Meguro-Kamata Electric Railway (1922–39) · Tokyo-Yokohama Electric Railway (1939–42) · Tokyo Kyuko Electric Railway (1942–2019)
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$6.9B (¥1.09tn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$550.7M (¥87bn)
Tokyu: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)
1922Goto Keita, Kanto's first suburban railway, and the rise and dismantling of Greater Tokyu
Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1953 · unconsolidated
Revenue$9M
Net income—
Net margin—
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FY1955 · unconsolidated
Revenue$12M
Net income—
Net margin—
1922Meguro-Kamata Electric Railway founded with ¥3.5m capital
1923The Mekama Line is completed end to end
1928Den-en-toshi Co., founded by Shibusawa Eiichi, is merged in
1932The Toyoko Line is completed end to end
1939Tokyo-Yokohama Electric Railway merged; trade name changed
1942Keihin Electric Railway and Odakyu merged; renamed Tokyo Kyuko Electric Railway
1944Keio Electric Tramway merged, completing Greater Tokyu
1948Keio, Odakyu and Keikyu regain their independence
1948Toyoko Department Store established
1949Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
1953Goto Keita publishes his blueprint for the Tama garden city
1953Tokyu Land Corporation established
Tokyu began in 1922 as a suburban electric railway on the south-western edge of Tokyo and, within two decades, had gathered most of Kanto's private lines under wartime control — only to be broken apart again six years later. By the year to March 1953 the surviving company was turning over $9.4M (¥3bn), rising to $11.9M (¥4bn) two years after that; what it kept through the dismantling — the Toyoko Line, the Mekama Line and the Shibuya terminus — mattered more to everything that followed than the years in which it had been the largest railway group in the country.
The Great Kanto Earthquake creates suburban demand, and Den-en-chofu is born
In the Kansai region Hankyu Railway had succeeded with a model in which the railway creates its own passengers, but in Kanto no operator had moved into suburban electric railways at all. In September 1922 Goto Keita (五島慶太) founded Meguro-Kamata Electric Railway with capital of ¥3.5 million and began building the line from Meguro through Den-en-chofu to Kamata. The Great Kanto Earthquake of September 1923 enlarged the demand to move from the city centre out to the suburbs, and schools and housing pushed into the area along the line one after another — Tokyo Higher Technical School, among others, relocated from Kuramae to Ookayama. In September 1925 Toyo Keizai judged that the line could absorb a fair share of passengers because its speed exceeded that of the government-run Tokaido Main Line and of Keihin Electric Railway, and the following year it recorded that operating results had improved from the second year of business (Shukan Toyo Keizai, 19 September 1925). The post-earthquake drift to the suburbs became the starting point of a long trend that ran on to the post-war Tama Den-en-toshi development.
In 1928 the company merged Den-en-toshi Co., which had been established by Shibusawa Eiichi (渋沢栄一), acquiring the high-end residential district of Den-en-chofu along with the know-how of property development. In 1932 the Toyoko Line (Shibuya–Yokohama–Sakuragicho) was completed end to end and, as the trunk route linking Tokyo and Yokohama, set the earnings base of Tokyu. In 1934 it merged Ikegami Electric Railway, completing a network that tied together Meguro, Shibuya, Kamata and Yokohama. At the start of the 1930s, with the Sakuragicho section still unbuilt, construction costs weighed heavily and there were observations that revenue per share stood at only half that of Keihin or Oji (Diamond, 1 January 1930); once through services to Sakuragicho opened, however, both passengers and revenue rose (Diamond, 10 November 1932). The basic form of the private-railway business model — lay the track, develop housing estates along it, and put a department store at the terminus — was in place by the first half of the 1930s. The decision to make Shibuya Station the terminus became the starting point of a line that runs, some ninety years later, to Shibuya Hikarie, Shibuya Stream and Shibuya Scramble Square.
