Nintendo — Company History

Financial history 1959–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1889
Head office
Kyoto, Japan
Listed
1962 · TYO: 7974
Founder
Yamauchi Fusajiro
Former names
Marufuku (1947–49) · Marufuku Karuta Hanbai (1949–50) · Nintendo Karuta (1950–51) · Nintendo Kotai 任天堂骨牌 (1951–63)
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$14.6B (¥2.31tn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$2.7B (¥424bn)
Nintendo: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1889From hanafuda maker to a postwar monopoly in playing cards

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1959 · unconsolidated
Revenue$881K
Net income$64K
Net margin7.3%
FY1965 · unconsolidated
Revenue$4M
Net income$336K
Net margin8.6%
  1. 1889Yamauchi Fusajiro begins making hanafuda cards in Kyoto
  2. 1933Yamauchi Sekiryo founds Yamauchi Nintendo & Co. as second-generation head
  3. 1947Marufuku Co. established, starting the postwar reorganisation
  4. 1949Yamauchi Hiroshi becomes president at twenty-two
  5. 1951Renamed Nintendo Kotai Co.
  6. 1953Mass production of Japan's first plastic playing cards
  7. 1957Bulk exports to South America begin
  8. 1959Exclusive domestic rights to Disney character cards; hanafuda manufacture mechanised
  9. 1960Entry into taxis and food; television commercials begin
  10. 1962Listed on the second section of the Osaka Stock Exchange
  11. 1963Renamed Nintendo Co.; domestic card share reaches about 80 per cent
  12. 1965Revenue and profit both fall as card sales stagnate

Nintendo spent its first six decades as a Kyoto card workshop, selling hanafuda and then Western playing cards through distribution borrowed from a tobacco house while the work itself stayed handmade. The twenty-two-year-old who inherited it in 1949 mechanised that craft and took roughly 80 per cent of the domestic market — and then discovered that the market itself had a ceiling.

The obsession with breaking out of a family workshop, inherited at twenty-two

In September 1889 Yamauchi Fusajiro (山内房治郎) began manufacturing hanafuda — Japanese flower playing cards — in Shimogyo-ku, Kyoto. The Yamauchi family were merchants who ran Haiko Honten (灰孝本店), a cement dealership, and the cards started as a sideline. The manufacture and sale of hanafuda had been licensed only in 1886, and demand for gaming implements that had lived in the shadow of gambling was just coming into the open. With the help of an old acquaintance, the tobacco king Murai Kichibei (村井吉兵衛), Fusajiro put his cards on the nationwide tobacco distribution routes of Murai Brothers & Co., widening his outlets at a stroke. In the last years of Meiji he also took up the manufacture of Western-style playing cards, and before the war those products spread widely both inside and outside Japan. In 1933 the adopted son-in-law Yamauchi Sekiryo (山内積良) founded Yamauchi Nintendo & Co. and succeeded as the second-generation head, and in November 1947 Marufuku Co. was established, beginning the postwar reorganisation into joint-stock form. Making cards remained handwork that never really left the craft stage, and Kyoto was well suited to that hand manufacture.

In 1949 the second-generation president Yamauchi Sekiryo died suddenly at sixty-six. His grandson Yamauchi Hiroshi (山内溥) took over as president at twenty-two, while still a student at Waseda University, and joined Nintendo in December of that year. Yamauchi later recalled his state of mind on inheriting the company at that age: I was seized with a formless rage. (Nintendo Shoho no Himitsu 任天堂商法の秘密, 1986). On taking office he began by tidying up the corporate form: in September 1949 the company was renamed Marufuku Karuta Hanbai Co., and in March 1950 Nintendo Karuta Co., after which it took over from Yamauchi Nintendo & Co. the manufacture of karuta cards including the Daitoryo (President) brand. In July 1951 the name changed again, to Nintendo Kotai Co. On the production side he avoided full-scale capital spending, holding back both plant extensions and hiring for increased output — a policy Yamauchi later named as the single biggest reason the company came through its crises.

The ceiling of the playing-card trade, seen from an 80 per cent share

In 1953 Nintendo began mass production of the first plastic playing cards made in Japan. In July 1957 it committed to bulk exports to South America, putting its products outside the domestic market. In October 1959 it developed a board-laminating machine and an automatic cutter in quick succession, mechanising hanafuda manufacture and converting a method that had depended on handwork into modern volume production. In the year to March 1962, sales by product were $827,778 (¥298m) for Western playing cards, $491,667 (¥177m) for karuta and hanafuda and $111,111 (¥40m) for everything else — the mainstay had already shifted to Western cards. In the same year the playing-card plant had 156 employees and production capacity of $1M (¥370m), standing alongside the karuta plant with its 202 employees and $583,333 (¥210m).

