Food & Life Companies (Sushiro)

Company history

Financial history 2015–2025 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1984
Head office
Suita, Osaka, Japan
Listed
2003; relisted 2017
Founder
Shimizu Yoshio
Revenue · FYE Mar 2025
$2.9B (¥430bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2025
$153M (¥23bn)
Food & Life Companies (Sushiro): long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1984A sushi shop that turned itself into a chain

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1984Shimizu Yoshio founds Sushi Taro in Toyonaka, Osaka
  2. 1991Switches to directly operated stores; first round-trip conveyor store
  3. 1995Dedicated preparation plant beside the Takarazuka Akura store

Sushiro began in October 1984, when Shimizu Yoshio set up Sushi Taro in Toyonaka, Osaka, and opened his first store there. Shimizu was a trained sushi chef, which made the company an oddity in conveyor-belt sushi: alone among the chains, it came out of a sushi counter rather than out of restaurant operation. It was also late. The established conveyor chains were already multiplying stores, and a latecomer with no scale had only one axis left to compete on — the quality of the sushi itself.

The first half of the 1990s turned that craft into an organization. In October 1991 the company switched its expansion policy to directly operated stores and opened Ochiai, its first store with a round-trip conveyor, in Kobe; running the stores itself put operating quality under head-office control. In December 1995 it built a preparation plant next to its Takarazuka Akura store, so that fish no longer had to be prepped in the back of each shop. Direct operation and centralized preparation were not, at the time, glamorous choices — but together they were the precondition for everything the company did next.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1996One hundred yen a plate — and a national chain

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1996Flat $1 (¥100) a plate at the Takashi store
  2. 2000Renamed Akindo Sushiro; head office to Settsu
  3. 2001Enters Kanto (2002: Chubu)
  4. 2003Lists on the TSE second section
  5. 2008Four regions opened in six months — all Japan but Okinawa
  6. 2008Unison Capital’s tender offer takes 65.19%

In September 1996 the company opened Takashi, in Takarazuka, at a flat $1 (¥100) a plate. At that time the ¥100 segment was shorthand in Japan for cheap and nasty; the third president, Toyosaki Kenichi, later recalled that conveyor-belt sushi was simply not taken seriously. Walking into that segment as a chef-run business was a refusal of the choice between price and quality. It was also a transfer of risk: fixing the price means the company, not the customer, carries every swing in the cost of fish — a move available only to a firm that already held direct operation and its own preparation.

The identity followed the format. In 1999 it merged with the identically named company run by Shimizu’s younger brother, consolidating the family business into one; in December 2000 it renamed itself Akindo Sushiroあきんど, “merchant” — and moved to Settsu with a new plant and warehouse inside the head office. Kanto followed in 2001 and Chubu in 2002, and in September 2003, nineteen years after the first store, it listed on the second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Then it reversed its own centralization: in 2003 it handed Kanto delivery to outside logistics, and in 2004 it abolished the head-office plant altogether, pushing preparation out to regional kitchens so that distance shrank as the store network spread. Head office moved to Suita in 2005.

The founder stepped down in April 2006, handing the presidency to a professional operator — the first break between owner and manager. Then came 2008. Between January and July the chain made its first openings in Shikoku, Tohoku, Kyushu and Hokkaido, covering every major region but Okinawa in six months. In the same year, in September, AS Holdings — a vehicle of Unison Capital — launched a tender offer, and by November held 65.19% of the shares.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2009Two funds, and the first store abroad

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2015 · consolidated
Revenue$1.1B
Net income$31M
Net margin2.8%
FY2016 · consolidated
Revenue$1.4B
Net income$29M
Net margin2.2%
  1. 2009Delisted from the TSE; Toyosaki Kenichi becomes president
  2. 2011Sushiro Korea — the first store outside Japan
  3. 2012Permira replaces Unison as owner
  4. 2015Mizutome Koichi becomes president; holding-company structure
  5. 2015Renamed Sushiro Global Holdings

The company left the market in April 2009 and was absorbed into the acquisition vehicle a month later. Toyosaki Kenichi became president in June and ran the private phase. Freed from quarterly disclosure, management could put money and attention into openings and store improvement on a longer clock — the point of going private in the first place, and the thing that made the later recovery possible.