Wartime consolidation swells the company into Greater Tokyu, and the post-war break-up
In May 1942, under wartime consolidation, the company merged Keihin Electric Railway (today's Keikyu) and Odakyu Electric Railway, changed its trade name to Tokyo Kyuko Electric Railway, and reached capital of ¥204.8 million. In 1944 it merged Keio Electric Tramway as well, and Greater Tokyu emerged — the largest private railway group in Japan, holding Kanto's principal private lines under one roof. In June 1948, after the war, corporate reorganisation restored Keio Teito Electric Railway, Odakyu Electric Railway and Keihin Kyuko Electric Railway to independence, and Greater Tokyu was dismantled after barely six years. Those were six exceptional years in which wartime controls bound together the private railways of the whole Kanto region, but they left behind, for later, a habit of thinking in terms of horizontal expansion in group management. What remained with Tokyu after the break-up was the network of south-western Tokyo built around the Toyoko and Mekama lines and the Shibuya terminus.
Tokyu started again holding the Toyoko and Mekama lines and the Shibuya terminus. In 1948 it established Toyoko Department Store (today's Tokyu Department Store), separating out the retail business, and in 1949 it listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In 1953 it established Tokyu Land Corporation, separating out property sales and the amusement-park business. The break-up of Greater Tokyu shrank the scale of the network, but the core assets — the Shibuya terminus and the Toyoko Line — stayed in hand and became the foundation for the later garden-city development and the redevelopment of Shibuya. A trinity of railways, property and department stores settled in through the reconstruction years as the skeleton of the Tokyu group. The founding of the core companies — Toyoko Department Store in 1948, Tokyu Land in 1953 — was concentrated in the post-war rebuilding period, and it assembled the prototypes of the entities that would later carry the Tama Den-en-toshi development and the Shibuya redevelopment. Whether or not it could keep the Shibuya terminus was, one might say, the watershed that determined the shape of the post-war business.
1956The Tama Den-en-toshi housing development, and rebuilding after the bubble
Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1957 · unconsolidated
Revenue$16M
Net income—
Net margin—
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FY2000 · consolidated
Revenue$9.2B
Net income$17M
Net margin0.2%
1962First Tama garden-city land readjustment completed (Nogawa district)
1966Den-en-toshi Line opens between Mizonokuchi and Nagatsuta
1968Goto Noboru's diversification begins in earnest (Tokyu Hotel Chain)
1969The Tamagawa Line (Shibuya–Futako-Tamagawa-en) is abolished
1977The Shin-Tamagawa Line (Shibuya–Futako-Tamagawa-en) opens
1979All trains run through between Den-en-toshi, Shin-Tamagawa and the Hanzomon Line
1984Den-en-toshi Line extended from Tsukimino to Chuo-Rinkan
1991The bus business is transferred to Tokyu Bus
1995An extraordinary loss of ¥42.9bn is booked as the bubble collapses
1996Tokyu Department Store returns to its core trade after failed financial engineering
2000The Mekama Line is split into the Meguro Line and the Tokyu Tamagawa Line
Over the four decades from the mid-1950s Tokyu bought the Tama Hills and turned them into a city, laying a railway into forest and open moor and recovering the investment by selling the land and the houses that grew up beside it. The confidence that model bred also carried the group into resorts, hotels and department stores; when land prices stopped rising the bill arrived as an extraordinary loss of $456.1M (¥43bn), and the second half of the 1990s was spent handing back what the bubble years had added.
Thirty years from Goto Keita's blueprint to the completion of the Den-en-toshi Line
In July 1953 Goto Keita chose the Tama Hills as the receptacle for the population flowing into the capital region and submitted a prospectus for the development of the south-west Josai district to the surrounding municipalities. Setting out his grounds for selecting undeveloped land, Goto wrote that if one drew a circle of roughly 40km radius centred on Tokyo Station it took in Chiba, Tsuchiura and Omiya to the east, Kawagoe, Hachioji and Sagamihara-machi to the north-west, and Fujisawa and Yokosuka to the south-west; and that the least developed part of that circle, still forest and open moor just as it was, was the belt running from Futako-Tamagawa along the Atsugi-Oyama highway to the Tsuruma, Zama and Ebina districts (Sangyo to Keizai, September 1953). He then made the scale of the plan explicit, saying that he therefore wished to buy up some four to five million tsubo of land along that highway and build a second Tokyo (Sangyo to Keizai, September 1953). In 1956 the south-west Tama River new city plan was adopted, designating the area within roughly one kilometre of the new line's stations as permitted for urbanisation.
