Tokuyama - Company History

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Financial history 1951–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded 1918
Founder Iwai Katsujiro
Founding location 山口県周南市
Core business at founding Soda ash made by the ammonia-soda process
Listed 1949
President Inoue Tomohiro President since 2026 (age 61, as of 2026)
Current priority Business divestment · Higher value added Transferring cement and concentrating on advanced electronic materials
Founding
In February 1918 Iwai Katsujiro, who ran the trading house Suzuki Iwai Shoten, set up Nippon Soda Kogyo at Tokuyama-cho in Yamaguchi Prefecture with capital of ¥2 million, in order to make at home the alkali Japan had been importing, and began producing soda ash by the ammonia-soda process. He chose a site that had limestone, salt, process water and a harbour all together. Low-priced selling by overseas producers then broke the economics, and around 1932 the company withdrew from soda ash. It turned the same salt-processing plant to caustic soda, took in the demand coming from rayon, and in 1931 restored a 5 per cent dividend for the first time in thirteen years. In 1936 it renamed itself Tokuyama Soda, and in 1994 took its present name.
The Decision
Inside a single works, the leftovers of one process have been made the raw material of the next business. In 1938 the company started cement as a place to put the by-product calcium carbonate that came out of caustic soda production, and public investment in the high-growth years grew it into one of Japan’s largest cement operations on a single plant. In 1952 it brought in electrolysis and produced chlorine alongside caustic soda, sent it through the pipework of the Tokuyama–Shin-Nanyo complex opened in 1964 to the adjacent plants, and connected it to vinyl chloride and polypropylene. In December 1981 a proposal from the planning department raised high-purity polycrystalline silicon and dry-process silica to production in two and a half years. High-purity products grew out of the by-products at hand and the purification skill that went with them.
Today
The company is transferring the cement business it ran for 88 years and leaning towards advanced electronic materials and dental materials. Consolidated revenue in the year to March 2026 was $2.2B (¥350bn) and operating profit $233.9M (¥37bn), with segment profit spread across advanced electronic materials at $99.3M (¥16bn), chemicals at $61.3M (¥10bn), cement at $60.1M (¥10bn) and life science at $49.3M (¥8bn). In March 2026 it decided to transfer the domestic sales business for cement and solidification materials to Taiheiyo Cement for $233.9M (¥37bn), and has begun considering a halt to production around the 2028 financial year, when the handover completes. Some 2.8 million tonnes of CO2 a year from cement making will disappear — and so will the kilns that turned other businesses’ waste into raw material.
Competition
Within the same polycrystalline silicon, the endings ran opposite ways for solar-cell grade and semiconductor grade. In August 2009, expecting demand to expand after the Lehman shock, the company entered a large investment in Malaysia; while construction ran late, oversupply from Chinese producers broke the market, and in the year to March 2016 it booked a net loss of $924.3M (¥101bn) and extraordinary losses of $1.2B (¥126bn). In May 2017 it transferred the entire shareholding in Tokuyama Malaysia to OCI of South Korea and withdrew completely. The Malaysian site, which chased scale in commodity solar-cell grade, is gone; the advanced semiconductor grade kept at Tokuyama grew. In the same 2012, SUMCO also stepped back from solar-cell wafers, so the route of taking volume in commodity grades has closed for the industry as a whole. In 2023 the company restarted production in Malaysia in a fifty-fifty joint venture with OCI, the very buyer it had sold to — but it has not gone back to mass production on its own.

Timeline

1918–1979From substituting imported alkali to the Tokuyama complex

  1. 1918Founded as Nippon Soda Kogyo at Tokuyama, Yamaguchi
  2. 1932Withdraws from soda ash; switches the plant to caustic soda
  3. 1936Renamed Tokuyama Soda
  4. 1937Tokyo sales office opened
  5. 1938First wet-process Portland cement kiln at the Tokuyama works
  6. 1949Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
  7. 1952Electrolytic caustic soda production begins at Tokuyama
  8. 1960Nanyo works built
  9. 1964Propylene oxide plant built as the Tokuyama–Shin-Nanyo complex opens
  10. 1966San-Arrow Chemical founded; vinyl chloride production begins
  11. 1967Ion-exchange membrane plant and the Higashi works built
  12. 1970Polypropylene production begins at the Higashi works
  13. 1972Isopropyl alcohol production begins; research laboratory opened
  14. 1978Towa Giken, the dental materials company, founded