In April 2011, with 321 stores at home and expansion room thinning, it set up Sushiro Korea in Seoul — its first move abroad, and the seed of the later network in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand. In September 2012 Permira, through CEIL Japan, bought out Unison’s entire holding, merged the company into itself in January 2013 and restored the Akindo Sushiro name. Two funds in five years, each handover bringing another reorganization and another change of corporate name.

In February 2015 Toyosaki gave way to Mizutome Koichi, brought in from outside after Dentsu and Japan Airlines — the first president who had not come up through the business. A month later the group moved to a holding-company structure, renamed the holding company Sushiro Global Holdings in October, and split its urban, higher-priced formats into a separate company. The scaffolding for relisting, for acquisitions and for overseas subsidiaries was now in place.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2017Relisting, Kyotaru, and Food & Life

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2017 · consolidated
Revenue$1.4B
Net income$62M
Net margin4.5%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$2.9B
Net income$153M
Net margin5.3%
  1. 2017Relists on the TSE first section — Permira’s exit
  2. 2021Renamed FOOD & LIFE COMPANIES; acquires Kyotaru
  3. 2022The flat ¥100 plate ends after 26 years
  4. 2024Yamamoto Masahiro succeeds Mizutome
  5. 2025Overseas Sushiro passes 30% of sushi revenue

Okinawa in 2015 completed coverage of all forty-seven prefectures; a first urban-format store followed in 2016. In March 2017 the group relisted on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, eight years after leaving it — the exit through which Permira recovered its investment. Overseas subsidiaries then came in a run: Taiwan in 2017, Singapore in 2018, Hong Kong in 2019, Thailand in 2020, China in 2021. A 2017 capital tie-up with Shinmei and Genki Sushi, aimed at consolidating the domestic industry, produced nothing and was unwound in 2019.

In April 2021 the holding company dropped Sushiro from its own name and became FOOD & LIFE COMPANIES — a deliberate redefinition from conveyor-belt sushi to food and daily life. In the same month it bought Kyotaru, the long-established takeaway sushi chain in stations and department stores, to catch the takeaway demand that the pandemic had created. The group now stood on three legs: eat-in Sushiro, takeaway Kyotaru, and the higher-priced urban formats. Then, in October 2022, the promise that had defined it since 1996 was folded up: a weak yen and rising raw-material costs pushed the flat ¥100 plate to $1 (¥120)$1 (¥150).

In October 2024 Mizutome handed over to Yamamoto Masahiro after some nine and a half years. By FY2025 (year to September) revenue reached $2.9B (¥430bn) with operating profit of $240.6M (¥36bn), and the centre of gravity had moved: overseas Sushiro grew from $154.9M (¥17bn) in FY2021 to $878M (¥131bn), more than 30% of sushi revenue, against ¥265.9 billion at home. Kyotaru, by contrast, fell short and is being pruned. The medium-term plan calls for the largest opening programme in the company’s history and an overseas network of 300–320 stores, while a 2024 tie-up with the sea-urchin farming venture Uninomics addresses the risk that sits under all of it — that warming seas will move the fish the whole business is built on.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1996

Going to a flat ¥100 a plate at the Takashi store (1996)

The author’s view

To read the 1996 move to a single price as merely following the low-price competition does not fit what the company had been doing in the years just before. Sushi Taro had switched to directly operated stores five years earlier, and the year before had built a preparation plant next to its Takarazuka Akura store. To fix a price at ¥100 means the store side takes the swings in cost onto itself — a hand hard to play for a company that does not hold its own preparation in its own hands. That president Shimizu Yoshio could descend into that territory was, it appears, because the eye for fish he had carried since his 鯛すし days and the structure of direct operation and in-house processing were both in place.

