Kanebo - Company History

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Financial history 1951–2007 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded 1887
Origin 財界人の出資
Founding location 東京都墨田区
Core business at founding Brokerage in imported raw cotton
Listed and delisted 1889–2005 — listed on the pre-war Tokyo Stock Exchange, and the corporation itself ended with the dissolution of 2007
Chairman & President Nakajima Akiyoshi Chairman & President since 2007
Founding
In January 1887 the Tokyo Cotton Trading Company was licensed as a broker standing between the importers and buyers of raw cotton, and in May of the same year it was licensed to set up a spinning works at Kanegafuchi in Sumida village, Katsushika district of Tokyo Prefecture. Volumes did not grow and within two years the trade had run into a wall, so the company installed British ring spinning frames in a mill of 30,000 spindles and rebuilt itself as a manufacturer spinning its own cotton yarn. In August 1888 it was renamed the limited-liability Kanegafuchi Boseki, in January 1889 it listed its shares on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and in May of that year it began operating. There were, however, no engineers in Japan able to run a mill on that scale; losses accumulated, and Mitsui sent in Nakamigawa Hikojiro and then Muto Sanji. Bringing in managers from outside set the direction of the appointments and the growth in scale that followed.
The Decision
Holding on to scale came before any test of which businesses to be in. Muto Sanji put forward the case for a great consolidation of the spinning industry, and from 1899 onward he bought up small and mid-sized spinners in difficulty and re-equipped them with British machinery, until by 1933 Kanebo was the largest company in Japan by sales across all industries. When the position of natural fibres gave way, the company turned to diversification with the Greater Kanebo plan of October 1961, and in 1967 reorganised itself into pentagon management, ranging textiles, cosmetics, food, housing and pharmaceuticals side by side. More than thirty plants and the employment of tens of thousands became a source of pride in themselves, and the internal logic that treated the maintenance of scale as the condition of survival took hold here. Even when the founding textile business collapsed in the 1990s the company would not move to shrink, and what accumulated instead was the accounting treatment it called low utilisation, together with channel stuffing.
Today
The corporation is gone; only the businesses continue, each under a different buyer. The accounting fraud came to light in September 2003 and the company fell into a shortfall in net assets on the order of $543.5M (¥63bn), and in March 2004 it asked the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan for support. The rehabilitation plan did not take up an independent rebuilding centred on cosmetics; it set as its basic policy the sale of the businesses one unit at a time. Cosmetics went to Kao for about $3.7B (¥410bn), textiles to Seiren, and food, household products and pharmaceuticals to Kracie. The parent itself was delisted from the first sections of both the Tokyo and Osaka exchanges in June 2005, and in 2007 it changed its trading name to Kaigan Bell Management and brought its corporate existence to an end. Consolidated sales of $57.7M (¥7bn) in the final year, to March 2007, had shrunk to 1 per cent of the $5.4B (¥681bn) of the peak year to March 1992.
Competition
What separates Kanebo from the other companies that came out of spinning is when each of them left its founding business. Nittobo gave up cotton spinning in 1998 and moved to glass fibre alone, and Fujibo Holdings became a holding company in 2005 and concentrated its resources on abrasives. Unitika, which held on, withdrew from textiles altogether in 2024, asking for $574.3M (¥87bn) of financial support and seeing its whole board step down. Kanebo widened its diversification from 1961 without reducing the textile side, carried both, and bought time with fraudulent accounts. Owning a highly profitable business in cosmetics is what delayed the decision to shrink. The Industrial Revitalization Corporation did not take up an independent rebuilding precisely because those cosmetics were the asset that would sell for the most as a source of repayment to creditors.

Timeline

1886–1936From cotton broker to spinner, and the case for great consolidation

  1. 1886Five Tokyo cotton wholesale houses found the Tokyo Cotton Trading Company
  2. 1887Forward trading in raw cotton opens; capital raised to ¥1m for a Kanegafuchi mill
  3. 1889Shares listed on the pre-war Tokyo Stock Exchange (東京株式取引所) in January; renamed Kanegafuchi Boseki in August
  4. 1892Nakamigawa Hikojiro and Asabuki Eiji join the board from Mitsui
  5. 1893Nakamigawa becomes president; a second Tokyo mill opens and yarn is first exported
  6. 1897Weaving added alongside spinning as acquired mills come in
  7. 1900Muto Sanji advances the case for great consolidation and steps up acquisitions
  8. 1901Nakamigawa dies; the company sets its course as an integrated textile maker
  9. 1906Entry into silk with the Kyoto branch mill
  10. 1921Muto becomes president; the move into silk reeling begins
  11. 1933Kanebo ranks first among Japanese companies by sales
  12. 1936Largest company in Japan by sales outside the semi-state Nippon Steel

1937–1960War, expansion into everything, and the retreat to textiles alone

  1. 1937Pyongyang rayon mill built; rayon and staple fibre added
  2. 1938Kanegafuchi Jitsugyo formed with ¥60m capital for the non-textile businesses
  3. 1941The six Keori Kogyo mills formally merged; capital reaches ¥70m
  4. 1944Kanegafuchi Boseki and Kanegafuchi Jitsugyo merge as Kanegafuchi Kogyo
  5. 1946Name reverts to Kanegafuchi Boseki; non-textile divisions cut away
  6. 1948Muto Itoji becomes president and leads the restoration
  7. 1949Chemical plants spun off as Kanegafuchi Chemical Industry, later Kaneka
  8. 1949Shares listed afresh in May on the Tokyo Stock Exchange as it reopened after the war
  9. 1950Nihon Cellulose Kogyo merged; capital reaches ¥1.78bn
  10. 1951Korean War procurement lifts half-year sales to ¥24.7bn
  11. 1953Kanebo New York established; profit falls back as the boom ends
  12. 1958Part of the spinning capacity suspended; sericulture split off as Kanegafuchi Sanshi
  13. 1959Hakata, Nakatsu and Nakajima mills closed