On who should carry the work out, Goto said that Tokyo Kyuko Electric Railway was the most suitable body, though he also thought an independent, separate company would do; either way, he saw no method of drawing Tokyo's population out there other than having a single company buy up those four to five million tsubo, bring in roads, sewers, gas and electricity, provide the other public facilities besides, and sell the ground as finished residential land (Sangyo to Keizai, September 1953) — a judgement that under a land-readjustment cooperative the public facilities would be difficult to build. In August 1956 the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that satellite towns had to be developed in order to hold down the population inflow into the capital region, so the administration's own concerns and Goto's plan pointed in the same direction. The first land readjustment (the Nogawa district of Kawasaki) was begun in 1959, and readjustment work continued for about forty years thereafter, across 55 districts and 3,204 hectares, down to the Inukura district in 2000.
Goto died in 1959, but his successors in management took the plan on, opening the Den-en-toshi Line between Mizonokuchi and Nagatsuta in 1966. Goto Noboru (五島昇), then at the head of the company, said that as things stood every train run piled up losses, running to about $277,778 (¥100m) a month, and that he was perfectly well aware of it; but since it was Tokyu, a private enterprise, doing the work, it could hardly ignore the abacus — if it came off, there was money in the land, money in the houses and money in the trains, an irresistible prospect, though an enormous plan for all that (Jitsugyo no Sekai, December 1966). He was describing a business structure in which the railway alone would run at a loss and the land and the housing would recover it. In later years he still looked back on it as having been driven through on sheer obstinacy (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 March 1989). In 1977 the Shin-Tamagawa Line (Shibuya–Futako-Tamagawa-en) opened, and in 1979 through operation of all trains with the Teito Rapid Transit Authority's Hanzomon Line began. In 1984 the extension to Chuo-Rinkan completed the Den-en-toshi Line end to end, and about thirty years after Goto's blueprint the rail infrastructure stood ready.
The bubble bursts, a ¥42.9bn extraordinary loss, and the retreat from non-core businesses
In a 1986 morning edition of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Goto Noboru recalled the starting point of Tama Den-en-toshi: he had had no confidence whatever that a railway could be run profitably on its own, and had thought that if the company first bought two million tsubo of land along the route and developed the area, something might come of it; land-readjustment schemes were still beyond imagining at that stage, and the plan was a broad-brush one (Nihon Keizai Shimbun morning edition, 16 March 1986). Nikkei Business that year noted that the Tokyu group was the product of the Tama Den-en-toshi development, and that the rising population along the line had fed through into a steady increase in passengers (Nikkei Business, 23 June 1986). In 1989 Goto set out the background of the times: the project had drawn attention around the world as a miracle of the twentieth century, and land prices had risen with the Ikeda cabinet's income-doubling plan and the property boom (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 March 1989). It had also been, he said looking back, a high-risk business whose success would have been doubtful without Japan's miracle (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 March 1989).
The weakness of the resort and department-store businesses expanded during the bubble came to the surface, and an extraordinary loss of $456.1M (¥43bn) was booked in the year to March 1995. With the influence of the founding Goto family thinning, Tokyu turned to rebuilding. Under a policy of working through the non-core businesses, shrinking the portfolio that had swollen in the bubble years and concentrating selectively on railways, property and lifestyle services became the basic theme of management in the second half of the 1990s. Development at Tama Den-en-toshi had passed its peak in the 1970s and settled down, and with the Inukura district in 2000 the land-readjustment work reached its close as well. The next question was how to draw value out of the Shibuya terminus and the property on the city-centre side. It was the turning point from the post-war Tama Den-en-toshi model to a model of redeveloping a city-centre terminus, and a period in which a ceiling on earnings growth from the railway business alone came into view and the shift of weight towards property began in earnest.
