Colowide

Company history

Financial history 2006–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1963
Head office
Kanagawa, Japan
Listed
2000
Origin
A restaurant in Zushi, Kanagawa
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$1.9B (¥300bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$13.9M (¥2bn)
Colowide: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1963Owning the district, one izakaya at a time

  1. 1963A restaurant company is incorporated in Zushi, Kanagawa
  2. 1977Converted into the Amataro izakaya — the founding store
  3. 1981Ofuna store begins expansion by directly operated outlets only
  4. 1986Enters Tokyo; head office moves to Fujisawa; Zushi processing plant
  5. 1987Second format, Sanmado

The company traces back to a small eating house incorporated in April 1963 in Zushi, a seaside town in Kanagawa. It became something else in September 1977, when the Amataro Shokudo was converted into Amataro, a “handmade” izakaya; that Zushi shop was thereafter treated as the founding store. The president of the day later described the beginning as a thirty-tsubo Amataro opened in 1977, and said the company had expanded it ever since entirely through directly operated stores. The idea behind the format was not cheapness but the hours after work — a comfortable place to talk, with a differentiated menu, roomy seating and karaoke. Rather than chase a discount war, the company read its customers by sex, age and spend and built stores to match.

From the Ofuna store of November 1981, expansion ran on company-operated outlets only. Machida took it into Tokyo in 1986, the same year the head office moved to Fujisawa and a plant was set up in Zushi to process ingredients in-house. This was deliberately the opposite of franchising a single sign across the country: hold the operation, hold the district. It also meant that the more stores there were, the more the company’s own processing and supply paid for itself — a structure recognised early.

The formats then multiplied — Sanmado, skewers and kettle-cooked rice, in 1987; a dining-karaoke format in 1992 — each aimed at a different age band and spend. The president called this the “number one in the district” trade: gather a wide range of customers within one area with several of your own formats, which is the reverse of running one format across a wide territory. Distinctive menus, compound openings and the fast in-house format development that direct operation allows carried the company through these years.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1994Colowide: central kitchens, a listing, a holding company

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1994Renamed Colowide; first kitchen distribution centre, Kamakura
  2. 1999Shares registered over the counter; 104 stores
  3. 2000Lists on the TSE Second Section
  4. 2002Promoted to the First Section; first acquisitions
  5. 2004Converts to a holding company with regional operating subsidiaries

In September 1994 the company renamed itself Colowide, a coinage from Courage, Love, Wisdom and Decision — a statement that it intended to be a general restaurant company rather than the operator of one izakaya brand. The following month it closed the Zushi plant and opened a kitchen distribution centre in Kamakura, later adding Osaka and Urawa. Taking the preparation out of each store’s kitchen was the only way to keep a “handmade” taste from varying store to store once there were many stores; it is the manufacturing-retail structure the group still runs on.

The centres were rented, not built. Speaking in 1999, the president put total investment in the three of them at around ¥120m — cheap, because he wanted the capital to go into stores — and credited them with making consistent food, hygiene control and the compound-store district strategy possible at once. By the end of October 1999 there were 104 stores, mostly Amataro, across Kanagawa and Tokyo with a foothold in Osaka; average spend was held under ¥5,000, and about ¥3,000 at Amataro itself. His stated medium-term goal was an 8% ordinary margin.

Capital markets followed. Colowide registered its shares over the counter in October 1999, listed on the Second Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in October 2000, and moved to the First Section in September 2002 — a national listed company less than forty years from a single Zushi restaurant, with proceeds going straight into openings and distribution centres at a pace of more than thirty new stores a year. Then the method of growth changed. Acquisitions began in 2002, and in October 2004 Colowide converted to a holding company, splitting its operating arm into regional companies for eastern Japan, western Japan and Hokkaido plus a central-kitchen company. Putting operating subsidiaries beneath a holding company made it far easier to take in an outside restaurant company whole and tidy up the structure by merger afterwards — a sequence it would use again and again.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2005Growth by acquisition

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2006 · consolidated
Revenue$801M
Net income$3M
Net margin0.4%
FY2015 · consolidated
Revenue$1.5B
Net income$12M
Net margin0.8%
  1. 2005Atom consolidated
  2. 2006The yakiniku chain Miya joins the group
  3. 2012Takes 66.6% of Rex Holdings — Gyu-Kaku and Reins International
  4. 2014Takes 50.71% of Kappa Create — Kappa Sushi
  5. 2016Revenue reaches about ¥234.1bn — 1.8× in three years

With the holding structure in place, buying restaurant companies became the main engine of growth. Atom, a conveyor-belt sushi and restaurant operator, was consolidated in October 2005; the yakiniku chain Miya followed in July 2006, alongside others. Each came with its own sign and its own network, and Colowide lined them up under the holding company with their brands intact rather than absorbing them into its own. Nor did it leave them as bought: Atom merged in a sister company in 2006, Miya was combined with another subsidiary in 2007, and duplicated functions were folded together while the brands and store networks stayed where they were.