In November 1959 Nintendo obtained exclusive domestic sales rights from Disney Productions for character playing cards, and from 1960 it opened up wholesaler and department-store routes across the country through television commercials, which it put in earnest from that year. Running a TV commercial to advertise something as trivial as playing cards was, at the time, utterly outside common sense, Yamauchi said of the period (日経ビジネス Nikkei Business, 30 May 1983). In January 1962 the shares were listed on the second section of the Osaka Stock Exchange and on the Kyoto Stock Exchange; by about 1963 the domestic share of Western playing cards had reached roughly 80 per cent, and in 1964 the company was counted, as a firm that made money, among Kyoto's neat little companies. In October 1963 the name was changed to Nintendo Co., dropping the playing-card trade from the corporate name. Yet what Yamauchi had seen on a study visit to the United States in 1956 was that even the largest playing-card maker in America ran a business of limited size, and the ceiling on a single-product company showed up as the stagnation of card sales from 1964.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1966Converging on play alone, and the home market the Famicom created

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1966 · unconsolidated
Revenue$4M
Net income$350K
Net margin8.3%
FY2006 · consolidated
Revenue$4.4B
Net income$845M
Net margin19.3%
  1. 1966Internal decision to become an all-round indoor-games company
  2. 1969The last of the outside ventures is withdrawn
  3. 1973Laser Clay Shooting System launched for arcades
  4. 1975Leisure equipment sells poorly; excess stock cuts revenue and profit
  5. 1977Entry into video games and arcade games
  6. 1980Game & Watch launched; over 30 million sold
  7. 1983The Famicom launched at $62 (¥14,800); listed on the first section of the TSE
  8. 1986The Famicom becomes a social phenomenon
  9. 1990New subsidiaries established in Europe and the United States
  10. 1992Nintendo withdraws from CD-ROM development with Sony
  11. 1996Nintendo 64 launched; Pocket Monsters released for the Game Boy
  12. 1998Pokémon Center Co. co-founded with Game Freak and Creatures
  13. 2001GameCube home console launched
  14. 2002Yamauchi Hiroshi steps down; Iwata Satoru becomes president
  15. 2004Nintendo DS handheld launched
  16. 2006Wii home console launched

Every attempt to grow outside cards — taxis, instant rice, prams, copiers — had been abandoned by 1969, and the failure fixed Nintendo's boundary at play. From mechanical toys it moved to electronic games and then, in 1983, to a deliberately cheap console that made its money on cartridges, bringing into being a home games market it would afterwards have to defend.

The paradox of choosing play alone, after losing every diversification

In 1960 Nintendo set up Daiya Kotsu (ダイヤ交通) and entered the taxi business. In June 1961, jointly funded with Omi Kenshi, it established Sanyo Foods (サンオー食品) and put on sale an instant rice reconstituted by pouring hot water over dried grain, together with character-branded furikake rice seasoning. The furikake grew within a year of launch into a product selling $277,778 (¥100m) a month, competing with Marumiya's Noritama. The instant rice, however, drew complaints that the flavour escaped, and the manufacturing machinery was sold to Nissin Food Products. Yamauchi also branched out into prams and copying machines, but all of them lacked continuity with the technology and the distribution built up in card manufacture, and by 1969 every one had been withdrawn. Yamauchi Hiroshi looked back in later years: Playing cards and karuta stopped selling, so little by little I was driven by the need to do something else and set about transforming the business, (Nintendo Shoho no Himitsu, 1986), describing this period as a state in which nothing whatever could be done (Nikkei Business, 30 May 1983).

Losing every diversification hardened a policy of never going outside entertainment: in 1966 a shift to becoming an all-round indoor-games company was settled internally, and Nintendo grew out of being a card specialist into a general maker of indoor amusement goods. After mechanical toys such as the Ultra Hand and the Kosenju SP light gun (光線銃SP), it extended in 1973 into the commercial Laser Clay Shooting System, but sales of that fell from $5.9M (¥2bn) in the year to March 1975 to $445,205 (¥130m) in the year to March 1976, and in 1974, compounded by the oil shock, profit dropped by nearly 50 per cent year on year. Even so, development of electronic games continued: the company entered the video-game business in 1977 and found its footing in the Invader boom of 1978. The Game & Watch, launched in 1980, sold more than thirty million units cumulatively, and by 1982 Nintendo stood as the top maker with more than 50 per cent of the pocket electronic-game market (読売新聞 Yomiuri Shimbun, 12 September 1982).