In 2000 Shibuya Mark City opened and the redevelopment around Shibuya Station began. In 2001 the petroleum retailing business was wound up, and in 2002 Japan Air System — which descended from Toa Domestic Airlines — merged with the Japan Airlines group, taking Tokyu out of aviation. This was the period in which the policy hardened: clear out the non-core businesses and concentrate managerial resources on railways, property and lifestyle services. The basis of the property strategy also settled in the first half of the 2000s — the Shibuya area to be held, other areas to be run as an asset-turnover building business. The organisational and financial footing for liquidating the bubble-era diversification while preparing the redevelopment of the Shibuya terminus was put in place in those same years. Winding up the non-core businesses and concentrating investment on Shibuya became the financial precondition for the projects that followed from Shibuya Hikarie onwards.
2001Shibuya redevelopment in earnest, and the move to a holding-company structure
Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2001 · consolidated
Revenue$8.3B
Net income-$249M
Net margin-3%
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FY2019 · consolidated
Revenue$10.6B
Net income$530M
Net margin5%
2002Japan Air System merges with the Japan Airlines group
2003Den-en-toshi Line runs through to the Tobu Isesaki Line via the Hanzomon Line
2004Toyoko Line begins mutual through operation with the Minatomirai Line
2005Tokyu Department Store made a wholly owned subsidiary
2012Shibuya Hikarie completed on the former Tokyu Bunka Kaikan site
2013Toyoko Line's Shibuya Station goes underground; through service with the Fukutoshin Line
2013Tokyu Fudosan Holdings established by joint share transfer
2018Shibuya Stream completed on the old Toyoko Line surface track site
2019Trade name changed from Tokyo Kyuko Electric Railway to Tokyu Corporation
2019Railway and tramway business split off into Tokyu Railways
With the non-core businesses cleared away, Tokyu turned the same method inward on to a single point: sending its own tracks underground at Shibuya and converting the ground they had occupied into offices, from Shibuya Hikarie in 2012 through Shibuya Stream to Shibuya Scramble Square in 2019. In that same year it dropped 電鉄 — electric railway — from its trade name and split the railway out into a subsidiary, closing the century in which the track had sat at the centre of the company.
Redevelopment land created by relocating the tracks, and Shibuya Hikarie
In 2003 the Den-en-toshi Line began mutual through operation with the Tobu Isesaki Line via the Hanzomon Line, and in 2004 the Toyoko Line began through operation with the Minatomirai Line. At the same time the Toyoko Line's Yokohama–Sakuragicho section ceased operating, switched over to the connection into the Minatomirai district. In 2005 Tokyu Department Store was made a wholly owned subsidiary, a reorganisation of businesses within the group. Under a property strategy of holding the properties in the Shibuya area and running an asset-turnover building business in other areas, the two-tier structure of holding and turnover had settled by the middle of the 2000s. The mutual through-service network of the Toyoko and Den-en-toshi lines spread across the whole capital region, and the means to capture commuting demand along the lines at metropolitan scale was in place. The widening of through services raised Tokyu's standing as the core of a capital-region rail network running across Shibuya, and shaped the preconditions for the redevelopment of the Shibuya terminus that followed.
Shibuya Hikarie was completed in 2012. Built by redeveloping the site of the former Tokyu Bunka Kaikan, it was the first phase of a Shibuya redevelopment tied to putting the Toyoko Line's Shibuya Station underground. On the decision-making over the Shin-Tamagawa Line, Yamato Matsumi (山戸松身) recalled that while the necessity of the line was fully acknowledged, a heavy anguish gripped the company, which could not commit to it lightly given what was at stake for its future (Kotsu Koron, May 1978); he also recorded the grounds on which the through route had been chosen, namely that the Den-en-toshi Line's through path should not run via the old Oimachi Line but take a separate, shortest route (Kotsu Koron, May 1978). When the Toyoko Line's Shibuya Station went underground in March 2013 and mutual through operation began with the Fukutoshin Line, the Tobu Tojo Line and the Seibu lines, the site of the former surface station became fresh land for redevelopment.
