Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1996 · consolidated
Revenue$11.3B
Net income$183M
Net margin1.6%
→
FY2026 · consolidated
Revenue$2.5B
Net income-$52M
Net margin-2%
The Shinjuku store opened in October 1996 — forty years after the first defeat, five after the announcement — and missed. Fiscal 1998 sales were $574.5M (¥75bn), less than half the $1.2B (¥160bn) originally projected; president Tanaka Tatsuro said he wanted at least ¥90 billion and conceded that the thirteen-year payback would slip. The ground was leased, and rent of roughly $64.4M (¥7bn) a year stayed on the books long after. The same years brought a scandal over payments to sokaiya racketeers, settled in April 1997 when nine current and former directors jointly paid $1.4M (¥170m) and the company agreed to open its shareholder meetings to the press.
In Nagoya the company tried the opposite structure. When JR Central built its twin towers over Nagoya Station, Takashimaya took an equity stake in the operating company — named JR Nagoya Takashimaya by July 1997 — and licensed its name, rather than building and leasing on its own account. There was internal caution about depending on a partner, but the group had no store in the Chukyo region at all. Opened in March 2000, it drew 38.4 million visitors in its first year against Shinjuku’s 33 million, took $564.3M (¥61bn) against a ¥50 billion target, and returned an ordinary profit of $7.1M (¥770m) where a loss had been budgeted; accumulated losses, planned to clear in twenty years, were gone in four. Freed from the pressure to fill a building it owned, the team had spent three years on the floors themselves — Rose Patio rest areas on prime central space on every level, ceilings 20cm higher than standard — and overturned the industry’s belief that a station-top store could not work.
Overseas Takashimaya kept going in alongside its property arm: Singapore (company 1989, store 1993), Shanghai (2009 / 2012), Ho Chi Minh City (2013 / 2016), Bangkok (2015 / 2018). At home it spun regional stores back out again — Yonago in 2003, Okayama, Gifu and Takasaki in 2004 — and sold Yonago outright in 2020. A 2008 agreement to merge with H2O Retailing, owner of Hankyu and Hanshin, would have created the industry’s largest operating profit and was billed as an alliance of two strong operators rather than a rescue; it was abandoned in April 2010, Suzuki Koji explaining that the more the two sides discussed merchandising, stores, personnel and systems, the more their thinking diverged. Then the pandemic: in the year to February 2021 the group posted a net loss of ¥34.0 billion, department stores losing ¥21.3 billion at the operating line while shopping-centre development still earned ¥5.8 billion — the clearest possible statement of where the group’s profit actually came from. Operating profit recovered to ¥57.5 billion by February 2025, but the direction had changed: the department-store floors at Tachikawa closed in January 2023 and Gifu in July 2024, while the April 2024 medium-term plan adopted ROIC as the measure of every business and pushed capital toward property and finance — some $99M (¥15bn) into residential lots in Haiphong, Vietnam, on the view, as president Murata Yoshio put it, that Japan and ASEAN are “a single trading area.”