In July 1983 Nintendo launched the Family Computer — the Famicom — at a unit price of $62 (¥14,800). It held the machine below the low-priced personal computers that cost more than $126 (¥30,000) and below the $104 (¥24,800) at which Atari of the United States had entered, and adopted a structure that recovered its return through separately sold ROM cartridges. It developed in-house a dedicated custom LSI to handle graphics and the running of the games, contracting the manufacture out to Ricoh. To mass-produce, it put up a new plant in Uji, Kyoto in November of the same year; Yamauchi recalled that the situation, in which failure would leave the capital investment unrecovered, had been a choice between the corporate reorganisation law, or the Famicom. In July of that year the shares were listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and revenue grew from $104.3M (¥23bn) in the year to August 1981 to $274.1M (¥65bn) in the year to August 1983.

Software that invented a use, and revived hardware past its prime

In 1992 Nintendo restarted the joint development of a CD-ROM unit for the Super Famicom with Sony, agreeing on a form in which Nintendo held the licensing rights over software houses. Even so the conflict did not dissolve — Sony wanted to open the standard and widen the market, Nintendo to hold the standard and manage it — and Nintendo stepped down from the joint development and shelved the development plan itself. I am no match for a gambler; I decided I would get out, Yamauchi said of the decision (Nikkei Business, 9 October 1995). On the judgement that what users wanted was not the performance of the hardware but the fun of the software, it chose cartridges rather than CD-ROM as the storage medium for its next-generation machine, and released the Nintendo 64 in June 1996 alongside Super Mario 64. Shipments three months after launch, at the end of September 1996, came to only 1.16 million units, leaving it well behind the PlayStation, around which more than 500 software houses had gathered.

Pocket Monsters, released in 1996 as software for the Game Boy, brought in a form of play in which two Game Boys were linked by a communications cable to trade the characters inside the game. A handheld already mature turned back into a product that sold, through an invention of use in software, and annual Game Boy unit sales reached 17.45 million in the year to March 2001. The rollout widened into three pillars — game software, a card game and a television anime — and nationwide broadcast of the anime began in 1997. In April 1998 Nintendo established Pokémon Center Co., which handled retail, jointly with Game Freak and Creatures. Overseas, Nintendo of America acquired the rights for the entire world outside Japan and Asia, and spent just under $22.9M (¥3bn) in initial costs to stage the boom. The rights, scattered across the companies involved, were later gathered into a single company by reorganising it as The Pokémon Company.

On 31 May 2002 Yamauchi Hiroshi handed the presidency to Iwata Satoru (岩田聡), a programmer thirty-two years his junior who had come from HAL Laboratory, and stepped back to become a director and adviser. Iwata, forty-two on taking office, was the first appointment from outside the founding family, ending four generations of Yamauchi family management, adopted sons-in-law included. Yamauchi had stated plainly the previous year that there would be no hereditary succession, explaining that no one within the family was suited to it. Under Iwata, the Nintendo DS, launched in December 2004, adopted a twin-screen layout and touch-panel controls, and Brain Age (脳を鍛える大人のDSトレーニング), released in 2005, widened the customer base to adults and the elderly. In 2006 it put out the Wii, a home console with motion controls, and the two hits took consolidated revenue to a record $19.7B (¥1.84tn) in the year to March 2009.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2007The successor trough, and single-platform consolidation with the Switch

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2007 · consolidated
Revenue$8.2B
Net income$1.5B
Net margin18%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$7.8B
Net income$1.9B
Net margin23.9%
  1. 2009Consolidated revenue peaks at $19.7B (¥1.84tn)
  2. 2011The 3DS fails to repeat the DS; sales end at 75.94 million
  3. 2012First net loss; Wii U launched
  4. 20143DS and Wii U both struggle; net loss again
  5. 2015Capital and business alliance with DeNA; Iwata Satoru dies at fifty-five
  6. 2016Kimishima Tatsumi serves as president through fiscal 2016
  7. 2017Nintendo Switch launched; revenue bottoms at $4.4B (¥489bn)
  8. 2018Revenue doubles to $9.6B (¥1.06tn), ending eight years of decline
  9. 2020Animal Crossing: New Horizons meets pandemic demand
  10. 2022Cumulative Switch sales pass 100 million units
  11. 2025Nintendo Switch 2 launched on 5 June; 15 million sold by December

The successors to the DS and the Wii both fell far short of what they followed, and across eight straight years of falling revenue Nintendo lost its two central figures. The answer, in 2017, was to stop running two hardware lines at once and pour everything into a single hybrid machine.