In 2018 Shibuya Stream was completed at an investment of about $615.9M (¥68bn), and the Japanese arm of Google, among others, moved into the building raised on the site of the old Toyoko Line surface tracks. In 2019 phase I of Shibuya Scramble Square (the East Tower, investment about $456.8M (¥50bn)) opened. On the delay to the Shin-Tamagawa Line and the form it finally took, Yamato judged that precisely because the period of labour before its birth had been so long, the Shin-Tamagawa Line had come into the world in an ideal form (Kotsu Koron, May 1978), and he touched too on the worry about capacity limits had it been built as an extension of the Ginza Line. The method of converting land freed up by relocating the tracks into office buildings is a feature found in no other private railway, in that it turns rail assets — the stations and the track itself — towards property development. A connected run of redevelopment continued from Shibuya Hikarie through Shibuya Stream to phase I of Shibuya Scramble Square, expanding the floor area around the station and the stock of leasable offices.
Spinning off the railway under a holding company, and recasting group management
In September 2019 the trade name was changed from Tokyo Kyuko Electric Railway to Tokyu Corporation, and in October the railway and tramway business was transferred by corporate split to Tokyu Railways. The Tokyu parent moved to a holding company overseeing the group as a whole across railways, property, lifestyle services and hotels. The aim was to separate the risk and return of the railway business from the parent and to speed up decisions weighted towards capital efficiency, such as property development and M&A. In parallel, the overseas garden-city-style development under way in Binh Duong province in Vietnam (Becamex Tokyu) was also moving, an attempt to carry the domestic model of developing land along a railway abroad. The move to a holding company was an organisational restructuring that recast the structure of a Tokyu built around a railway company, which had held for about a hundred years since the founding of Meguro-Kamata Electric Railway in 1922, in a direction that put property and lifestyle services in the leading role.
In 2013 three companies — Tokyu Land, Tokyu Community and Tokyu Livable — had established Tokyu Fudosan Holdings through a joint share transfer, reorganising the group's property business under a holding-company structure first. Together with the holding-company conversion of the Tokyu parent, this completed an arrangement in which the three domains of railways, property and lifestyle services are each run independently under their own holding company. Through this two-stage holding-company conversion, the Tokyu group adopted a governance structure unusual among capital-region private railways, running the railway business and the property business on separate decision-making lines. The roughly six years from the founding of Tokyu Fudosan Holdings in 2013 to the holding-company conversion of the Tokyu parent in 2019 were the central period in which the group's management structure was recast. That an organisational reform to raise the speed of managerial decisions ran at the same time as the Shibuya redevelopment coming into full swing is the defining feature of the 2010s.
The turning points, read in full: what was at stake, what was chosen and what the revenue did around it. The Japanese edition is the edition of record and carries the sourced dossier behind each decision — background, options weighed, outcome — linked under every decision.
Key decision · 1922
Founding Meguro-Kamata Electric Railway and the model of running track and land together (1922)
The origin of the idea that a railway builds a town
What the founding of Meguro-Kamata Electric Railway produced was not a single suburban electric line but a form of management in which the railway and the land along it are run on one set of accounts. It did not count from the outset on breaking even on fares alone; it opened housing ground beside the line and turned the very movement of the people who lived there into revenue. This design, for which there was no precedent in Kanto, was set in motion by executive director Goto Keita on a particular piece of ground called Den-en-chofu. The origin of the notion that a railway company does not merely lay track but builds a town and makes its residents into passengers can be seen here.
That said, the reason this form began to turn was an unexpected tailwind: the migration to the suburbs caused by the Great Kanto Earthquake. Population flowed outwards and land prices rose, and the momentum of that era supported, from the land-and-housing side, an account that the railway alone could not have balanced. The unified form that Goto Keita laid down at Den-en-chofu was handed on to the Tama garden-city housing development carried out by his successors, and reaches as far as today's redevelopment of Shibuya. The question of how far the railway and the property can go on being run on one set of accounts still remains with a company that chose, from its founding, to move track and land as one.