1961–1992Diversification, and the concentration of profit in cosmetics

  1. 1961Greater Kanebo construction plan announced; nylon, cosmetics and food set as growth fields
  2. 1962Kanebo Cosmetics merged into the parent; entry into cosmetics
  3. 1964The plan completed; the three o'clock in the afternoon view of cotton rejected
  4. 1965Tachibana Seika merged in August, taking the company into food
  5. 1966Management control of Yamashiro Seiyaku taken over; entry into pharmaceuticals
  6. 1967Pentagon management set out across textiles, cosmetics, food, drugs and housing
  7. 1968Ito Junji becomes president at 45; 60 plants and over 70 affiliates
  8. 1970Five domestic mills closed
  9. 1971Trading name changed from Kanegafuchi Boseki to Kanebo
  10. 1975Dividend passed; four mills closed; expelled from Zensen Domei over the wage freeze
  11. 1977Natural-fibre division hived off into a subsidiary
  12. 1982Two domestic mills closed
  13. 1992Four domestic mills closed

1993–2007The founding business collapses, the accounts unravel, and the company is broken up

  1. 1993Cotton yarn hits ¥58,000 a bale; two spinning mills and one weaving mill suspended
  2. 1994Ishihara Soichi becomes president; ¥24bn of fixed assets sold to avoid a net-asset shortfall
  3. 1996Consolidated shortfall of ¥24.9bn; interest-bearing debt reaches ¥500bn
  4. 1998Hoashi Takashi becomes president; a three-year 10 per cent pay cut for 15,000 union members
  5. 1999Prescription drugs sold to Nippon Organon; consolidated ordinary profit back in surplus
  6. 2001Trading name changed to Kanebo, written in katakana
  7. 2003Interim results point to a consolidated net-asset shortfall of about ¥63bn
  8. 2004Talks with Kao broken off; the Industrial Revitalization Corporation backs the whole group
  9. 2004Hoashi and seven directors resign; Nakajima Akiyoshi installed as president
  10. 2005Shares delisted in June; cosmetics sold to Kao for about ¥410bn in December
  11. 2005Three ChuoAoyama accountants indicted over the fraud, cumulatively at the ¥200bn level
  12. 2006The three core businesses transferred to a fund consortium for ¥43.4bn
  13. 2007Dissolution resolved; the name changed to Kaigan Bell Management

Founding Story

1886–1936From cotton broker to spinner, and the case for great consolidation

Kanebo began as a trading house that could not make trading pay, and within three years had rebuilt itself as a spinning mill on the Kanegafuchi flats east of Tokyo. Two men sent in from Mitsui — Nakamigawa Hikojiro and, after him, Muto Sanji — turned that rescue into a doctrine of buying up weaker spinners and re-equipping them, and by 1936 the company that doctrine produced was the largest in Japan by sales outside the semi-state steel maker.

From Tokyo Cotton Trading Company to Kanegafuchi Boseki

In November 1886 five houses belonging to the Tokyo ginned-cotton wholesalers' guild — Mitsukoshi, Daimaru, Shirokiya, Arao and Okuda — came together[1] to establish the Tokyo Cotton Trading Company (東京綿商社) with capital of ¥100,000, under Mitsukoshi Tokuemon (三越得右衛門) as its head[2]. Tokyo at the time had nine firms calling themselves ginned-cotton wholesalers, the principal ones being the forerunners of Mitsukoshi, Shirokiya and Daimaru[3]. The purpose of the new company was futures dealing in raw cotton, and it opened forward trading in February 1887[4]. It soon concluded, however, that spinning the cotton and selling it as yarn would pay better, and in April of that year raised its capital to ¥1 million[5]. At Kanegafuchi in Sumida village, Katsushika district of Musashi province, it built a spinning mill of more than 30,000 spindles[6] and named it the Tokyo Cotton Trading Company Kanegafuchi Spinning Works. The building was a showy thing suggestive of a European castle, and public opinion nicknamed it the spinning university.[7]

The company gave up buying and selling raw cotton in August 1888 to become a spinner outright, and changed its name to Kanegafuchi Boseki (鐘淵紡績会社)[8]. In January 1889 it listed its shares on the Tokyo Stock Exchange[9], and in May of the same year it began operating[10]. The opening coincided with a slump, however, and the business was in trouble from the start[11]. With help from Inoue Kaoru (井上馨), business adviser and supervisor to the Mitsui family, Nakamigawa Hikojiro (中上川彦次郎), the family's senior managing director, came in to rebuild it[12]. Nakamigawa took a seat on the board in January 1892 together with Asabuki Eiji (朝吹英二), a director of Mitsui's industrial division[13], and in January 1893 succeeded Mitsukoshi Tokuemon as president[14]. That same year of 1893 a second Tokyo mill of 10,000 spindles was added, and the company made its first export of cotton yarn[15].