The price of two parallel lines, and a new machine launched from a corner

Neither the successor to the DS nor the successor to the Wii reached the record of the generation before it. The 3DS put glasses-free stereoscopy in front, but it lacked a use-expanding killer title on the order of the DS's Brain Age, and its cumulative unit sales stopped at 75.94 million against the 154.02 million the DS had sold. The Wii U could not overturn the reception that it was no more than a Wii with a GamePad attached, and finished at 13.56 million against the Wii's 101.63 million. Taken year by year, even at its peak in the twelve months to March 2016 the Wii U managed 3.38 million units, barely a tenth of the 25.95 million the Wii had recorded in the year to March 2010. At results briefings, president Iwata Satoru gave repeatedly as his reflection that the value of the Wii U had not been conveyed adequately, and that the effort had fallen short.

From its peak in the year to March 2009, consolidated revenue fell for eight straight years, shrinking from $19.7B (¥1.84tn) to $4.4B (¥489bn) in the year to March 2017. In the years to March 2012 and March 2014 it dropped into net loss as well. In 2015 Nintendo concluded a capital and business alliance with DeNA and settled a policy of deploying its own IP on smart devices too. In July of that year Iwata Satoru died suddenly at fifty-five. Following the death of Yamauchi Hiroshi in 2013, the company had lost two leaders in a short span. His successor, Kimishima Tatsumi (君島達己), was a practitioner from the accounting and legal side, neither a game developer nor a member of the founding family, and his tenure as president lasted only the two years to the end of fiscal 2016.

The paradox of a success reproduced by an organisation without an indispensable figure

In March 2017 Nintendo launched the Nintendo Switch, which took away the physical boundary between handheld and home console. A hybrid machine that could be used in handheld mode, tabletop mode or TV mode, it was built so that development resources scattered across two lines could be concentrated on a single piece of hardware. Flagship titles including The Legend of Zelda: Breath of the Wild, Splatoon 2 and Super Mario Odyssey were fed in one after another within the launch year; consolidated revenue doubled from $4.4B (¥489bn) in the year to March 2017 to $9.6B (¥1.06tn) in the year to March 2018, putting an end to eight consecutive years of decline. Annual hardware sales also grew, from 2.74 million units in the year to March 2018 to 15.05 million in the year to March 2019.

Animal Crossing: New Horizons (あつまれ どうぶつの森), released in March 2020, met the indoor demand of the pandemic and became a hit; annual Switch sales reached the 21 million range in the year to March 2021, combining 14.83 million of the base model with 6.19 million Lite units. In the year to March 2022 cumulative sales passed 100 million, and as of February 2025 the cumulative total across all models stood at 150.86 million, closing on the 154.02 million of the Nintendo DS, Nintendo's best-selling hardware. On 5 June 2025 it launched the successor Nintendo Switch 2, carrying over the hybrid form together with backward compatibility that lets the first machine's software be played. Worldwide sales in the four days after launch passed 3.5 million units, a record for any Nintendo dedicated game machine over its first four days. In December 2025 the cumulative total reached 15 million, the fastest pace of any Nintendo hardware, the original included.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

The turning points, read in full: what was at stake, what was chosen and what the revenue did around it. The Japanese edition is the edition of record and carries the sourced dossier behind each decision — background, options weighed, outcome — linked under every decision.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1961

Key decision · 1961

Diversifying out of the playing-card business, and losing every bet (1961)

What failure taught by elimination

What this failed diversification left Nintendo was two lessons. One was a de facto selection and concentration: that it could win only in the field of entertainment, where it had a feel for the ground. The other was management cut to its own size — in an entertainment business where hits and misses run large, holding neither plants nor inventory in-house. Yamauchi said in later years that he had not wished to transform the company; the company changed while he was floundering. It was precisely the experience of seeking the next pillar outside and losing every time that pointed Nintendo, by elimination, in the direction it should go.