1980–2008The five-year plan and three new fields — until polysilicon put out a shoot

  1. 1982Plastic lens materials launched
  2. 1983High-purity electronic solvents (IPA, methylene chloride) launched
  3. 1984Polycrystalline silicon production begins at the Higashi works
  4. 1985Kashima works built
  5. 1988Five-year plan names fine chemicals, electronics and medical as priorities
  6. 1989General Ceramics acquired; Tsukuba research laboratory opened
  7. 1994Renamed Tokuyama Corporation; A&T Corporation founded
  8. 1995Shin Dai-ichi Vinyl founded
  9. 1996Tokuyama Electronic Chemicals founded in Singapore; Taiwan Tokuyama in Taiwan
  10. 2005Tokuyama Chemicals (Zhejiang) founded in China
  11. 2007TD Power Material founded for aluminium nitride heat-dissipating materials
  12. 2008Tokuyama Korea founded

2009–2017The Malaysian bet, and a ¥100.6bn curtain call

  1. 2009First net loss in the company’s post-war history, in the year to March
  2. 2009Tokuyama Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. founded in August
  3. 2013Net loss of ¥37.9bn on impairment of the Malaysian plant
  4. 2015Yokota Hiroshi becomes president; net loss of ¥65.3bn
  5. 2016Net loss of ¥100.6bn and extraordinary losses of ¥125.7bn
  6. 2017Entire shareholding in Tokuyama Malaysia transferred to OCI of South Korea
  7. 2018Tokuyama Kairiku Unso acquired, bringing logistics in-house

Founding Story

1918–1979From substituting imported alkali to the Tokuyama complex

Over six decades Tokuyama turned one shoreline site in Yamaguchi into a self-feeding process industry: alkali first, then cement made from the alkali plant’s waste lime, then resins made from its co-product chlorine, all linked by pipework inside a single complex. Sales rose from $14.7M (¥5bn) in 1951 to $516.5M (¥119bn) by 1979 — and the two oil shocks at the end of that run made it plain that a business built on cheap naphtha, power and coal would have to become something else.

The kanji nobody could read — a company created to make alkali at home

The motive for founding the company was not an entrepreneur’s ambition but national import substitution. In February 1918 Iwai Katsujiro (岩井勝次郎), who headed the trading house Suzuki Iwai Shoten (鈴木岩井商店)[1], incorporated Nippon Soda Kogyo (日本曹達工業) at Tokuyama-cho in Yamaguchi Prefecture[2][3] with capital of ¥2 million[4], in order to make at home the alkali Japan had been importing from abroad, and began producing soda ash by the ammonia-soda process[5]. The trade mark adopted at the founding — the initials N, S and K of Nippon Soda Kogyo enclosed in the hexahedron of a salt crystal, salt being the principal raw material of soda — was carried on as the company’s emblem thereafter[6]. Soda ash was the foundation of the core industries of the day: sheet glass, soap, spinning and weaving. Japan’s dependence on imported alkali was debated again and again as a national weakness. The site facing Tokuyama harbour satisfied the raw-material conditions of limestone, salt and abundant process water all at once — an advantage of place that would later lead to the industrial complex. A chemical maker, being a process industry, can exist only where four conditions coincide: raw materials, energy, a port, and a way of dealing with waste heat. Tokuyama was chosen as one of the few candidate sites that met all four.

The market, however, collapsed almost as soon as the company started. Dumping by overseas producers kept results poor, and around 1932 the company withdrew from soda ash in all but name and switched to making caustic soda[7]. The timing coincided with the rise of the rayon industry and the expanding demand for caustic soda it brought; results recovered, and in 1931 a 5 per cent dividend was restored for the first time in thirteen years[8]. The founding cause of making soda ash in Japan was set aside after little more than a decade, and the company survived by turning the same salt-processing plant to caustic soda. In 1936 it renamed itself Tokuyama Soda[9], building its birthplace and its product into the name, and widened its range of chemical products. Through the second half of the 1930s it started up one inorganic chemical after another — magnesium carbonate, calcium chloride, sodium silicate[10] — but once the Second World War began, difficulty in securing raw materials stalled production, the soda division included[11]. Reinforcing its plant amid the post-war recovery, the company listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1949[12], and a soda company begun before the war secured its footing as a major chemical manufacturer. The pattern of a process-industry firm surviving by changing the sign over its main product was already visible at this point.

