Sekisui Chemical

Company history

Financial history 1971–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1947
Head office
Osaka, Japan
Listed
1949
Founder
Ueno Jiro
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$8.3B (¥1.31tn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$475.5M (¥75bn)
Sekisui Chemical: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1947A converter with no feedstock

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1947Sekisui Sangyo founded by ex-Nippon Nitrogen staff
  2. 1948Nara plant acquired; Japan’s first automatic injection moulding; renamed Sekisui Chemical
  3. 1952Rigid PVC pipe from the Kyoto plant
  4. 1953Listed in Osaka (Tokyo 1954)
  5. 1960Mizuguchi: PVB interlayer film for laminated glass
  6. 1964Tokuyama Sekisui — PVC resin in-house

Sekisui Chemical was not founded on a business idea. In March 1947 a group of employees of Nippon Nitrogen Fertiliser (today Chisso), which had lost its Korean plants in the defeat and could not absorb the returning staff at home, set up Sekisui Sangyo as one of several vehicles to take them in. Capital was ¥100,000. In January 1948 the new company took over Nippon Nitrogen’s Nara plant, began what was Japan’s first automatic injection moulding, and renamed itself Sekisui Chemical.

That origin fixed the shape of everything after it. Where most of Japan’s general chemical firms diversified downstream from petrochemicals, Sekisui had no raw material of its own: the only way to grow was to find another use for resin, and then another. Plastic tape, selling from late 1949, put the company on its feet. Ueno Jiro became president in September 1951 and drove expansion hard — rigid PVC pipe from the Kyoto plant in 1952, displacing metal pipe; listings in Osaka (1953) and Tokyo (1954); Ritto for pipe and building materials and Mizuguchi for polyvinyl butyral interlayer film in 1960; and in 1964 Tokuyama Sekisui, which finally gave it PVC resin of its own and a chain running from monomer to moulded part.

Repeated rights issues lifted capital to ¥8.55 billion, sales multiplied fifty-eight times in fifteen years, and by 1964 the press bracketed the company with the era’s other prodigies as “Sony, Honda, Sekisui.” The trouble was that nothing it made was hard to copy.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1965The fall, and a house built in a factory

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1971 · unconsolidated
Revenue$215M
Net income$5M
Net margin2.5%
FY1976 · unconsolidated
Revenue$575M
Net income$4M
Net margin0.7%
  1. 1963North America: foam polystyrene sheet, “the third paper”
  2. 1965First loss; Ueno steps back to chairman
  3. 1967Obata Kenzo sent from Asahi Kasei; capital halved
  4. 1971Sekisui Heim — steel-framed unit housing
  5. 1971Nasseki Kogyo opens unit-house production

Rivals poured into PVC pipe and corrugated sheet, overproduction crushed prices, and the North American venture Ueno had launched in 1963 — foam polystyrene sheet, sold as “the third paper” — ran into Dow and Monsanto, whose research budgets were of another order. Left holding inventory, Sekisui posted a loss in 1965 and fell out of the ranks of growth companies; Ueno moved up to a chairmanship without representative authority. In March 1967 Obata Kenzo arrived from Asahi Kasei — like Sekisui, a descendant of the old Nippon Nitrogen group — to rebuild it, selling off loss-making lines and, in July, halving the capital outright. Within two years the debt was written down and the dividend restored.

Out of that retrenchment came the decision that defined the company. In February 1971 Sekisui launched Sekisui Heim, a steel-framed unit house: the body of the home built as boxes on a production line and craned into place on site. It was the resin-conversion business reasoned outward — a firm that had spent twenty years standing up mass-production plants for one product family after another now applied the same logic to the largest consumer product there is. Crucially, it had no one who could draw an architectural plan, and that ignorance is what allowed it to treat a house as a factory good rather than a building site.

