Mitsukoshi

Company history

Financial history 1976–2008 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1673
Head office
Nihonbashi, Edo (Tokyo)
Listed
1949
Founder
Mitsui Takatoshi
Revenue · FYE Mar 2008
$7.5B (¥774bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2008
$42.6M (¥4bn)
Mitsukoshi: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1673Echigoya: cash, and no haggling

  1. 1673Mitsui Takatoshi opens the Echigoya drapery in Edo
  2. 1683Moves to Surugacho: cash payment, one price for everyone
  3. 1871Mitsui named sole agent for the new currency — on condition it leave drapery
  4. 1872The drapery is separated; three Mitsui branches take the name Mitsukoshi

Mitsukoshi begins in 1673, when Mitsui Takatoshi opened a drapery called Echigoya in Honcho 1-chome, the busiest merchant street in Edo, in a rented shopfront one and a half ken wide. The name looked back to the family’s samurai past: an ancestor had served the Rokkaku Sasaki house, and after Oda Nobunaga destroyed it, Mitsui Echigo-no-kami Takayasu withdrew to Ise, where his son gave up the sword for trade. The shop was run by the Mitsui family and kept selling cloth on the same ground for the whole of the Edo period — as did the other future department stores, all of them Edo-era drapers: Ito Gofukuten from 1611, Daimaru from 1717, Takashimaya from 1831.

Fire pushed the store one block south to Surugacho in 1683, and Takatoshi used the move to announce a new way of selling: 現銀掛値なし — cash on the counter, and one price for everyone. The second half meant no sizing up the customer and no haggling; the first meant abandoning the custom of settling accounts twice a year and taking money at the point of sale. Together they brought in the passing trade and paid the shop in cash. Echigoya became the largest store in Edo, taking as much as 1,000 ryo in a day — the city ranked it with its other thousand-ryo trades, the theatres and the fish market.

At Surugacho the house also began money-changing, which is why both Mitsukoshi and the Mitsui bank date themselves from the same address; through the later Edo period drapery and exchange ran as the two wheels of what became the country’s largest enterprise. The split came under the new government. In June 1871 the Mitsui exchange house was named sole agent for converting the new currency — on condition that it abandon drapery and confine itself to banking. Rather than kill the founding business, the chief clerk Minomura Rizaemon accepted the condition and worked around it: three branches of the Mitsui family took the surname Mitsukoshi — from Mitsui and Echigoya — and took the cloth business with them when it was separated from the house in March 1872.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1873From drapery to department store

  1. 1895Japan’s first display selling of kimono cloth
  2. 1896Renamed Mitsukoshi Gofukuten
  3. 1900Seated selling abolished across the whole store
  4. 1904Incorporated with ¥500,000 capital; the “Department Store Declaration”
  5. 1914Renaissance-style flagship; food and horticulture complete the format
  6. 1923The Great Kanto Earthquake destroys the flagship

For thirty years the shop had no settled home. In 1893 Mitsui reorganized its bank, trading, mining and drapery arms as unlimited partnerships; in August 1895 the drapery was folded back into the Mitsui main house in its old form. Three changes of shape in under three decades. What the partnership years did bring was Western practice — Mitsui Gofukuten was among the first Japanese firms to hire women as shop staff, and an early user of motor trucks for deliveries.

The change that mattered was on the selling floor. In November 1895 the upper storey of the main store was rebuilt as a display floor — the first display selling of kimono cloth in Japan; the shop was renamed Mitsukoshi Gofukuten in 1896; and in October 1900 the entire building became display floor and seated selling was abolished. The old method sat one clerk in front of one customer to unroll bolts of cloth; the new one let customers walk the floor and choose. The reason was arithmetic rather than fashion: seated selling could not scale to an unknown crowd, and it broke down the moment the shop carried more kinds of goods. Nothing else could be added until it went.

In December 1904 the business was incorporated as Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsukoshi Gofukuten with ¥500,000 of capital, and in the same month issued its “Department Store Declaration” — a public confirmation of a change already finished rather than the start of one. The goods took another decade to arrive: food and horticulture departments only opened with the Renaissance-style five-storey flagship of September 1914, which the newspapers called the greatest building east of Suez. The 1920s brought the everyday-goods hall, Mitsukoshi Market, Japan’s first escalator, and the slogan “the Imperial Theatre today, Mitsukoshi tomorrow.” Then, in September 1923, the Great Kanto Earthquake burned the flagship down: losses of ¥7.375m forced capital back to ¥7m, and the emergency barrack markets put up around the city became, in time, the Ginza and Shinjuku stores.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1924A national chain, the war, and the loss of first place