By-product lime called cement into being — one plant among the largest in Japan

The cement business began not as a move into a new field but as a search for somewhere to put the by-product calcium carbonate left over from soda ash production. Starting in March 1938 with the installation of the first wet-process Portland cement kiln at the Tokuyama works[13], the company added capacity repeatedly through the war and after it, until the site swelled into one of Japan’s largest cement works on a single plant[14]. The pattern by which a chemical by-product turns into a second pillar was born here. That waste from the core alkali business should become the raw material of a new one is nothing unusual in a process industry. What was distinctive in Tokuyama’s case was that this disposal of a by-product was built up, on one site, into cement production among the largest in Japan. The judgement to concentrate processes at the single location of Tokuyama also laid the groundwork for the complex to come. Public investment during the post-war high-growth years raised cement into an earnings source ranking alongside soda.

The same structure applies to chlorine. In 1952 the company built a new electrolytic caustic soda plant, putting in place a system that produced chlorine alongside it[15], and with the inauguration of the Tokuyama–Shin-Nanyo petrochemical complex in 1964 it started up petrochemical products originating in chlorine — propylene oxide, methylene chloride, carbon tetrachloride and others[16]. The complex was built not through solitary investment but through joint ventures with peers: in 1963, with Asahi Glass and Toyo Soda, it set up Nihon Godo Hiryo (日本合同肥料)[17], and in 1964, with Toyo Soda, Shunan Petrochemical (周南石油化学) with capital of $1.4M (¥500m)[18], putting a supply network for petrochemical feedstock in place. In 1966 it entered vinyl chloride by founding San-Arrow Chemical (サンアロー化学) jointly with Tekkosha (鉄興社) and Daicel Chemical Industries[19], and in 1970 began producing polypropylene in-house[20]. To support the run of capital investment it also raised its own capital, to $8.9M (¥3bn) in 1965 and $9M (¥3bn) in 1967[21]. Chlorine, which emerges at the same time as caustic soda, is a by-product with nowhere to go on its own; but once the complex ran pipelines straight into the adjacent plants, it turned directly into resin feedstock. The three-pillar structure of chemicals, cement and resins was assembled in this way, along the lines of the pipework.

The ion-exchange membrane and the oil shocks — the trigger for structural change

The ion-exchange membrane the company developed on its own in 1967[22] became the mainstay of a domestic salt-making industry then being pressed to switch from the mercury process to a mercury-free one, and created the archetype of Tokuyama working its way into social infrastructure with technology of its own. It was an early example of success for a chemical maker that carried resource-intensive businesses and was groping for a way to survive through technical differentiation. The origin of the idea of escaping the commodity competition of a process industry by way of process patents and licensing lies here. In later years the ion-exchange membrane spread at home and abroad as the mainstream process for caustic soda electrolysis, and half a century on from making soda ash in Japan, the company found itself in the position of a technology licensor of salt-electrolysis plant. It was also the first sign that the centre of gravity of the business was shifting away from a plain volume chemical maker towards a company that sells the plant itself.

The two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, however, shook to its foundations a business structure that depended on naphtha, electric power and coal. Soaring feedstock costs squeezed the profitability of the three existing pillars, and a shared problem — breaking out of the resource-intensive model — took shape inside the company. The fine chemicals, electronics and medical ventures that would catch fire in the 1980s were conceived amid that sense of crisis[23]. A recognition spread through the company that it had to move its centre of effort from commodity chemicals at the mercy of energy prices to high value-added electronic and medical products made in small volumes and many varieties. Tokuyama Soda entered the run-up to rewriting its own definition, from a soda company into a diversified chemical maker. In the same period the industry as a whole was debating how to end its dependence on naphtha, and the company’s change of direction ran with that current.