In the 2010s the deals got much larger. In October 2012 Colowide took 66.6% of Rex Holdings, owner of the yakiniku chain Gyu-Kaku and of Reins International, absorbing one of the largest restaurant groups in Japan. In December 2014 it took 50.71% of Kappa Create Holdings, operator of the Kappa Sushi conveyor-belt chain. Izakaya, yakiniku and conveyor-belt sushi — the three principal Japanese restaurant formats — were now all inside the group, acquired rather than raised.

The effect on scale was immediate and almost arithmetical. Consolidated revenue went from about ¥128.4bn in the year to March 2013, the first under IFRS, to about ¥177.6bn in the year to March 2015 with a full year of Rex, and to about $2.2B (¥234bn) in the year to March 2016 with Kappa Create added — roughly 1.8 times in three years. Atom, Reins International, Kappa Create and the group’s procurement arm sat side by side beneath the holding company, each running its own brands: a federation rather than a chain.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2016Ootoya, COVID, and the cost of buying

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2016 · consolidated
Revenue$2.2B
Net income$3M
Net margin0.1%
FY2026 · consolidated
Revenue$1.9B
Net income$14M
Net margin0.7%
  1. 2016Freshness Burger acquired through Reins International
  2. 2020Hostile tender offer takes Ootoya Holdings to 46.8%
  3. 2021COVID: operating loss of about ¥13.3bn
  4. 2025Acquires the Australian operator Seagrass Holdco
  5. 2026Revenue about ¥300.1bn; C-United acquired

The buying continued into new categories. In December 2016 Colowide took the burger chain Freshness Burger through Reins International, adding café and fast food. Then in September 2020 came the deal it is best known for: a tender offer for Ootoya Holdings, the set-meal chain, launched and completed without the agreement of Ootoya’s own management, lifting Colowide’s stake to 46.8% and making it a consolidated subsidiary. A hostile offer pushed through against an incumbent board is rare in Japan, and it drew wide attention; it also completed the set — izakaya, yakiniku, conveyor-belt sushi and now set meals, nearly every major Japanese restaurant format under one roof.

Scale of this kind carries a weight on the balance sheet. Successive acquisitions left the group with substantial goodwill, so that when trading deteriorated the write-downs came with it: a net loss of about ¥5.6bn in the year to March 2017, and then, with impairments, an operating loss of about ¥4.6bn and a net loss of about ¥6.4bn in the year to March 2020. COVID made it far worse — an operating loss of about ¥13.3bn and a net loss of about ¥10.1bn in the year to March 2021 — because a business built on people coming through the door has no defence when they stop.

The recovery was run through restructuring as much as through returning customers. Directly operated izakaya were consolidated into a single subsidiary, peripheral businesses in confectionery and contract food service were bought in 2024, the Australian operator Seagrass Holdco in 2025 and the café group C-United in 2026. Consolidated revenue for the year to March 2026 came to about $1.9B (¥300bn) with operating profit of roughly ¥9.4bn. The izakaya chain that started with one store in Zushi is now a holding company for a large number of other people’s brands.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1994

Closing the Zushi plant for the Kamakura kitchen centre — building the central-kitchen network (1994)

A plant held as a function, a plant that became an asset

Three distribution centres, all rented, for total investment of something like ¥120m — the answer the president gave in a 1999 lecture contains the core of the decision. Having chosen direct operation throughout and the “number one in the district” trade, there was no way to stop a handmade taste varying from store to store except to strip the preparation out of the kitchens. And yet the money was wanted for stores. A rented central kitchen was the compromise that satisfied both. Separating having a plant from building one is where the lightness of this period lay.

That lightness did not last. Total investment in the Nagahama plant ran to about ¥4.5bn — an order of magnitude away from the rented years. The reason for building it was the increase in stores in western Japan brought by the acquisitions of Reins International and Kappa Create: rather than a capability existing first and then supporting acquisitions, it was largely the acquisitions that set the scale of the capability. And as Ootoya’s president Kubota sought to protect the virtue of cooking inside the restaurant, there are signs on which standardisation does not take. Vertical integration is a device for lowering cost, but it is also a mechanism that forces the question, every time, of what to leave intact in the company you have bought.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Colowide full history in Japanese →

  1. Colowide Co., Ltd. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Colowide Co., Ltd. — 1999 lecture by the company president on the central-kitchen network, store economics and the flotation.
  3. Colowide Co., Ltd. — 決算短信 (earnings releases) and tender offer disclosures for Ootoya Holdings, 2020.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Colowide’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/7616/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/7616/history.json History overview
GET /api/7616/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/7616/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/7616/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/7616/executives.json Executives
GET /api/7616/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/7616/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/7616/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/7616/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/7616/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/7616/workforce.json Workforce