With an eye on opening markets on the Chinese mainland, Nakamigawa built a Hyogo branch mill at Kobe, giving it 40,000 spindles and a site of more than 38,000 tsubo[16]. To the manager entrusted with the whole of that construction he appointed Muto Sanji (武藤山治), who had shown his ability at the Kobe branch of Mitsui Bank[17]. Muto was 28 at the time[18]. Through purchases and mergers the mills at Sumidono, Nakajima, Sumoto, Miike, Kurume, Kumamoto, Nakatsu and Hakata were added to the cotton-yarn works[19], and in 1897 the company moved into weaving as well[20]. Capital reached ¥11,606,800 in May 1907[21]. Production of cotton yarn grew on the two-site base of Tokyo and Hyogo[22], and the business widened through the later Meiji years.

Buying the small spinners: the case for great consolidation

After Nakamigawa died in October 1901, his ideals passed to Muto Sanji[23]. Muto regarded the scatter of small and minor spinners as a national disadvantage, put forward the case for a great consolidation of the spinning industry (紡績大合同論)[24], and set out a pattern of rescue in which financially weak small and mid-sized spinners were bought, their machinery replaced and their management reformed. The firms Kanebo merged or acquired in the Meiji and Taisho periods alone ran to fifteen companies and twenty-six mills, beginning with Shanghai Spinning[25]. In 1906 it entered the silk business by building a Kyoto branch mill[26], then merged Nihon Kenmen Boshoku and Kinuito Boseki to begin making silk yarn and cloth[27]. Kanebo's move into silk reeling shifted what had been a cottage industry onto a modern industrial footing, and gave form to Muto's ideal of building the nation on silk through the use of domestic resources[28].

In 1916 the company built the Yodogawa mill and began bleaching, dyeing and print finishing of cotton yarn and cloth[29]. From 1921 it moved into silk reeling as well, and by the early Showa years its silk-related plants numbered twenty-three[30]. Muto became president in July 1921 and directed the expansion of the business until he stepped down in January 1930[31]. In the early Showa years new mills were built at Hikone, Nagahama and Maruko[32], and further mergers and acquisitions added three companies in the cotton division and, from 1931 onward, ten more in silk reeling[33]. Expansion overseas began with the 1911 merger of Shanghai Manufacturing Silk[34], gathered pace with the First World War, and from 1922 saw the Kota No. 1 through No. 9 mills newly built or acquired at Shanghai, Qingdao and Tianjin[35].

By 1936 Kanebo was, leaving aside the semi-state Nippon Steel, the largest company in Japan by sales[36]. After Muto stepped down, and with Nagao Ryokichi (長尾良吉) in between, Tsuda Shingo (津田信吾) became president in July 1930[37]. Tsuda pushed into diversified management, starting production of woollen yarn and man-made fibres in 1934 and opening up the field of linen goods[38]. In line with national policy on raw materials, sheep rearing, reed cultivation, flax fibre production and even coal mining were added to the business[39]. The full-scale move into man-made fibres began with the construction of the Takasago and Hofu rayon mills in 1934[40]. The wool division likewise set up plants from 1934 in preparation, and in 1936 the company took over the running of six mills of Keori Kogyo[41].

1937–1960War, expansion into everything, and the retreat to textiles alone

Between the China Incident and the surrender, Kanebo's textile business was squeezed almost out of existence by the militarisation of industry, and mining, heavy chemicals, timber and aircraft took its place; in 1944 the two halves were fused into Kanegafuchi Kogyo. Defeat stripped away the whole of the overseas estate, and by 1949 the company had spun off its chemical plants, abolished timber, machinery and mining outright, and kept textiles alone — a base narrow enough that the Korean War boom and its rebound moved the whole company.

Kanegafuchi Jitsugyo split off, then folded back into Kanegafuchi Kogyo

In 1937 the company built the Pyongyang rayon mill and took up the manufacture of rayon and staple fibre[42]. The six Keori Kogyo mills it had been running under contract were formally merged in 1941, followed by the mergers of Ogiwara Keito Boseki and Toyo Boshoku Kogyo[43]. In Manchuria it also ran Kotoku Keori, and in Korea it built plants in a number of places[44]. Over the eight years from the China Incident to the end of the Second World War the textile business was cut back to an extreme degree as industry was turned to military production, and in its place the range of activities widened to mining, heavy chemicals and aircraft[45]. In 1938 a separate company, Kanegafuchi Jitsugyo (鐘淵実業), was established with capital of ¥60 million to carry the non-textile businesses[46]. Kanegafuchi Jitsugyo was created as an offshoot of the old Kanebo[47].

Kanegafuchi Jitsugyo took over the non-textile activities Kanebo had been running and extended them into mining, chemicals, agriculture and stock rearing[48], and through the conversion of Kanebo's own textile mills and the building and buying of others moved into heavy industry, metal mining, timber processing and the aircraft industry[49]. Kanegafuchi Boseki reached capital of ¥70 million in November 1941[50], and held plant comprising 1.31 million cotton spindles and 13,700 cotton looms, 225,000 worsted spindles and 132,000 silk-spinning spindles[51]. Daily output of staple fibre had reached 81 tons and rayon 35 tons[52]. There were also 1,200 woollen looms, 676 spindles of cotton sewing thread and two sets of flax degumming plant[53]. Directly run operations and investments had spread through the former overseas territories of Manchuria, Mongolia, north China, central China and the southern regions[54].