  1. 1928Renamed Mitsukoshi Ltd.; Kobe store opens
  2. 1930Ginza and Shinjuku — six branches opened in six years
  3. 1937Department Store Law; wartime requisition of 80% of the floor
  4. 1949Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange at its opening
  5. 195413% of all Japanese department store sales
  6. 1971Paris Mitsukoshi, the first store overseas
  7. 1972Daiei overtakes Mitsukoshi as Japan’s largest retailer

Rebuilding turned into expansion. Capital went back up to ¥15m in October 1924, the temporary markets were converted into permanent branches, and the restored flagship reopened in April 1927 with the Mitsukoshi Hall. In June 1928 the company dropped gofukuten from its name to become simply Mitsukoshi Ltd. — twenty-four years after declaring itself a department store — and opened Kobe. Ginza and Shinjuku followed in 1930, Takamatsu in 1931, Sapporo in 1932, Sendai in 1933: six branches in six years, carrying the name across the country. Capital reached ¥30m in 1931 and the shares were listed on the Tokyo exchange; from 1932 the Mitsukoshimae subway station fed straight into the basement floor.

The Department Store Law of 1937 and the war then stopped the method entirely. The law restricted new stores and extensions — growth by opening branches was exactly what Mitsukoshi did — while rationing narrowed what could be sold, power cuts halted the escalators, and the escalators themselves were surrendered as scrap steel. At its worst, 80% of the selling floor was requisitioned. Ginza, Takamatsu and Sendai burned in air raids; Osaka and Sapporo were requisitioned at the surrender; the Keijo and Dairen branches were lost outright. The network built before the war was precisely what the war took.

Recovery was quick and then enormous. Mitsukoshi listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in May 1949, the day it opened, had the whole flagship back in use by 1951, and in 1954 sold $68.9M (¥25bn)over 13% of every yen spent in a Japanese department store, from 11% of the floor space, plus nearly 30% of all gift certificates. Sales tripled and profits quintupled over the following decade, reaching $259.7M (¥94bn) in FY1966; by 1968 the company had 10,500 employees and 170,000 square metres of floor. Ikebukuro opened in 1957, Hirakata in 1968, and Paris — the first store abroad — in 1971. But the growth in retailing had moved to the supermarkets: in 1972 Daiei, fifteen years after its founding, passed Mitsukoshi with $990.9M (¥305bn) against $949.4M (¥292bn) and took first place in Japanese retailing away for good.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1973Long reigns, and the money that went into land

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1976 · unconsolidated
Revenue$1.4B
Net income$28M
Net margin2%
FY1985 · unconsolidated
Revenue$2.3B
Net income$1M
Net margin0.1%
  1. 1973Hiroshima and Yokohama stores; joins the Mitsui presidents’ club
  2. 1979FTC order over forcing goods onto suppliers
  3. 1982President Okada Shigeru dismissed and arrested
  4. 1986Sakakura Yoshiaki returns as president; the “expanded department store”
  5. 1988Golf-course development begins — $452.7M (¥58bn) on land alone
  6. 1997¥44.6bn special loss; Fukuoka Mitsukoshi opens on ¥60bn

Hiroshima and Yokohama opened in 1973, the year Mitsukoshi formally joined the Mitsui presidents’ club. Okada Shigeru, president from 1972 to 1982, came from the advertising side and grew the company on exhibitions and events that the press could not ignore — but he was extremely cautious about spending on the stores themselves and left the merchandising alone, riding a network that was already built. In 1979 the Fair Trade Commission ordered him to stop forcing goods onto suppliers, and in FY1982 writing off dead stock produced a ¥5.1bn loss. Behind it, the department store share of Japanese retail sales was falling from 11.0% in 1974 to 7.6% in 1985.

In 1982 Okada was dismissed and arrested over irregular accounting and kickbacks on supplier goods; his one-line response on being told — “Why?” — is still quoted in Japan. The conditions that produced a ten-year reign were structural: directors had no fixed terms and no retirement age, and approval documents circulated with the chairman’s and president’s seals already on them, inverting the bottom-up consensus process that the same paperwork is supposed to serve. Only five men held the presidency in the fifty postwar years. The same mechanism would surface again fifteen years later.