1980–2008The five-year plan and three new fields — until polysilicon put out a shoot

This was the stretch in which Tokuyama tried to convert itself from a resource-intensive maker into a high-purity one, and put in place — between 1982 and 1989 — every business that would carry it decades later: plastic lens materials, high-purity electronic solvents, polysilicon, dental materials and aluminium nitride. The name lost its soda in 1994; but the balance sheet did not, and in the year to March 2009 the company recorded its first net loss since the war.

1982, 1983, 1984 — three straight years of high value-added moves

The structural change that followed the oil shocks showed itself as a rapid succession of specific products. In 1982 came plastic lens materials and desiccants; in 1983, high-purity isopropyl alcohol and methylene chloride for the electronics industry, aimed at replacing chlorofluorocarbons and ethane; and in July 1984 the company began producing polycrystalline silicon at its Higashi works. The idea was to apply the purification skill built up as a soda company to an industry-wide problem, the removal of CFCs from semiconductor cleaning processes. The tactic of escaping price competition in commodities by retreating into high-purity niches is concentrated in those three years. Polycrystalline silicon is the raw material of semiconductor wafers, and at the time of entry most domestic producers had withdrawn, leaving a structure in which a small number of Japanese suppliers remained alongside Shin-Etsu Chemical and Osaka Titanium. The route the company chose was a vertically integrated, high-purity one: supplying the chemicals and materials used downstream in the electronics industry directly from the Tokuyama complex.

In 1985 it built the Kashima works to give the new businesses a production base, and under the five-year plan that began in 1988 it formally designated three fields — fine chemicals, electronics and medical — as priority businesses to be grown. Towa Giken (トーワ技研), the dental equipment company founded in 1978 and later renamed Tokuyama Dental; the Tsukuba research laboratory opened in 1989; and the acquisition that same year of General Ceramics of the United States, which brought aluminium nitride technology into the company, were all part of that framework. The process industry at Tokuyama, the new materials at Kashima, the research function at Tsukuba and the technology imported from America were bound together into a single five-year plan, and the priorities of long-term investment were reordered inside the company. Polysilicon, dental materials and heat-dissipating materials — the earnings pillars of today — were all sown in this decade or so. Every leading player of the rebuilding period nearly forty years later had been put in place inside the company by the end of the 1980s.

Dropping the soda in 1994 — redefining the brand and building the overseas network

In April 1994 Tokuyama Soda changed its corporate name to Tokuyama Corporation. The reasons given publicly for the change were that the substance of the business no longer fitted inside 曹達 — soda — and, in addition, that younger people could no longer read the kanji for it. It was a declaration that the company’s self-definition as a chemical maker was moving from its founding product to its business portfolio. Consolidated sales in the year to March 1995 reached the order of $1.8B (¥168bn), and the renaming was at once a brand renewal and a change in the framework of how the company presented itself outside. Dropping the soda from the name was also expected to make it easier to gather recruitment, investor relations and overseas promotion under one brand. Seventy-six years after its founding, management here faced the fact that what the name pointed to and what the company actually was no longer matched.

In the same year it established A&T Corporation, a medical diagnostics systems company; then came Shin Dai-ichi Vinyl (新第一塩ビ) in 1995, Singapore and Taiwan in 1996, Zhejiang and Shanghai in China in 2005, TD Power Material for aluminium nitride heat-dissipating materials in 2007, and Korea in 2008 — a chain of subsidiaries and local operating companies. Electronic materials, diagnostics and dental each widened their overseas network in step with the globalisation of their customer industries. Over the same period the core soda and cement businesses turned from flat to gently shrinking, and the centre of gravity of the portfolio moved to the new fields. For a process industry, overseas bases were also part of a cost strategy: running plant in regions with cheaper feedstock, power and labour. Domestic plant was becoming a burden on profitability through both depreciation and replacement investment, and a structural shift proceeded little by little, holding earnings up through a combination with small overseas sites.

The year to March 2009 — the first net loss at a company known for prudence

Hit directly by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Tokuyama recorded a net loss of $59.9M (¥6bn) in the year to March 2009. For a company that had been described as prudently run this was the first net loss since the war, and a figure that laid bare the fact that the new businesses were not yet earning at a pace that could absorb the market swings of the traditional ones. The number and the scale of the diversification had grown, but the constitution remained dependent on chemicals and cement. Swings in the chlor-alkali and cement markets had recurred on a decade-long cycle, and each time the pattern was visible: the profits of the new businesses cancelled out. Twenty years on from the five-year plan, the company had not managed to shed its character as a process industry. Structural change required more than a run of new businesses; it had to be accompanied by a clearing-out of the commodity ones.

