part of the investment is financed against collateral such as the ARM shares it holds, so a fall in AI-related stocks could reach as far as its cash management. Whether this is a bet aiming at winner-takes-all, or excessive risk staked on a single technology, has no answer at the time of writing; the fate of SoftBank Group hangs on whether the AI investment now under way bears fruit.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →


References & sources

This English edition follows the Japanese one chapter by chapter. The Japanese edition remains the edition of record: it carries the source-by-source citations, the financial tables and the shareholder and executive records. 日本語版(詳細)— SoftBank Group full history in Japanese →

  1. SoftBank Group Corp. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports), including the 沿革 corporate-history section of the FY2025 filing, the broadband infrastructure and ARM segment disclosures, the overview of the principal funds, and the IFRS consolidated accounts.
  2. SoftBank / SoftBank Group press releases: 11 Jan 1996 on the joint venture with Yahoo of the United States; 11 Jul 2013 on completion of the Sprint acquisition; 18 Jul 2016 on the agreement to acquire ARM Holdings plc; 20 May 2017 on the first closing of the SoftBank Vision Fund; 23 Mar 2020 on the ¥4.5 trillion programme to repurchase shares and reduce debt; 14 Sep 2020 on the sale of Arm Limited; 8 Feb 2022 on the termination of that sale and preparation for Arm's listing; 22 Jan 2025 on the Stargate Project; 20 Mar 2025 on the acquisition of Ampere Computing. Also the official biography of Son Masayoshi and the SoftBank Fact Book (1998).
  3. Nikkei Business — 日経ビジネス (Nikkei BP): 19 Jan 1987; 13 Feb 1995; 26 Aug 1996; 13 Oct and 17 Nov 1997; 6 Mar and 2 Oct 2000; 5 Mar 2001; 11 Feb 2002; 29 Mar, 26 Jul, 6 Sep, 1 Nov and 29 Nov 2004.
  4. Nihon Keizai Shimbun — 日本経済新聞 (Nikkei Inc.): 7 Feb 2020 on Elliott's ¥2.2 trillion buyback demand; 4 Jun 2020 on buying back shares while loss-making; 11 Dec 2020 on the ¥1.5 trillion executed; 3 Dec 2021 on the FTC suit against the ARM sale; 15 Sep 2023 on Arm's Nasdaq listing; 5 Jun 2024 on Elliott's renewed demand. Nikkei xTECH — 日経クロステック, 17 Mar 2006.
  5. Shukan Toyo Keizai — 週刊東洋経済 (Toyo Keizai Inc.): 27 Oct and 24 Nov 2012 and 6 Jul 2013 on the Sprint acquisition; 25 Jun, 30 Jul and 17 Sep 2016 on the Alibaba share sale and the ARM acquisition; 3 Jun 2017 on the ¥10 trillion fund; 4 Apr 2020 on the asset sales during the pandemic; 24 Oct 2020 on Nvidia and ARM. Toyo Keizai Online, 6 Aug 2024 on the rivals facing Arm.
  6. Bloomberg, 26 Apr 2020, on the ¥2.5 trillion buyback supporting the share price. PRESIDENT Online, 25 Sep 2023, on the ¥9 trillion listing of Arm.
  7. 近代中小企業 (Modern Small and Medium Enterprises), June 1983, on the appointment of Omori Yasuhiko. 知識 2(3)(51), on early revenue and headcount.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →



Data API

SoftBank Group’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET. Full specification →

/api/9984/manifest.json ·/api/9984/history.json ·/api/9984/timeline.json ·/api/9984/decisions.json ·/api/9984/executives.json ·/api/9984/shareholders.json ·/api/9984/financials.json ·/api/9984/financials-longterm.json ·/api/9984/segments.json ·/api/9984/regions.json ·/api/9984/workforce.json · /api/9984/decisions/{slug}.json

/api/companies.json ·/api/decisions.json