Sakakura Yoshiaki — driven out by Okada, then president of Seibu Department Stores — returned to run Mitsukoshi from 1986 to 1995 and stayed as chairman to 1997. His programme, the “expanded department store”, took the company into hotels, sports, imported cars, overseas stores and golf-course development, in step with the late-1980s fashion for the “comprehensive lifestyle industry.” The premise was sound — Nihonbashi alone was still producing over 40% of sales and some 75% of profit, while the institutional selling behind it and the ageing charge-account clientele were both thinning. The answer was not: golf-course development from 1988 consumed $452.7M (¥58bn) in land alone, lent through subsidiaries so that the counterparty stayed hidden — from the union until the end of September 1997, and from the previous president, by his own account, for the whole ten years. On 3 October 1997 Mitsukoshi booked a ¥44.6bn special loss and guided to a ¥32bn net loss.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1998The blank decade, and merging to keep the name

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2004 · consolidated
Revenue$4.4B
Net income$62M
Net margin1.4%
FY2008 · consolidated
Revenue$7.5B
Net income$43M
Net margin0.6%
  1. 1999¥26bn net loss; first dividend passed since listing
  2. 2003New-formation merger with four regional Mitsukoshi companies
  3. 2005Four stores closed on one day; Ishizuka Kunio becomes president
  4. 2007Integration with Isetan announced
  5. 2008Isetan Mitsukoshi Holdings; a 58-year listing ends

The losses kept coming. In the year to February 1999 a further ¥36.4bn was provided against subsidiary deficits, producing a ¥26bn net loss; two years of parent-company losses totalled ¥59.3bn and Mitsukoshi passed its dividend for the first time since listing, with eight consecutive years of consolidated net losses and equity below 3% of assets. President Inoue Kazuo, announcing 600 job cuts in February 1999 — 1,150 people eventually took voluntary retirement — said the damage was worse than the 1982 affair. The underlying arithmetic was worse still: corporate sales backed by the Mitsui group were shrinking structurally, the 御帳場 charge-account customers who defined the house were ageing, and part-timers made up about 15% of staff against more than 40% at Isetan and Takashimaya.

On 1 September 2003 Mitsukoshi and its Nagoya, Chiba, Fukuoka and Kagoshima affiliates were all dissolved into a newly created company of the same name. The form was chosen for what it did to the balance sheet: a new-formation merger allowed the assets to be revalued at market, and the revaluation gains erased ¥13.3bn of consolidated deficit along with the accumulated losses inside the subsidiaries — the ticker moved out of the 8000s as a side effect. It drew objections from Mitsukoshi’s own retirees: these were unrealized gains the previous generations had built up little by little, one said, and spending them this casually was too easy. In May 2005 four stores — Yokohama, Osaka, Hirakata and Kurashiki — closed on a single day, and 1,000 people applied within a fortnight for 800 early-retirement places. Ishizuka Kunio, president from that year, stopped the seasonal sales and pushed own-buy, self-edited floors to lift the gross margin.

It worked in reverse: nothing replaced the volume the sales had carried, and the regulars drifted away. First-quarter profit in 2007 fell 60% year on year and operating profit dropped below half of Isetan’s or Daimaru’s; on 23 August Ishizuka said plainly that two years of reform had not produced results for the company as a whole, and that the speed was not a passing grade. The reasons to stop trying alone then converged. A six-year plan built around a new Osaka store at Umeda needed $1.5B (¥180bn) of investment against roughly $849.1M (¥100bn) of cash flow; the share price stayed low over ¥100bn of unrealized property gains, which kept the takeover rumours alive. Japanese department stores take 80% of their goods on consignment and are run store by store, so scale buys less than it looks — but integration with Isetan, raised in August 2007, created the country’s largest department store group at over $12.7B (¥1.5tn) in sales. Shareholders approved it in November, Isetan Mitsukoshi Holdings was established on 1 April 2008, and Mitsukoshi ended 58 years of listing; the two stores’ companies merged in April 2011.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1904

Abolishing seated selling for display floors, and declaring a department store (1904)

The declaration was a conclusion the selling floor had already reached

By October 1900, when the whole of the main store had been turned into display floor and seated selling abolished, Mitsukoshi was already a shop capable of laying out goods other than kimono cloth. The Department Store Declaration came four years later, in December 1904 — the month the joint-stock Mitsukoshi Gofukuten was founded. The declaration did not summon a new format into being; nine years of rebuilding the selling floor, begun when display selling was first adopted, had already produced the condition in which such a declaration could be made. That Hibi Osuke chose the month the company changed its legal form to say so publicly suggests he judged the remaking of the way goods were sold to be essentially complete.