Two senses of direction sat side by side inside the company. One was reinforcement in polycrystalline silicon, in anticipation of expanding semiconductor and solar-cell demand; the other was structural rationalisation of chlor-alkali and cement as they turned into commodities. The symbol of the first was the founding in August 2009 of Tokuyama Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., a polycrystalline silicon manufacturing and sales company — at the time, an accelerator into a growth segment. The answer to the second had not yet been given as of 2009. The judgement to press down on both at once decided the next decade. Stepping into the largest overseas investment in the company’s history, in a dimension quite separate from the core business, in the year after the first post-war loss, must have provoked argument inside the company. Running contraction and expansion at the same time carried the danger that if either one seized up, the whole balance would go.

2009–2017The Malaysian bet, and a ¥100.6bn curtain call

Tokuyama put the largest single investment in its history into solar-grade polycrystalline silicon in Malaysia, then watched Chinese oversupply erase the price assumption the plan rested on, and wrote off the result across three consecutive loss-making years. The exit in May 2017 repudiated the 2009 plan outright — and left the company with the two axes it had quietly kept alive underneath the impairments.

Overseas investment to ride the solar-cell wave

Tokuyama Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., established in 2009, was designated as a new site to supply solar-grade polycrystalline silicon in volume. The concept was to take the purification technology built up at the Tokuyama works and deploy it wholesale in Malaysia, riding the global renewable-energy investment that followed the Lehman shock and the expansion of Chinese solar-cell makers. Silicon purification is a business decided by plant investment and the unit cost of energy, and cheap overseas electric power and cost-advantaged land were the draw. The assumption inside the company at the time was that the Malaysian plant would sit alongside the existing plant at Tokuyama and that supply volume would double in step with growing world demand. Construction spending ran to several hundred billion yen in total — the largest single investment in the company’s history. The choice to make general solar-grade material, rather than advanced semiconductor grade, the main battlefield became the decisive one in determining the scale of the losses that followed.

The plan, however, went wrong from the start and kept going wrong. While construction delays and commissioning trouble pushed full operation further away, the market for solar-grade polycrystalline silicon fell sharply on oversupply from Chinese producers, and the price assumption collapsed. The market peaked just as the plant was starting up, so that product was launched into the middle of a glut — the worst possible timing. In the year to March 2013 the company booked an extraordinary loss of $330.9M (¥32bn) and a net loss of $388.3M (¥38bn), and had no choice but to move to impair the plant. Four years after the first post-war loss, a loss of unprecedented scale appeared. The market cycle written into the plan had been centred on the upside case, and there was little preparation for the downside scenario of mass entry by Chinese producers and a collapse in prices. It is the fate of a process industry that a plant, once started up, cannot easily be stopped.

A net loss of ¥100.6bn — among the largest in the company’s history

The losses did not stop at one. In June 2015 the presidency passed from Kogo Kazuhisa (幸後和壽) to Yokota Hiroshi (横田浩), and the man who would lead the rebuilding took his post. Even so, the year to March 2015 brought a net loss of $539.6M (¥65bn), and the year to March 2016 finally a net loss of $924.3M (¥101bn) together with an extraordinary loss of $1.2B (¥126bn). The solar-cell market for the Malaysian business had collapsed in all but name, and the cumulative impairments reached a scale among the largest in the company’s history. Three consecutive loss-making years from 2013 came not from a single year of poor markets but from a structural cause: the premise of the business itself had disappeared. Consolidated sales at their peak were around $2.8B (¥300bn), and a single-year loss of more than ¥100bn drove the company into a state that was critical from the point of view of capital structure as well, on both the equity ratio and the interest-bearing debt ratio.

For a company with consolidated sales of the order of ¥300bn at its peak, a loss of more than ¥100bn in one year was something that could not be overlooked, in terms of corporate governance or of capital structure. Yet over the same period other new fields went on growing as businesses — the advanced semiconductor grade of polycrystalline silicon, dental equipment, aluminium nitride heat-dissipating materials. The advanced semiconductor line at Tokuyama sat outside the Chinese price offensive, and Omnichroma, the dental product launched in 2013, had begun gaining share in the United States. The scenario for rebuilding narrowed to a single shape: keep the growth fields, and settle the commodity bet. Within polycrystalline silicon itself the axis became a selection by application — abandon the general solar-cell grade, keep the advanced semiconductor grade.

