Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2002 · consolidated
Revenue$4.9B
Net income$100M
Net margin2%
→
FY2008 · consolidated
Revenue$7.6B
Net income$134M
Net margin1.8%
The expansion had to be financed with debt. The property company Shuwa had accumulated roughly 28% of Isetan’s shares by 1993, which under securities-industry rules barred the company from raising equity; interest-bearing debt went from ¥48.3bn at March 1990 to ¥118.3bn at March 1993, with ¥7.5bn of interest in that year alone. Mitsubishi Bank declined to support a share buy-back while the price was held artificially high, and turned cool on a planned 100,000 m² store in Yokohama. In January 1993 news that Ito-Yokado was in talks for Shuwa’s stake knocked ¥150 off the share price in a day. That March the company reported sales of $4.0B (¥443bn), down 5.4%, with recurring profit down 64%. In May the founding family’s Kosuge Kuniyasu resigned to become honorary chairman — a post that did not exist in the articles of association — and Koshiba Kazumasa, a merchandising man, took over.
Koshiba’s answer was to go back to being a retailer. In July 1993 he told his executives that Isetan would expand outright buying, carry its own inventory risk and differentiate on that basis; his first act as president was to tour the parties to the abandoned Odaiba project and apologize. Then came the rebuilding of the selling floor itself. At the loss-making Kichijoji store, a credit-division manager sent in as store head in 1994 abandoned the “town for young people” premise, lifted the share of clothing sales taken by customers over 45 from about 25% to 32–33% in a year, and returned the store to profit by March 1996. The same people brought the method to Shinjuku in 1996 as the okaiba revolution — stop calling it a place where staff sell and make it a place where customers buy — and used i-card purchase data to re-sequence the entire store. When Takashimaya opened a rival flagship in Shinjuku that October, Isetan’s sales rose 9.6% year on year.
Barneys, meanwhile, filed for Chapter 11 in January 1996 and sued; Isetan counter-sued and won an order for $197m in 1997, but wrote off ¥34.3bn in the year to March 1996 — its first loss since listing in 1961 — and ¥47.4bn across two years. The lesson entered the language of the company: asked in 1998 whether he would write a house rule, Koshiba said it would be “don’t touch anything outside the core business.” In 1999 Isetan stopped trying to make its branches into miniature Shinjukus and gave them the different job of being the best all-round store in their own district. In September 2003 it rebuilt the 1968 annex as the Men’s Building without adding a square metre, tearing out the brand-by-brand partitions and taking editorial control of the floor back from the suppliers; two years later 53% of visitors were men and sales reached $372.2M (¥41bn). The last moves were consolidating ones — Iwataya taken over by tender offer in 2005, a ten-year, ¥200bn investment vision in 2006 — and then, in August 2007, agreement to merge with Mitsukoshi. Isetan was delisted on 1 April 2008 into Isetan Mitsukoshi Holdings, and the operating company itself disappeared into Isetan Mitsukoshi Ltd. in April 2011.