Even so, it took another ten years for the goods to catch up. Mitsukoshi said it would add lines beyond cloth, but the building that housed the food and horticulture departments was not finished until September 1914 — a long distance between the statement of intent and the actual floor. Nor did the head start hold. By the early Taisho years every department store had put the same format in place. The road from drapery to department store was common to all of them; what Mitsukoshi held was not a direction but a lead of a few years.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1988

The “expanded department store”, and a golf-course venture that spent ¥58bn on land alone (1988)

The right question, answered with land, for ten years

For a company drawing 75% of its profit from a single store, wanting a source of earnings outside that store was in itself the right problem to set. When Sakakura Yoshiaki raised the “expanded department store” in the late 1980s — when the “comprehensive lifestyle industry” was in fashion and rivals were extending around their core — he was choosing what the rest of the industry chose. The miscalculation lay less in optimistic forecasts than in the form of the answer. Hotels, sports facilities and golf courses were all businesses of acquiring land and putting up buildings: investment that never came back to the substance of a department store, its assortment and its service.

That said, ¥58bn of losses alone did not sink Mitsukoshi. The ¥36.4bn special loss in the year to February 1999 was a provision against accumulated subsidiary deficits, and a part-time ratio of about 15% against more than 40% at Isetan and Takashimaya was a weight that had piled up with no connection to golf courses at all. In a company where an investment can run for ten years without the previous chairman knowing of it, nobody’s choice is ever checked. The core of the failure lies less in the decision to diversify than in the absence of any mechanism that could stop it.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2004

Closing four stores at once, early retirement, and clearing the consolidated deficit by new-formation merger (2004)

The nine years at Kitahama

Closing the Osaka store was the settling of an account left open in November 1996, when Mitsukoshi failed to take Umeda. Beaten by Yodobashi Camera with a bid below even the second-placed Parco, it chose instead to refit its Kitahama store and hold on to its regular customers, and went on accumulating losses away from the flow of people. That it finally folded a store with 315 years behind it suggests the judgement it had deferred, once the chance to retake the location was gone, could not be deferred any further. The ¥4bn a year the four stores were losing includes what that deferral cost.

Yet it is hard to say the company came out of the clean-up any lighter. Even after erasing ¥13.3bn of consolidated deficit with unrealized gains and cutting four stores and a thousand people, consolidated operating profit stood at roughly half of Takashimaya’s. Having spent its hidden assets first, Mitsukoshi was also left in a position where ¥100bn of unrealized land value had it named as a takeover target. Settling the past and rebuilding the core business were separate pieces of work. Two years later it gave up on reforming alone and turned to integration with Isetan.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Mitsukoshi full history in Japanese →

  1. Mitsukoshi Ltd. and Isetan Mitsukoshi Holdings — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports), including the corporate chronology.
  2. My Showa History of Mitsui『私の三井昭和史』, Edo Hideo, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1986 (chapters “The history of the Mitsui zaibatsu”, “Two great chief clerks”, “Reorganizing for liberalization”).
  3. Eighty Years of Companies and Banks『会社銀行八十年史』, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, part 2, Japanese company histories, 47 department stores (“Mitsukoshi”, “Overview”).
  4. A History of Enterprise: One Hundred Years of Meiji『企業の歴史:明治百年』, Keizai Shunjusha, 1968, part 3, “Mitsukoshi”.
  5. An Industrial History of Japan『日本産業史』, Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha, 1994: vol. 1 (“The formation of the zaibatsu”, “Land transport”), vol. 3 (“Distribution — the rise of the general supermarket”, “The rise of the convenience store”), vol. 4 (“Taking on creative innovation”).
  6. Shukan Toyo Keizai — 週刊東洋経済: 29 Nov 1997 (“The limits of running on a good name — no sense of crisis even after a ¥44.6bn special loss”); 27 Mar 1999 (“The false image of an old name”); 12 Jan 2002 (“A risky bet on a new Osaka store, halfway through restructuring”); 5 Jun 2004 (“Department stores on the offensive — Osaka”); 16 Jul 2005 (“Four closures, a thousand jobs, and a long absence of strategy”); 11 Aug 2007 (“Mitsukoshi and Isetan — no visible end to the integration talks”); 8 Sep 2007 (“A last-resort integration, and Mitsukoshi’s blank decade”); 12 Apr 2008 (“Isetan Mitsukoshi Holdings is born”).

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


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Data API

Mitsukoshi’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/8231/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/8231/history.json History overview
GET /api/8231/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/8231/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/8231/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/8231/executives.json Executives
GET /api/8231/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/8231/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/8231/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/8231/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/8231/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/8231/workforce.json Workforce