In February 1944, at the demand of the times, Kanegafuchi Boseki and Kanegafuchi Jitsugyo were merged to form Kanegafuchi Kogyo (鐘淵工業) with capital of ¥324 million[55]. It was here that the form of running every business under one roof was created[56]. Defeat, however, took away the entire vast overseas estate; many of the home plants were destroyed or had been converted, and subsidiaries and affiliates were let go[57]. The blows and losses the war inflicted were the heaviest among the companies of the industry[58]. In May 1946 the trading name reverted to Kanegafuchi Boseki, and the non-textile divisions were cut away[59]. In the same year the name reverted, the company established Kanebo Real Estate[60].

Keeping textiles only, and restoring the machinery

Kurachi Shiro (倉知四郎) became president in December 1945, and in June 1948, on Kurachi's retirement, Muto Itoji (武藤絲治) took the post[61]. Muto called for the whole company to unite in getting back on its feet, and led the restoration from the front[62]. In April 1949 seven chemical plants were contributed in kind, at a value of $555,556 (¥200m), to create the second company Kanegafuchi Chemical Industry[63]; in September the separation of the chemical division was completed, the timber, machinery and mining businesses were abolished altogether, and textiles alone were retained[64]. Through this rationalisation the group of businesses that had been extended before the war as far as mining, heavy chemicals and aircraft was narrowed down to textiles alone. The Kanegafuchi Chemical Industry that was spun off is the company later known as Kaneka[65].

Capital rose from ¥324 million at the end of the war to $4.5M (¥2bn) in November 1949[66], and to $4.9M (¥2bn) in September 1950 with the merger of Nihon Cellulose Kogyo[67]. In February 1953 Kanebo New York was established, and representatives were stationed in Bangkok and Hamburg[68]. Restoration of plant reached 636,962 cotton spindles as of April 1955, roughly three times the 213,500 held at the end of the war[69]. Cotton looms went from 2,847 to 6,999, worsted spindles from 33,800 to 137,429, and daily staple-fibre output from zero to 74 tons[70]. Woollen cards rose from 4 to 47 and woollen looms from 93 to 182[71].

To raise the grade of its products, the Yodogawa mill was fitted with two DuPont J-Box continuous bleaching machines and five Sanforizing shrink-proofing finishers built under the patent of the Peabody company of the United States[72]. A Williams Unit continuous dyeing machine, a Morrison continuous dyeing machine and a London shrinking machine for shrink-proofing woollens went into the same mill[73]. Bleaching capacity rose from 2 sets to 14.5, dyeing from 2.5 to 2.7 and printing from 0.4 to 8[74]. Total sales for the term ended April 1955 were $54.4M (¥20bn)[75], made up of 47.2 per cent cotton-related, 25.8 per cent wool-related, 12.0 per cent silk-related and 14.3 per cent man-made fibre[76].

The Korean War boom rebounds, and the limits of natural fibres

During the Korean War procurement boom, half-year sales grew about 2.7-fold, from $25.6M (¥9bn) in the term ended April 1950 to $68.6M (¥25bn) in the term ended September 1951[77]. The term ended April 1951 recorded after-tax profit of $11.3M (¥4bn) and an after-tax margin of 24.2 per cent[78]. Profit in the term ended April 1953, however, fell away to $555,556 (¥200m): the boom had been a passing thing dependent on market conditions[79]. As of 1953 the company counted thirty-four mills across cotton, wool, silk and staple fibre, and its workforce ran to tens of thousands, led by Sumoto with 3,076, Yodogawa with 2,385 and Hofu with 1,895[80].

In 1958 Kanebo decided to suspend part of its spinning capacity, and in July it separated the sericulture division to form Kanegafuchi Sanshi[81]. The following year, 1959, it closed the Hakata, Nakatsu and Nakajima mills[82]. Until then the plants closed had been provincial raw-silk reeling works employing between 100 and 500 people; from this year the closures extended to main plants of around 1,000 employees, and output adjustment began in earnest. As a recession measure Kanebo went as far as a company-wide wage cut for one year, and came through the crisis[83]. The understanding spread within the company that if the firm deteriorated, so would the treatment of its employees, and corporate consciousness rose rather than fell[84].

Views of the cotton spinning industry as a three o'clock in the afternoon industry or a four o'clock in the afternoon industry were beginning to be heard at the time[85], and the future of the founding business was becoming hard to picture. It was in this period that Kanebo began diversifying under the banner of aiming at industries related to the beauty of daily life.[86] The diversification was built along a vertical and a horizontal axis[87]. The vertical axis meant handling not spinning alone but weaving, finishing and fashion as one chain, while at the same time developing a synthetic-fibre business[88]. On the horizontal axis it chose fields with which it could share technical and sales information, diversifying into cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and food[89]. The history of diversification as Kanebo itself later described it goes back to these years of the mid-Showa 30s[90].

1961–1992Diversification, and the concentration of profit in cosmetics

Kanebo answered its dependence on natural fibres by adding rather than subtracting: nylon at Hofu, then cosmetics, food, pharmaceuticals and housing, first under the Greater Kanebo plan and then under the five-sided pentagon management of Ito Junji. Only cosmetics became a real earner, and after the oil shock took the dividend away in 1975 the company financed itself by selling land — roughly $377.3M (¥90bn) of property over eleven years — while the textile mills it would not close went on consuming what cosmetics made.

