Buying Westinghouse to build the world’s largest nuclear business (2006)
What the bet on being number one left behind
At the heart of this decision was the choice to bet Toshiba’s growth on the global boom in new nuclear construction, reaching beyond a maturing domestic market. Taking in a pressurized-water maker from outside, holding both reactor types, and vaulting to number one in the world — the vision itself was in step with the “nuclear renaissance” then in vogue. But how far Toshiba had seen through the acquisition price, swollen by the bidding war, and the risks inherent in nuclear power as an ultra-long-term, capital-intensive business, is open to question. That it paid a consideration above the going rate at a moment that looked like an opportunity is where the danger of this investment shows.
The outcome of the acquisition left the question of how far a single company’s judgement can withstand an upheaval in its external environment. Onto the shock of the Fukushima accident, which no one could have priced in, was laid a flaw specific to the business — ballooning construction costs in the United States — and the nuclear power Toshiba had counted on as its pillar of growth turned into its heaviest burden. Toshiba’s dismantling, from letting go of its breadwinner memory business to its exit from the stock market, can be traced back to this acquisition. The question is not whether concentration or dispersion is the right answer, but the weight of resting a company’s fate on a bet too large to walk back from — and that is what this decision asks of us today.
Revenue and net margin, FY2001–FY2011
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY2006 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Toshiba
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
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