The pattern that set in this period — hold no equipment, work entirely through outside contractors, and concentrate resources on entertainment where a hit pays big — became the skeleton of the high-margin constitution that ran on from the light gun to the Game & Watch, the Famicom and the Switch. The structure in which a small parent company generates enormous profit is an extension of a philosophy reasoned backward from the total defeat of the 1960s. That the origin lies not in a tale of success but in the memory of retreat is where the singularity of this company shows.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1983

Key decision · 1983

The Family Computer launch and the turn to a low-price, software-profit model (1983)

Hand out the machine, earn from software for years

The core of this decision lies not in building one superior games machine, but in designing the shape of the business itself: put a cheap machine into as many households as possible and earn over a long period from separately sold software. With demand for Disney playing cards having run its course and the Game & Watch boom having ended, Nintendo had twice tasted the frailty of a single hit. The unit price of $62 (¥14,800) was, built on that reflection, a choice that put the installed base that would form the denominator above everything else. Selling the hardware thin and recovering thick on software was what allowed Nintendo to sustain, deliberately, a machine that in president Yamauchi's words earns little for how well it sells.

The other pillar was the in-house development of a custom LSI specialised for graphics processing, and a small, tightly managed software line-up on the principle of releasing only what will certainly sell. The former set the machine apart from others in the same ten-thousand-yen class in colour and in speed of movement; the latter was a brake against the self-destruction through shoddy overproduction that had undone Atari. Cheap hardware, proprietary drawing performance and a narrowed software slate combined, and the home games market itself came into being. This pattern of designing profit by separating hardware from software was carried on into the Nintendo of later years, which manages software and characters as long-term assets.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1996

Key decision · 1996

Breaking with the Sony camp and developing the 64-bit Nintendo 64 alone (1996)

An open market, or a market held in hand

At the core of this decision lie president Yamauchi Hiroshi's view of management — that a games machine is decided by its software — and the choice that Nintendo would hold the supply of that software. The cartridge-based Nintendo 64 gave Nintendo fast loading and control over supply volumes, but the high cost of manufacture and the small capacity damaged how easily software houses could take part. The difference between the PlayStation, which opened its standard and gathered more than 500 developers, and the Nintendo 64, which held its standard and managed supply, showed up not in the performance of the hardware but in the number and the breadth of the software.

What Nintendo protected was a highly profitable business of selling information on cartridges, and a mechanism for managing the quality and quantity of software in-house. What it gave up in exchange was the breadth of software houses drawn to the openness of CD-ROM, and the next generation's share was overturned by Sony. That said, the mid-1990s choice not to ride the hardware performance race and to compete instead on fun and on distinctive play was carried on into the line that drew in a wide range of users with the Nintendo DS and the Wii. Open the standard and gather numbers, or hold the standard and manage quality — this decision left that question behind at every changeover of home console generations.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1998

Key decision · 1998

Co-founding The Pokémon Company and the shift to IP-led management (1998)

Turning characters, not hardware, into the asset

At the core of this judgement is that it prepared not one hit product but an organisation to keep that character alive for a long time. What Ishihara Tsunekazu (石原恒和) said again and again was that when rights are scattered across companies it becomes impossible to see where and how a character is being exposed, and it stops appearing before children in the order its creator intended. Reorganising the Pokémon Center that the three companies had built into The Pokémon Company, and binding the firms involved together as shareholders, was a move from a way of selling that borrowed the heat of a boom to keep shipping goods, to a way of selling that managed exposure and preserved the character's value. It can be called an attempt to design a lifespan as an asset rather than the lifespan of a one-off hit.

The boom that Nintendo of America staged at a cost of about $22.9M (¥3bn) showed in practice that the same character would sell across borders if the names were changed to the American style and the anime remade for English. What lasted for Nintendo, though, was less the boom itself than the mechanism of gathering the rights into one company and managing them. A games-machine maker's results are easily swung by whether the next piece of hardware lands. Within that, the meaning of this decision lay in making it possible to hold, in corporate form, a pillar of earnings — IP — that is less exposed to the turnover of hardware generations.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2002

Key decision · 2002

Nintendo's succession from Yamauchi Hiroshi to Iwata Satoru (2002)

Replacing personal gravity with talent and cash

The point of this handover is that president Yamauchi, who had decided early that his successor would not come from the family, rebuilt the company's centre of gravity itself into a form that could be passed to the next generation. A manager who had taken over the company at twenty-two and gathered decision-making into one pair of hands for half a century rejected hereditary succession and chose Iwata Satoru, a man from outside the founding family who knew the software development floor. It was an attempt to bridge a company that had run on one individual's instinct and nerve across to another individual with the same qualities.