The Greater Kanebo plan and the move into nylon

Muto Itoji, restored to the presidency, flew to Italy himself to see Snia Viscosa and concluded the introduction of the new nylon technology that the man-made fibre companies had all been chasing[91]. In October 1961 Kanebo announced its Greater Kanebo construction plan[92], correcting its bias towards natural fibres and setting nylon, cosmetics and food as its three growth fields. The plan centred on commercialising nylon and expanding cosmetics and food, all of which connected back to businesses of the pre-war company[93]. At the Hofu mill some $55.6M (¥20bn) was invested in the nylon business[94], and the company entered the synthetic fibre market in earnest. The main aim, however, was expansion of scale with textiles still at the centre — adding synthetics to natural fibres — and the non-textile divisions were treated as a supporting force for that synthetic-fibre advance[95].

The cosmetics business was formed by establishing Kanebo Cosmetics in January 1961 and taking over the operation from Kanegafuchi Chemical Industry[96], then merging that company into the parent in April 1962[97]. Some $27.8M (¥10bn) in all was invested in setting up sales companies[98]. In April 1964 Kanebo merged Harris and gained the Odawara plant[99]; in February 1965 it merged Kyoei Keori, and in August Tachibana Seika, entering the food business[100]. In October 1966 it took over management control of Yamashiro Seiyaku and set foot in pharmaceuticals[101]. In August 1971 it took over management control of Nakataki Seiyaku Kogyo, and the following May of 1972 established Kanebo Pharmaceutical Sales[102]. In February 1974 it established Kanebo Foods Tokyo Sales, giving it its own distribution channel for food as well[103].

The Greater Kanebo plan began in 1961 and was completed in 1964, and through the textile recession of 1964 and 1965 Kanebo turned in results conspicuously good for the industry[104]. Half-year sales had been split in the term ended October 1959 between roughly two pillars — $46.9M (¥17bn) in cotton, wool and silk and $11.7M (¥4bn) in man-made fibre[105] — but by the term ended October 1962 nylon at $5M (¥2bn) and cosmetics, food and others at $7.8M (¥3bn) had got under way[106], and by the term ended April 1966 cosmetics and food had grown to $30.6M (¥11bn)[107]. As of 1968 the number of plants and works stood at 60 and affiliated companies at more than 70[108]. Employees that same year numbered 24,791, and the business ranged over cotton, wool, silk, man-made fibre, synthetic fibre, resins, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and food[109].

Pentagon management and the Ito Junji regime

The Greater Kanebo plan foundered in the recession of 1965[110]. That the synthetics business, carrying the handicap of a late entrant, failed to lift itself told against the company, and the deterioration of its financial structure through dependence on outside capital proved fatal[111]. Muto was forced out of the presidency, held to account for the failure of a flashy diversification[112], and the change was talked of at the time as a coup. In 1967 Kanebo set out pentagon management, with textiles, cosmetics, food, pharmaceuticals and the housing environment as its five pillars[113], and Ito Junji (伊藤淳二), who became president in 1968 at the age of 45, drove it forward. Ito was a man who had risen through dealings with the labour union, and on the business side he built the cosmetics division into a highly profitable operation, second in its industry.

Ito's accession to the presidency became the material for the novel Yakuinshitsu Gogo Sanji (役員室午後三時) by Shiroyama Saburo (城山三郎)[114]. In December 1971 the trading name was changed from Kanegafuchi Boseki to Kanebo[115]. In October 1974 Kanebo Nakataki Seiyaku and Kanebo Yamashiro Seiyaku were merged, unifying the pharmaceutical division[116]. Kanebo Menshi was established in March 1977 and Tokyo Reines in July, and in August 1982 Kanebo Home Products Sales was set up[117]. Annual sales in the term ended April 1969 broke down as $239.4M (¥86bn) in cotton, wool and silk, $139.7M (¥50bn) in synthetic and man-made fibre and $45M (¥16bn) in cosmetics[118]; by the term ended April 1978 synthetic and man-made fibre had grown to $1.0B (¥208bn), overtaking cotton, wool and silk at $364.2M (¥73bn), while cosmetics had reached $291M (¥59bn)[119].

The cosmetics business grew into the highest-margin operation in the group, recording sales of $211.7M (¥54bn) and profit of $24.9M (¥6bn) in the term ended April 1977[120]. The sources of its competitiveness were a sales organisation built around the chain-store method and a close-contact style of selling through wholly owned sales subsidiaries[121]. In October 1967 the cosmetics sales division was separated to form Kanebo Cosmetics Sales[122], a company later renamed Kanebo Cosmetics[123]. In November 1981 three companies — Kanebo Cosmetics, Kanebo Dior and Kanebo Dior Monsieur — were merged[124], and after the consolidation of the sales companies, Kanebo Cosmetics Hokkaido Sales and ten others became consolidated subsidiaries[125].

Oil shock, the lost dividend, and asset sales to buy time

The first oil shock of 1973 put synthetic fibres into overproduction and hit Kanebo hard[126]. From 1974 onward, the measure the textile industry took against a long recession went no further than output adjustment through recession cartels[127]. In 1975 management and labour agreed a wage freeze that put employment first as a response to structural depression, and Kanebo was expelled from the Zensen Domei federation for it[128]. In the same year it closed six mills and went as far as cutting back the natural-fibre business[129]. In the term ended April 1975 the dividend was passed, and the company then posted ordinary losses for five consecutive terms[130]. Both Muto's Greater Kanebo plan and Ito's pentagon management had their weakness exposed by this textile recession[131].