That said, the ¥100 price did not go on protecting the company forever. The flat pricing begun in 1996 ended in October 2022, moving to ¥120–150 a plate in the face of a weak yen and rising raw-material costs. The thirty consecutive years of revenue growth that Toyosaki Kenichi spoke of were themselves the flip side of years spent absorbing rising costs while holding the price still. A single price was a weapon in competition and, at the same time, a promise the company would one day have to fold up itself once the market moved.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2008

Accepting Unison Capital’s tender offer and leaving the Tokyo Stock Exchange (2008)

The question of whose umbrella to fight under

Read this going-private as nothing more than a buyout by an investment fund and you miss its spine. The largest reason Sushiro let go of the listing was to avoid being swallowed into the merger with Kappa Sushi that its largest shareholder, Zensho, had drawn up — a “number one and number two alliance” that would have bound the market together by scale. To protect its own way of working — a cost ratio of 50% and preparation done inside the store, both rooted in its sushi-chef origins — it chose a move in capital instead: to team up with Unison Capital and swap out its controlling shareholder. That, it appears, is where the core of this decision lies.

The price of independence, though, was that the company handed its own shares over as a fund’s possession. What waited for it after it left the market was a succession of backers — Unison giving way to Permira — and years in which management was tied to an investor’s timetable for recovering its money. Even so, being free of quarterly disclosure let it pour resources into openings and store improvement, and that led on to the relisting and to first place in conveyor-belt sushi. Choosing afresh whose umbrella to fight under can itself be a management decision; Sushiro’s going-private can be read as one instance of that.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2011

Setting up Sushiro Korea and opening the first store in Seoul (2011)

The author’s view

The explanation that it went abroad because the domestic market was saturated does not capture the character of this expansion. At the moment it committed, Akindo Sushiro had left the stock market and sat under a fund, and it operated 321 stores in Japan. That president Toyosaki Kenichi nonetheless placed a local company capitalized at 3 billion won first, and set a target as distant as 80 stores in seven years, was — it appears — because there was no way to learn whether a format assembled in Japan around a flat ¥100 plate would also hold outside Japan, other than to open its own stores and see.

The figures it raised were not, however, realized as raised. Against a target of 80 stores in seven years, the overseas network as a whole, Korea included, passed 200 stores only in February 2025. The plan to launch with almost the same menu as Japan was likewise rewritten early, into a line-up carrying such things as shrimp nigiri topped with tomato. What supported the East Asian expansion that followed was less the accuracy of the plan first drawn than the fact that judgment could be left to the stores on the ground.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Food & Life Companies (Sushiro) full history in Japanese →

  1. FOOD & LIFE COMPANIES / Akindo Sushiro — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports), including the corporate-history section.
  2. FOOD & LIFE COMPANIES — earnings briefing materials (決算説明会), FY2026 plan.
  3. Diamond Online — ダイヤモンド・オンライン: 4 Aug 2014, Toyosaki Kenichi interview link; 19 May 2022, on the chef-founded, fund-raised chain link; 2 Jan 2025, Yamamoto Masahiro interview link.
  4. Toyo Keizai Online — 東洋経済オンライン: 29 Dec 2012, on choosing a fund again after a fund link; 27 May 2024.
  5. Nihon Keizai Shimbun — 日本経済新聞: Aug 2011, first store abroad in Korea link; Dec 2013, the Korean CEO on sushi toppings link; May 2022, the end of the ¥100 plate link; 2 Aug 2024.
  6. M&A Online — 24 Sep 2008, on the Unison Capital tender offer link.
  7. Akindo Sushiro — news release on the opening of the first overseas store in Seoul, 2011 link.
  8. Ryutsu News — 流通ニュース, 2025: overseas network passes 200 stores, targeting more than 310 in FY2026 link.
  9. Keieisha Tsushin Online — 経営者通信Online, Feb 2022, Mizutome Koichi interview link.
  10. Cambria Palaceカンブリア宮殿 (TV Tokyo), Feb 2011, with Toyosaki Kenichi.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


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Data API

Food & Life Companies (Sushiro)’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/3563/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/3563/history.json History overview
GET /api/3563/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/3563/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/3563/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/3563/executives.json Executives
GET /api/3563/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/3563/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/3563/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/3563/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/3563/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/3563/workforce.json Workforce