Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2004 · consolidated
Revenue$4.4B
Net income$62M
Net margin1.4%
→
FY2008 · consolidated
Revenue$7.5B
Net income$43M
Net margin0.6%
The losses kept coming. In the year to February 1999 a further ¥36.4bn was provided against subsidiary deficits, producing a ¥26bn net loss; two years of parent-company losses totalled ¥59.3bn and Mitsukoshi passed its dividend for the first time since listing, with eight consecutive years of consolidated net losses and equity below 3% of assets. President Inoue Kazuo, announcing 600 job cuts in February 1999 — 1,150 people eventually took voluntary retirement — said the damage was worse than the 1982 affair. The underlying arithmetic was worse still: corporate sales backed by the Mitsui group were shrinking structurally, the 御帳場 charge-account customers who defined the house were ageing, and part-timers made up about 15% of staff against more than 40% at Isetan and Takashimaya.
On 1 September 2003 Mitsukoshi and its Nagoya, Chiba, Fukuoka and Kagoshima affiliates were all dissolved into a newly created company of the same name. The form was chosen for what it did to the balance sheet: a new-formation merger allowed the assets to be revalued at market, and the revaluation gains erased ¥13.3bn of consolidated deficit along with the accumulated losses inside the subsidiaries — the ticker moved out of the 8000s as a side effect. It drew objections from Mitsukoshi’s own retirees: these were unrealized gains the previous generations had built up little by little, one said, and spending them this casually was too easy. In May 2005 four stores — Yokohama, Osaka, Hirakata and Kurashiki — closed on a single day, and 1,000 people applied within a fortnight for 800 early-retirement places. Ishizuka Kunio, president from that year, stopped the seasonal sales and pushed own-buy, self-edited floors to lift the gross margin.
It worked in reverse: nothing replaced the volume the sales had carried, and the regulars drifted away. First-quarter profit in 2007 fell 60% year on year and operating profit dropped below half of Isetan’s or Daimaru’s; on 23 August Ishizuka said plainly that two years of reform had not produced results for the company as a whole, and that the speed was not a passing grade. The reasons to stop trying alone then converged. A six-year plan built around a new Osaka store at Umeda needed $1.5B (¥180bn) of investment against roughly $849.1M (¥100bn) of cash flow; the share price stayed low over ¥100bn of unrealized property gains, which kept the takeover rumours alive. Japanese department stores take 80% of their goods on consignment and are run store by store, so scale buys less than it looks — but integration with Isetan, raised in August 2007, created the country’s largest department store group at over $12.7B (¥1.5tn) in sales. Shareholders approved it in November, Isetan Mitsukoshi Holdings was established on 1 April 2008, and Mitsukoshi ended 58 years of listing; the two stores’ companies merged in April 2011.