The direct reason for the lost dividend was that the heavy deficits in textiles could not be covered by the non-textile divisions[132]. Of the non-textile fields, only cosmetics had grown into a source of earnings; food, pharmaceuticals and the housing environment all struggled[133]. Pentagon management, for all its five pillars, took the shape of an irregular pentagon in which the sales scale of textiles was disproportionately large[134]. Kanebo was one of the companies in the structurally depressed industries that made its decisions earliest, and it chose diversification into the unrelated fields of cosmetics, food, pharmaceuticals and housing as its way forward[135]. In June 1977 Kanebo hived the natural-fibre division off into a subsidiary, which Ito described as stripping ourselves bare and drawing up with our backs to the river.[136]

Kanebo kept itself funded by selling assets piecemeal, disposing of roughly $377.3M (¥90bn) of property, centred on the Miyakojima district, over the eleven years from fiscal 1974[137]. Its profit structure as of 1985 rested on one leg: cosmetics earned more than $41.9M (¥10bn), textile losses ate up about half of that, and what remained was a slender surplus[138]. Closures of textile mills came only intermittently — five mills in 1970, four in 1975, two in 1982 and four in 1992[139]. Having kept the unprofitable divisions while directing resources to the non-textile side, the company fell behind in textiles on productivity gains and the development of new materials[140]. More than 70 per cent of the domestic cotton-goods market had already been taken by imports[141].

1993–2007The founding business collapses, the accounts unravel, and the company is broken up

Cotton yarn prices fell in 1993 to a level last seen in 1966, and the spinning business Kanebo had been founded on dropped below 100,000 spindles. A decade of restructuring, asset sales and swollen deferred tax assets held the balance sheet together until 2003, when a shortfall of about $543.5M (¥63bn) in net assets came into view; from there the state-backed Industrial Revitalization Corporation took over, the cosmetics business went to Kao, and in 2007 the shareholders voted the 120-year-old company out of existence.

The collapse of cotton spinning and rationalisation that went nowhere

Parent-company sales for the year ended March 1993 came to $4.6B (¥510bn), down 2.8 per cent on the previous year, and ordinary profit stopped at $40.5M (¥5bn), down 48 per cent; on a consolidated basis the company posted a net loss of about $89.9M (¥10bn)[142]. On 7 April 1993 Kanebo announced a restructuring plan whose centrepiece was the suspension of two spinning mills and one weaving mill in the cotton business[143]. The direct cause was the collapse of the cotton-yarn market: the price of one bale of the benchmark carded 40s yarn had fallen from ¥100,000 three years earlier to ¥58,000 by March 1993[144]. That ¥58,000 was roughly the level of the all-time low of 1966, and below the roughly ¥90,000 regarded as the break-even line for domestic makers[145].

Closing the two spinning mills was reckoned to reduce Kanebo Menshi's spinning capacity from 194,000 spindles to 88,000[146]. The cotton spinning the company had been founded on, which before the war had boasted 1.31 million spindles, had already dropped below a million and now fell below 100,000 as well[147]. The judgement rested on a reading that total domestic demand in 2000 would be 4.6 million bales and that imports would rise by a further million bales from three million[148]. In wool, one spinning mill was made into a separate company and the plant of another suspended; in food, the drinks, confectionery and frozen-dessert lines were cut away[149]. Cosmetics and toiletries, pharmaceuticals, fashion and new materials were set as the four divisions for priority reinforcement[150]. In September 1996 the cotton business was transferred to Kanebo Menshi, the wool business to Kanebo Wool and the synthetic-fibre business to Kanebo Toide[151].

In July 1993 Kanebo Foods was established and the confectionery, frozen-dessert and drinks divisions transferred to it[152], and in October 1994 the Tottori plant was separated to form Kanebo Stockings[153]. To avoid a consolidated shortfall in net assets, fixed assets including land were sold off in quantity — $234.8M (¥24bn) in the year ended March 1994 and $140.4M (¥13bn) in the year ended March 1995[154]. Ishihara Soichi (石原聡一), who became president in June 1994, likewise could not bring himself to any deep restructuring, and the reason given was that honorary chairman Ito Junji retained a voice in personnel matters[155]. The synthetic-fibre business posted a consolidated loss of close to $53.2M (¥5bn) in the year ended March 1995, and the natural-fibre business a loss of about $42.5M (¥4bn)[156]. By March 1996 the consolidated shortfall in net assets reached $228.9M (¥25bn), and consolidated interest-bearing debt stood at $4.6B (¥500bn)[157].

The Hoashi reforms and equity inflated by deferred tax assets

In April 1998 Hoashi Takashi (帆足隆) became president[158]. A sales man who had graduated from Matsuyama University of Commerce and joined Kanebo Cosmetics Osaka Sales[159], he met none of the conditions that had governed accession to the presidency until then — Keio University, the textile business, the administrative divisions[160]. His was the arrival of an outside hand who belonged neither to the Keio clique nor to the textile lineage. Hoashi set out to eliminate a consolidated shortfall in net assets of $178M (¥23bn), compress borrowings by $404.9M (¥53bn) and cut 2,400 jobs. Managing the business by manipulating the figures was, Hoashi himself admitted, one of Kanebo's bad habits. Kanebo's greatest problem, as he saw it, was that it lacked the basic commercial function of selling[161].