The other preparation was the cash pile he had thickened with retirement in view. Criticised by analysts for poor capital efficiency, Yamauchi still gave priority to leaving cash that could withstand sudden change in the business environment, and thought of it as provisions for the generation that would follow. In practice, Nintendo under Iwata reached record revenue with the Nintendo DS and the Wii, while in the trough of the successor machines that came after, this cash supported the rebuild. A founder-manager of strong personal gravity deliberately thinning his own indispensability and replacing it with talent and cash — resources that can be handed on — before passing the company over: Yamauchi Hiroshi's succession is instructive in showing business succession as a question not only of whom to pass it to, but of what to pass with it.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2025

Key decision · 2025

Launching the successor Nintendo Switch 2 (2025)

How do you inherit an enormous success

The heart of this decision lies in the question of when, and in what form, to release the successor to a machine that sold in record numbers. Nintendo had in the past lost unit sales with the successors to the DS and the Wii, experiencing a second-generation jinx in which the bigger the previous generation, the more the next one struggles. Against the difficulty of following a first Switch in the 150-million class, what the company chose was not a change of course but continuity. It kept the hybrid form that serves as both home console and handheld, prepared backward compatibility that lets the first machine's software be played, and staked itself on a design that carries the accumulated assets and users straight over to the next generation.

That said, what supported the start was not the design of continuity alone. The figures — 3.5 million units worldwide in four days, 6 million in seven weeks, and 15 million by December 2025, the fastest in the company's history — arose only because of the first Switch's user base, built over eight years, and the strength of being able to connect to it seamlessly through backward compatibility. In the United States tariffs threatened prices and pre-orders were postponed before launch, but Nintendo came through without moving either the unit price or the release date. An enormous success in the previous generation can be a burden or a footing for the next. Whether the first machine's assets can be turned into a footing will be decided by the sales cycle that follows.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →


References & sources

This English edition follows the Japanese one chapter by chapter. The Japanese edition remains the edition of record: it carries the source-by-source citations, the financial tables and the shareholder and executive records. 日本語版(詳細)— Nintendo full history in Japanese →

  1. Nintendo Co., Ltd. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports), including the 沿革 corporate-history section and the segment and results disclosures.
  2. Nintendo Shoho no Himitsu 任天堂商法の秘密 (1986), the source of Yamauchi Hiroshi's recollections of the 1949 succession and of the diversification years.
  3. Nikkei Business — 日経ビジネス (Nikkei BP): 30 May 1983 (Yamauchi Hiroshi on surviving the toy market); 10 Dec 1984; 17 Mar 1986; 9 Oct 1995; 27 Jan 1997; 24 Jul 2000.
  4. Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun — 日経産業新聞 (Nikkei Inc.): 3 Jun 1983 on entering home video games at the lowest price; 6 Mar 2017 on staking Nintendo's fate on the Switch. Nikkei MJ — 日経MJ, 24 May 2017.
  5. Yomiuri Shimbun — 読売新聞: 15 Jun 1979; 30 Aug 1980; 12 Sep 1982 on LSI-based electronic games; 28 Dec 1982.
  6. Shukan Noda Keizai — 週刊野田経済, Jul 1964, on Nintendo's two-track strategy (Noda Keizai Kenkyusho, ed.). NDL Digital Collections.
  7. Gekkan Keizai — 月刊経済, May 1986, on the Nintendo-staged “Famicom phenomenon”. NDL Digital Collections.
  8. Keizai Joho — 経済情報, Mar 1964.
  9. 企業の歴史 : 明治百年 (Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968), the Nintendo entry.
  10. Kunitomo Ryuichi (国友隆一), Sega vs. Nintendo セガ vs. 任天堂 (Kou Shobo, Feb 1994), on the contest between Nakayama Hayao and Yamauchi Hiroshi.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →



Data API

Nintendo’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET. Full specification →

/api/7974/manifest.json ·/api/7974/history.json ·/api/7974/timeline.json ·/api/7974/decisions.json ·/api/7974/executives.json ·/api/7974/shareholders.json ·/api/7974/financials.json ·/api/7974/financials-longterm.json ·/api/7974/segments.json ·/api/7974/regions.json ·/api/7974/workforce.json · /api/7974/decisions/{slug}.json

/api/companies.json ·/api/decisions.json