Production capacity followed immediately, with Nasseki Kogyo in October 1971 and Sun-S Heim in March 1972 (both now Sekisui Heim Industry). Housing sold through channels that had nothing in common with pipe or mouldings, and it would in time become the group’s largest source of profit.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1977Building the three pillars

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1977 · unconsolidated
Revenue$753M
Net income$4M
Net margin0.5%
FY1985 · unconsolidated
Revenue$1.5B
Net income$17M
Net margin1.2%
  1. 1977Divisional structure introduced
  2. 1982Two-You Home — timber-framed unit housing
  3. 1983Sekisui America Corporation
  4. 1992Kyoto Technology Centre
  5. 2000Seven divisions consolidated into three

From 1977 the task was to make each business stand on its own. A divisional structure introduced in May of that year separated housing, plastic mouldings and environmental products (pipe and building materials) into self-managing units. Housing widened its range with the timber-framed Two-You Home in March 1982 and a new Gunma plant that April, and in December 1983 Sekisui America Corporation began the move abroad from a base first consolidated at home.

The research estate expanded in step, and along the same fault line: the Applied Electronics Laboratory (1987), the Housing Research Institute (1990) and the Kyoto Technology Centre (1992) gave the two halves of the company — houses and functional materials — laboratories of their own. Growth by acquisition was, at this stage, modest and domestic: Komatsu Kasei in 1997 for pipe, Hinomaru in 2000 for the Kyushu sales network.

In March 2000 seven divisions were folded into three — Housing, Urban Infrastructure & Environmental Products, High Performance Plastics — with a separate new-business unit alongside. It was the frame the company still runs on.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2001The three-company frame, and growth bolted on outside it

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2006 · unconsolidated
Revenue$7.3B
Net income-$448M
Net margin-6.2%
FY2018 · consolidated
Revenue$10.0B
Net income$575M
Net margin5.7%
  1. 2001Three-company system established
  2. 2006Daiichi Pure Chemicals (now Sekisui Medical)
  3. 2009PVOH resin business bought from Celanese
  4. 2011Genzyme diagnostics business acquired
  5. 2017Polymatech Japan — automotive materials

In March 2001 the three divisions became three companies — Housing, Urban Infrastructure & Environmental Products, High Performance Plastics — under an internal company system that has not been reorganised since. The design is legible: housing earns the money, infrastructure captures domestic renewal demand, and high performance plastics opens the growth fields of electronics, mobility and medicine. What is equally legible is the method. Sekisui does not restructure the frame; it adds outside it, and it adds by buying.

Korea’s Youngbo Chemical came in 2003; Daiichi Pure Chemicals in 2006 became Sekisui Medical and gave High Performance Plastics a life-science leg; in 2009 the polyvinyl alcohol resin business bought from Celanese secured the feedstock for interlayer film, an upstream move a converter would once have been unable to make. Then a decade of steady acquisition: the diagnostics business of Genzyme in 2011, Mitsubishi Plastics’ pipe operations in 2012, a Thai unit-housing plant in 2013, Eidia from Eisai in 2015, Polymatech Japan in 2017 for automotive materials, Soflan Wiz the same year for fire-resistant products, and Singapore’s Veredus Laboratories in 2018.

By the end of the period, medicine and mobility existed as real businesses — but they had all entered from outside, appended to a structure that itself never changed.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2019ESG, mobility, and a fourth field

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2019 · consolidated
Revenue$10.5B
Net income$606M
Net margin5.8%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$8.7B
Net income$547M
Net margin6.3%
  1. 2019ESG Management Department; Kato Keita becomes president
  2. 2019AIM Aerospace acquired (now Sekisui Aerospace)
  3. 2022Tokyo Prime listing; long-term plan Vision 2030
  4. 2025Sekisui Solar Film — perovskite photovoltaics

2019 brought a change of register. An April reorganisation of head office created an ESG Management Department, putting non-financial targets such as greenhouse-gas reduction inside the management system; in November the company bought AIM Aerospace of the United States, now Sekisui Aerospace, to scale up mobility materials. In June, Kato Keita, a strategist from the high-performance-plastics side, became president — and met the collapse of housing demand under COVID in his first full year. Alongside the move to the Tokyo Prime market in April 2022 he set out Vision 2030, committing the company to raising the share of revenue from businesses aimed at social problems: medicine, mobility, perovskite solar.