The formation of Greater Tokyu under wartime transport consolidation, and its post-war dismantling (1942)
How consolidation and division drew the map of the capital-region private railways
That Tokyu, Odakyu, Keikyu and Keio today divide the private-railway map of the capital region between them as separate companies can be seen as the product of these six years of consolidation and of the dismantling that undid them. What gathered the four into one, and what separated them again, was less any management vision than the outside forces of war and occupation. President Goto's merger-driven management had prepared the ground on which Kanto's private railways could be bound together, but its culmination, Greater Tokyu, was not chosen as a peacetime business strategy; it appears rather to have been a provisional shape produced by wartime national policy.
What the dismantling left with Tokyu were the south-western Tokyo lines it had been working on before the expansion, and the Shibuya terminus. Ironically, it was precisely this shrunken compass that later became the stage on which resources were poured into the Tama garden-city development and the redevelopment of Shibuya. What it kept and restarted from appears to have governed the character of the later Tokyu far longer than the few years in which it was enormous. Between two external forces, consolidation and division, the parting of the ways for the post-war company lay in which assets Tokyu managed to take back into its own hands.
Building the Tama garden city, with railway and lineside development run as one (1966)
The high point, and the limit, of the development-profit-return model
The building of the Tama garden city can be seen as the decision that remade Tokyu, a railway company, into a developer that opens up whole areas along its lines. Accepting that the railway alone would run at a loss, it recovered the investment from the profit on selling land and housing, and the population that grew up there in turn steadied the railway's earnings. It is a case in which the cycle regarded as the ideal of private-railway management was carried through to the end on the vast practical ground of the Tama Hills. Even so, Goto Noboru himself looked back on the project in later years as having been driven through on sheer obstinacy (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 March 1989), and said too that it had been a high-risk business whose success would have been doubtful without Japan's miracle (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 16 March 1989). It is fair to say it was a wager that only stood up because of the tailwind of high growth and rising land prices.
This development-profit-return business model governed the character of Tokyu for a long time afterwards. Confidence in a structure that earned from land and housing encouraged expansion during the bubble years into non-core fields such as resorts and department stores; those turned towards liquidation after the extraordinary loss of ¥42.9bn in the year to March 1995, and the width of the swing in a management that leaned on development profits was exposed as well. Tokyu set up Tokyu Fudosan Holdings ahead of the rest in 2013 and in 2019 hived off the railway and tramway business as Tokyu Railways, converting the parent into a holding company overseeing property and lifestyle services. The structure of running railways and property on separate decision-making lines, unusual among capital-region private railways, can be seen as the consequence of the two wheels of railway and property established at the Tama garden city reaching, half a century on, into the shape of the organisation itself.
The end of personal rule by the Goto family, and the clearing-out of bubble-era non-core businesses (1995)
When the favoured land runs out
At the centre of this decision lay the question of how to move a management that had depended on the personal command of the founding Goto family, and on development profits premised on rising land prices, over to management by an organisation. The development profit from the Tama garden city had at once permitted a loose attitude towards profit and loss and an expansion into non-core businesses. The bursting of the bubble broke that premise, and the death of chairman Goto Noboru left a vacuum where the centre of gravity had been. The extraordinary loss of ¥42.9bn can be seen as a figure that forced both reckonings at once. That the non-core businesses were let go under the pressure of losses, rather than narrowed down voluntarily in good times, tells us something about the character of this clearing-out.
Even so, the clearing-out itself bought Tokyu time to defend. Lightened by letting the non-core go, Tokyu gathered its resources on to Shibuya, its own terminus, and gained the footing from which it advanced to the redevelopment from Shibuya Hikarie onwards in the 2010s and to the holding-company conversion of 2019. A structure in which an organisation, rather than the founding family's gravitational pull, carries the management runs on to today's arrangement of moving railways and property on separate decision-making lines. What does a company blessed with land and land prices fall back on to right itself when that blessing runs out? The 1990s, when the kingdom of the Goto family ended, appear to be the distant starting point of today's Tokyu management with its regard for capital efficiency.