May 2017 — the day the Malaysian business was let go

In May 2017 Tokuyama transferred the entire shareholding in Tokuyama Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. to OCI of South Korea and withdrew completely from the Malaysian polycrystalline silicon business. The terms of the transfer were shaped by a priority on bringing down the curtain on the business, and the accumulated losses reached a point of settlement. What the company chose here was to repudiate the very concept of 2009 — supplying solar-grade material from overseas production. OCI, the buyer, was betting on a recovery in the market for solar-grade silicon; Tokuyama took the decision to step off the same market. In a process industry, whether to hold on to a plant that remains after impairment or to fix the loss and let it go is a branching point of managerial judgement. Tokuyama chose the latter, and turned its decade in Malaysia into a settlement.

After the withdrawal the business structure was reorganised onto two axes: the traditional businesses of chemicals and cement, and the growth businesses of advanced electronic materials and life sciences. While the July 2018 acquisition of Tokuyama Kairiku Unso (徳山海陸運送) brought logistics in-house, research and development investment was concentrated on advanced semiconductor and dental applications, as though to recover the decade lost in Malaysia. That the seeds sown by the 1988 five-year plan had not withered during the crisis was the condition that supported the later rebuilding. Had the business foundations of Omnichroma in dental materials or of advanced semiconductor polycrystalline silicon been dismantled in this period as well, the growth drivers of the 2010s onwards would have been lost. In the shadow of the impairments, the research and development lines inside the company were in fact preserved, kept safe as candidates to lead the rebuilding.

Read the full history in Japanese →

Notes

  1. 日本会社史総覧 (A Conspectus of Japanese Company Histories, Toyo Keizai Inc., 1995)↩
  2. Tokuyama Corporation, annual securities report, the “History” section↩
  3. Tokuyama Corporation, annual securities report, the “History” section↩
  4. Tokuyama Corporation, annual securities report, the “History” section↩
  5. Tokuyama Corporation, annual securities report, the “History” section↩
  6. 企業の歴史 : 明治百年 (Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968)↩
  7. 日本会社史総覧 (A Conspectus of Japanese Company Histories, Toyo Keizai Inc., 1995)↩
  8. 日本会社史総覧 (A Conspectus of Japanese Company Histories, Toyo Keizai Inc., 1995)↩
  9. Tokuyama Corporation, annual securities report, the “History” section↩
  10. 日本会社史総覧 (A Conspectus of Japanese Company Histories, Toyo Keizai Inc., 1995)↩
  11. 日本会社史総覧 (A Conspectus of Japanese Company Histories, Toyo Keizai Inc., 1995)↩
  12. Tokuyama Corporation, annual securities report, the “History” section↩
  13. Tokuyama Corporation, annual securities report, the “History” section↩
  14. Tokuyama Corporation, annual securities report, the “History” section↩
  15. Tokuyama Corporation, annual securities report, the “History” section↩
  16. 日本会社史総覧 (A Conspectus of Japanese Company Histories, Toyo Keizai Inc., 1995)↩
  17. 企業の歴史 : 明治百年 (Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968)↩
  18. 企業の歴史 : 明治百年 (Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968)↩
  19. 日本会社史総覧 (A Conspectus of Japanese Company Histories, Toyo Keizai Inc., 1995)↩
  20. Tokuyama Corporation, annual securities report, the “History” section↩
  21. 企業の歴史 : 明治百年 (Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968)↩
  22. 日本会社史総覧 (A Conspectus of Japanese Company Histories, Toyo Keizai Inc., 1995)↩
  23. 日本会社史総覧 (A Conspectus of Japanese Company Histories, Toyo Keizai Inc., 1995)↩

References & sources

  1. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha (1968), the Tokuyama Soda entry.
  2. A Conspectus of Japanese Company Histories, Toyo Keizai Inc. (1995), the Tokuyama entry.
  3. Tokuyama Corporation (TSE 4043) — company disclosures and corporate-history materials.

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