From May 1998 the basic pay of the 15,000 members of the Kanebo union, group companies included, was cut by 10 per cent for three years[162]. It was the first pay cut for union members since the company's founding; bonuses had already been reduced to zero in the winter of 1994[163]. In March 1999 the prescription-drug business was transferred to Nippon Organon along with 600 employees, the Kasukabe plant and most of the pharmaceutical research and development centre[164]. In November of the same year, 1999, the chemical-products business was transferred to Ion[165]. In October 1998 a sales headquarters was set up, with Hoashi himself as its head, imposing a selling structure that cut across the divisions[166].

Consolidated ordinary profit for the year ended March 1999 recovered to a surplus of $93.1M (¥11bn)[167], with operating profit of $151.7M (¥17bn) from cosmetics and $57.8M (¥7bn) from home products[168]. The consolidated shortfall in net assets narrowed from $178M (¥23bn) to $188M (¥21bn)[169]. The share price too recovered, closing at ¥179 on 13 September 1999 against ¥105 at the September close of the previous year[170]. In March 2000 the information-systems business was turned into a joint venture as Kisco Solutions[171]. Consolidated deferred tax assets, however, which had been $116M (¥13bn) at March 2000, swelled to $346.8M (¥40bn) by the end of March 2003, while shareholders' equity ran below $8.6M (¥1bn). In January 2001 the trading name was changed to Kanebo, written in katakana[172].

From the accounting fraud to the break-up and dissolution

At the interim results of September 2003 it became clear that Kanebo was heading for a consolidated shortfall in net assets of about $543.5M (¥63bn). In November of that year the company announced a scheme to separate the cosmetics business from the parent into a new company in which Kao would hold 49 per cent. The new company was to be established by the end of March 2004. In February 2004 Hoashi received an ultimatum from the leadership of its main bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation: unless he accepted an outright sale of the cosmetics business, support might be withdrawn. The ultimatum was delivered a week before the talks were broken off. With the labour union reluctant to accept an outright sale, the negotiations were broken off on 16 February.

On 10 March 2004 the Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan decided to support the Kanebo group as a whole. It valued the cosmetics business at $3.5B (¥380bn) and its framework committed $3.4B (¥366bn) in total through investment and lending. It was also a decision taken without a close examination of the value of the assets outside cosmetics. With a consolidated shortfall of $1.6B (¥170bn) in net assets unavoidable for the year ended March 2004, Hoashi and seven other directors resigned, and Nakajima Akiyoshi (中嶋章義), a career middle manager risen from within, was installed as president[173]. In opinion polling, 77.0 per cent opposed the support given by the Industrial Revitalization Corporation, the most common concern, at 71.3 per cent, being that it would loosen discipline on companies whose management had deteriorated[174].

The method of the fraud was to use dormant companies and closely connected business partners to build complicated shareholding structures, holding direct stakes down so that subsidiaries could be kept off the consolidated accounts. As of 13 April 2005 the cumulative scale of the falsification had reached the level of $1.8B (¥200bn). In October of that year three accountants belonging to ChuoAoyama Audit Corporation were indicted, and all ten of its trustees resigned apart from chairman Okuyama Akio (奥山章雄). The sale proceeded business by business: buyers were found for some twenty kinds of business, and more than 700 employees transferred to the acquiring companies. In June 2005 the shares were delisted from both the Tokyo and Osaka stock exchanges[175], and in December of that year the cosmetics business passed to Kao for about $3.7B (¥410bn). In May 2006 the three core businesses were transferred to a consortium of investment funds for a total of $373.2M (¥43bn), and at the shareholders' meeting of February 2007 dissolution was resolved and the trading name changed to Kaigan Bell Management.

