The boardroom fight over responsibility for the land-fraud loss, and the change of chairman and president (2018)
Institutional design, and whether it functions
What this affair raises is less the fraud itself than the shape of the governance the fraud exposed afterwards. The chairman, with no trace of involvement in the transaction, stepped down; the president, who had been first to put his seal on the approval document, was promoted to chairman and leads the present structure — an inversion in which the one bearing the heavier responsibility remained and the lighter one left, played out inside the board itself. The investigation report, commissioned precisely to bring outside eyes to bear, was sealed because of that third-party character and placed beyond the reach of shareholders. That an institution can be well designed and still not function is written plainly here.
The shareholders’ meeting did, however, re-elect the incumbent management. One may read that as strong results outweighing doubts about governance. But most of the loss remains unrecovered, and the attribution of responsibility that the report framed as “heavier the higher one sits” was left without ever taking a definite form. How far a company can describe its own failure in its own words once the crisis has passed — the land-fraud affair seems to have left Sekisui House with that question, weightier than the size of the loss.
Revenue and net margin, FY2013–FY2023
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY2018 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Sekisui House
- 1963 Tanabe Ken’s switch to direct sales, responsible construction and the upmarket house (1963)
- 1976 Do not wait for demand, create it — running on demand creation through the oil shock (1976)
- 1978 Turning 65 branch offices into self-accounting “companies within the company” (1978)
- 1992 Consolidating a sprawl of product brands and regrouping them by buyer segment (1992)
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
Disclaimer
- This page is provided for general information only and is not investment advice, nor a recommendation to buy or sell any security.
- Figures are compiled independently and include our own estimates, approximations and machine-processed data; we make no warranty as to their accuracy or completeness.
- Sources are primarily each company’s securities reports and other public filings, but errors and omissions may remain.
- Any use of this information is at the reader’s own risk. Past performance does not indicate future results.
- Company names, logos and other marks belong to their respective owners.
Data API
Sekisui House’s history, financials, executives and
shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.
Full specification →
| Method | Endpoint | Returns |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/companies.json | All companies |
| GET | /api/1928/manifest.json | Resource index |
| GET | /api/1928/history.json | History overview |
| GET | /api/1928/timeline.json | Chronology |
| GET | /api/decisions.json | All management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/1928/decisions.json | Management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/1928/decisions/{slug}.json | One decision (full dossier) |
| GET | /api/1928/executives.json | Executives |
| GET | /api/1928/shareholders.json | Major shareholders |
| GET | /api/1928/financials.json | Financial statements |
| GET | /api/1928/financials-longterm.json | Long-term results |
| GET | /api/1928/segments.json | Business segments |
| GET | /api/1928/regions.json | Sales by region |
| GET | /api/1928/workforce.json | Workforce |