In January 2025 Sekisui established Sekisui Solar Film to design, make and sell perovskite cells — light, flexible, film-type panels that can go on building façades and roofs too weak for silicon. The technology is the company’s own history turned into a power device: decades of film-lamination know-how from laminated-glass interlayer, applied to generation. It also fits none of the three companies. It is a fourth field.

Revenue of about $8.2B (¥1.23tn) and roughly ¥100 billion of operating profit in the year to March 2025 mark what the three-company frame has accumulated. But Japan’s shrinking population points the housing market down over the long run, and the largest earner has the least room left to grow. Whether the acquired medical and mobility businesses, or the perovskite venture launched in 2025, mature into a replacement pillar in time — and how to reform the housing business while paying for a fourth field — is the problem Kato’s management has taken on.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1963

North America and “the third paper”: the fall of a growth company (1963)

What it means to go out first

Sekisui’s move into North America was a conception ahead of its time: beat freight costs by producing locally, and take a world market with a material of your own. The logic of local production, as Ueno Jiro actually described it, runs straight through to the overseas expansion of Japanese companies that followed. The problem was that, with the technology behind “the third paper” not yet settled, he chose for himself a battlefield where he would meet Dow Chemical and Monsanto — opponents with research capacity of an entirely different order — head on. Moving first and failing to win are lodged inside one and the same decision, and that is where the difficulty of the attempt shows.

What should not be forgotten is that the failure did not stay contained within the Sekisui group. While President Ueno was betting on the United States, the Sekisui House that Tanabe Takeshi was raising at home went on to lead the group’s growth. The parent that burned out spectacularly abroad, and the spun-off company that secured its footing domestically — two choices made in the same years ran to opposite ends. Was the decision to take the lead right, or should the company have waited for market and technology to mature? The fall of Sekisui the growth company still puts the question of what it means to go out ahead of everyone else.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1971

Entering housing with the steel-framed unit home “Sekisui Heim” (1971)

The prototype of a diversification that turned weakness into a weapon

The heart of this decision lies in reading amateurism not as a weakness but as a weapon. Having no employee who could draw an architectural plan was a deficiency — and precisely that deficiency licensed the manufacturer’s view of a house as a factory product, and pushed the company into an industrialisation unbound by the conventions of on-site construction. The fear of a shrinking equilibrium, which a converter without feedstock of its own had tasted in the crisis of 1965, made the company accept the strain of “overtime every day,” and personnel moves made by something close to ambush poured energy into a team of amateurs. In the way a desperate, cornered throw ended up converting the weakness of the latecomer into cost competitiveness, one can see a crisis rewriting an organisation’s common sense.

That said, a market opened by amateurs does not go on widening for ever. Japan’s falling population turns the housing market down over the long term, and the room left to grow in the housing business — by then the largest pillar of profit — thins out. Now that the value offered to middle-income households in 1971, “a home you can buy for three times your annual income,” has fully matured, the company is looking for the pillar that will succeed housing in medicine, mobility and perovskite solar cells. Where does a company that opened a new market half a century ago with an amateur’s idea find its next group of amateurs, beyond a mature core business? This story of entry leaves the question open.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Sekisui Chemical full history in Japanese →

  1. Sekisui Chemical Co., Ltd. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Histories of Enterprises: One Hundred Years of Meiji『企業の歴史 : 明治百年』 (Keizai Shunjusha, 1968).
  3. A History of Sekisui Chemical積水化学の歴史, on Ueno Jiro, 2017.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Sekisui Chemical’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/4204/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/4204/history.json History overview
GET /api/4204/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/4204/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/4204/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/4204/executives.json Executives
GET /api/4204/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/4204/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/4204/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/4204/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/4204/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/4204/workforce.json Workforce