Read the full history in Japanese →

Notes

  1. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  2. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  3. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  4. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  5. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  6. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  7. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  8. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  9. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  10. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  11. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  12. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  13. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  14. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  15. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  16. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  17. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  18. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  19. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  20. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  21. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  22. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  23. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  24. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  25. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  26. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  27. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  28. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  29. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  30. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  31. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  32. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  33. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  34. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  35. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  36. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  37. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  38. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  39. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  40. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  41. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  42. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  43. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  44. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  45. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  46. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  47. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  48. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  49. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  50. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  51. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  52. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  53. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  54. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  55. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  56. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  57. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  58. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  59. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  60. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  61. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  62. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  63. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  64. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  65. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  66. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  67. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  68. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  69. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  70. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  71. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  72. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  73. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  74. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  75. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  76. Eighty Years of Japanese Companies and Banks, Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1955, the Kanegafuchi Boseki entry↩
  77. Company Yearbook (Kaisha Nenkan)↩
  78. Company Yearbook (Kaisha Nenkan)↩
  79. Company Yearbook (Kaisha Nenkan)↩
  80. Company Yearbook (Kaisha Nenkan)↩
  81. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  82. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  83. Diamond, special issue of 10 March 1964, The secret of the Kanegafuchi Boseki that called back a setting sun↩
  84. Diamond, special issue of 10 March 1964, The secret of the Kanegafuchi Boseki that called back a setting sun↩
  85. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  86. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  87. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  88. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  89. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  90. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  91. Yomiuri Shimbun, 26 April 1961↩
  92. Diamond, 4 September 1967, Driving an unusual diversified management↩
  93. Diamond, 4 September 1967, Driving an unusual diversified management↩
  94. Diamond, 4 September 1967, Driving an unusual diversified management↩
  95. Nikkei Business, 15 August 1977, Escaping structural depression: a study of Kanebo's change of direction↩
  96. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  97. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  98. Diamond, 4 September 1967, Driving an unusual diversified management↩
  99. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  100. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  101. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  102. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  103. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  104. Diamond, 4 September 1967, Driving an unusual diversified management↩
  105. Company Yearbook (Kaisha Nenkan)↩
  106. Company Yearbook (Kaisha Nenkan)↩
  107. Company Yearbook (Kaisha Nenkan)↩
  108. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  109. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha, 1968↩
  110. Nikkei Business, 15 August 1977, Escaping structural depression: a study of Kanebo's change of direction↩
  111. Nikkei Business, 15 August 1977, Escaping structural depression: a study of Kanebo's change of direction↩
  112. Nikkei Business, 19 March 1973, The advance guard of industrialisation troubled by harmony: the KTSM (Kanebo–Toyomenka) venture in India↩
  113. Nikkei Business, 30 September 1985, Can pharmaceuticals, fashion and information revive the company?↩
  114. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  115. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  116. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  117. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  118. Company Yearbook (Kaisha Nenkan)↩
  119. Company Yearbook (Kaisha Nenkan)↩
  120. Company Yearbook (Kaisha Nenkan)↩
  121. Shukan Toyo Keizai, 8 November 1975, Sink or swim: sales-led pentagon management↩
  122. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  123. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  124. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  125. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  126. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  127. Nikkei Business, 15 August 1977, Escaping structural depression: a study of Kanebo's change of direction↩
  128. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  129. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  130. Shukan Toyo Keizai, 8 November 1975, Sink or swim: sales-led pentagon management↩
  131. Shukan Toyo Keizai, 8 November 1975, Sink or swim: sales-led pentagon management↩
  132. Nikkei Business, 15 August 1977, Escaping structural depression: a study of Kanebo's change of direction↩
  133. Nikkei Business, 15 August 1977, Escaping structural depression: a study of Kanebo's change of direction↩
  134. Nikkei Business, 15 August 1977, Escaping structural depression: a study of Kanebo's change of direction↩
  135. Nikkei Business, 15 August 1977, Escaping structural depression: a study of Kanebo's change of direction↩
  136. Nikkei Business, 15 August 1977, Escaping structural depression: a study of Kanebo's change of direction↩
  137. Nikkei Business, 30 September 1985, Can pharmaceuticals, fashion and information revive the company?↩
  138. Nikkei Business, 30 September 1985, Can pharmaceuticals, fashion and information revive the company?↩
  139. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  140. Nikkei Business, 31 July 1995, Kanebo turns to desperate fundraising; a management still bound by the Ito school, with bold disposal of loss-making divisions urgent↩
  141. Nikkei Business, 31 July 1995, Kanebo turns to desperate fundraising; a management still bound by the Ito school, with bold disposal of loss-making divisions urgent↩
  142. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  143. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  144. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  145. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  146. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  147. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  148. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  149. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  150. Nikkei Business, 21 June 1993, Trajectory of a setback: Yagi Koichi, vice-president of Kanebo — shrinking the cotton business is the flow of the times↩
  151. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  152. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  153. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  154. Nikkei Business, 31 July 1995, Kanebo turns to desperate fundraising; a management still bound by the Ito school, with bold disposal of loss-making divisions urgent↩
  155. Nikkei Business, 31 July 1995, Kanebo turns to desperate fundraising; a management still bound by the Ito school, with bold disposal of loss-making divisions urgent↩
  156. Nikkei Business, 31 July 1995, Kanebo turns to desperate fundraising; a management still bound by the Ito school, with bold disposal of loss-making divisions urgent↩
  157. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  158. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  159. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  160. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  161. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  162. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  163. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  164. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  165. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  166. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  167. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  168. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  169. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  170. Nikkei Business, 27 September 1999, Case study: Kanebo — the great reform of its 112th year↩
  171. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  172. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩
  173. Nikkei Business, 8 November 2004, The criminal complaint already priced in: the riddle of Kanebo's vast accounting fraud↩
  174. Nikkei Business, 12 April 2004, Business opinion: 77 per cent oppose the Industrial Revitalization Corporation's support for Kanebo↩
  175. Kanebo, securities report, corporate history section↩

References & sources

  1. Yomiuri Shimbun: 26 April 1961, on Muto Itoji.
  2. Diamond (Diamond, Inc.): special issue of 10 March 1964, The secret of the Kanegafuchi Boseki that called back a setting sun; 4 September 1967, Driving an unusual diversified management; and People Who Make History (1967).
  3. Corporate Histories: A Century of Meiji, Keizai Shunju-sha (1968), the Kanebo entry.
  4. Shukan Toyo Keizai (Toyo Keizai Inc.): 8 November 1975, Sink or swim: sales-led pentagon management.
  5. Nikkei Business (Nikkei BP): 30 September 1985, on whether pharmaceuticals, fashion and information could revive the company.

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Data API

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