Redeveloping the Shibuya terminus by concentrating investment on land freed up by putting the railway underground (2012)
The single point at which running track and land together came to fruition
This run of redevelopment can be seen as a decision that concentrated on to a single point in the city centre, Shibuya, the form Tokyu had pursued since the founding of Meguro-Kamata Electric Railway in 1922 — lay the track and earn from the land beside it. In the Tama Hills it ran a railway on to hills where there was as yet nothing, and recovered the investment by selling the residential ground that land readjustment produced. At Shibuya it does the reverse, sending underground a line that has already become an artery and turning the railway land freed up at the surface into property of its own, to be held for the long term. The shift from development that spreads outwards over an area to development that digs deep into prime central land can be seen there.
The method of turning former railway land into floor space that generates rent also chimes with a wider movement among private railways, which face inter-city competition and a plateau in the population along their lines and look for earnings outside the railway. The concentration of investment on Shibuya matched the organisational rebuilding of 2019, when the railway and tramway business was hived off as Tokyu Railways and the parent recast as a holding company for property and lifestyle services. That said, the value of the floor space it holds depends on the demand of the companies that occupy it, and it is not free of the questions raised by the spread of working from home and by office vacancy. What the once-in-a-century rebuilding of Shibuya leaves behind appears to be something that will be measured in how it is used over the next decade.
Renaming to Tokyu and splitting the railway business into Tokyu Railways under a holding company (2019)
Unwinding, by its own hand, the vertical integration held since Greater Tokyu
At the centre of this decision is that Tokyu itself unwound the vertical integration it had held since 1922 — developing the land along a railway and supporting the railway with the profit from it. The unified management of railway and property, held up as the ideal at the Tama garden city, produced a cycle in which the population that grew up along the line enriched the railway; it was also a structure that kept a railway carrying a heavy and long-lasting capital burden at the centre of the parent company. The holding-company conversion can be seen as an organisational shift that took that railway out of the parent and put development and asset management in the leading role instead. A company that let go of the wartime consolidation's Greater Tokyu after the war has now, by its own hand, separated the railway and moved it to an operating subsidiary beneath a holding company.
There appears to be a symbolic meaning in dropping the two characters for electric railway from the company name. The railway remains the foundation of the Tokyu group to this day, but it has withdrawn from the centre of decision-making. In the history of capital-region private railways growing as one with the land along their lines, a structure that places the railway in a subsidiary and puts property and asset management in the parent is still a minority position. What does it mean for a railway company to become a holding company? That question is left to the balance of power within this group between railways and property, and which of them leads its growth. The answer appears to be something that Tokyu's capital allocation from here on will show.
This English edition follows the Japanese one chapter by chapter. The Japanese edition remains the edition of record: it carries the source-by-source citations, the financial tables and the shareholder and executive records. 日本語版(詳細)— Tokyu full history in Japanese →
Tokyu Corporation — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports), including the 沿革 corporate-history section.
Shukan Toyo Keizai — 週刊東洋経済 (Toyo Keizai Inc.): 19 September 1925, on the new line's speed against the Tokaido Main Line and Keihin Electric Railway.
Diamond — ダイヤモンド (Diamond, Inc.): 1 January 1930, on the burden of construction costs with the Sakuragicho section unbuilt; 10 November 1932, on the rise in passengers and revenue after through services opened.
産業と経済 (Sangyo to Keizai), September 1953 — Goto Keita's 城西南地区開発趣意書, the prospectus for the development of the south-west Josai district.
Yomiuri Shimbun — 読売新聞, 16 August 1956, 首都圏の構想きまる (The capital-region plan is settled).
実業の世界 (Jitsugyo no Sekai), December 1966 — 都市開発にかける五島昇 (Goto Noboru stakes himself on urban development).
交通公論 (Kotsu Koron), May 1978 — 新玉川線20年 (Twenty years of the Shin-Tamagawa Line), by Yamato Matsumi (山戸松身).
Nihon Keizai Shimbun — 日本経済新聞 (Nikkei Inc.): morning edition of 16 March 1986; 14 and 16 March 1989, Goto Noboru on the Tama garden city.
Nikkei Business — 日経ビジネス (Nikkei BP), 23 June 1986, 堅実に走る実業家たち (Businessmen who run a steady course).