Into suburban condominiums, and from five market brands to one — Brillia (2003)
What was left after the names were cut
A company that had laid out five market-segmented brands in 1993 folded the names into one within a decade. The reading behind it was that showing a single standard under a single name wins more buyers than raising a separate banner for each tier of purchaser. There seems to be a reason the judgment came up from the field: the dozen-odd subordinates of Hatanaka Makoto — who, tasked with clearing finished inventory after the bubble burst, had argued to the development division that a property priced without regard to the market does not sell — were by then at the centre of housing development.
Still, it strains credibility to attribute Brillia’s success to brand consolidation alone. The Meguro project, at roughly ¥6 million per tsubo on average, sold without trouble because demand remained in the high-priced central Tokyo band; as Okubo Masayuki has said, the company drifted away from supplying the ¥40–50 million range. Nor did it take sites at auction any more, moving instead to create them through rebuilds and urban redevelopment. Cutting names made the company lighter, but the buyers it sold to and the ways it could find land narrowed in exchange.
Revenue and net margin, FY1998–FY2008
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY2003 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
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The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Tokyo Tatemono
- 1896 Founding Tokyo Tatemono — installment building, collateral lending and brokerage in one company (1896)
- 1903 A branch on transferred concession land in Tianjin, and expansion into Hankou, Keijo and Manchuria (1903)
- 1998 Japan’s first SPC-Law registration, and the move into securitization and asset management (1998)
- 2011 Writing down SPC investments in one go — a ¥71.7bn net loss, and a two-track model of redevelopment and disposals (2011)
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
Disclaimer
- This page is provided for general information only and is not investment advice, nor a recommendation to buy or sell any security.
- Figures are compiled independently and include our own estimates, approximations and machine-processed data; we make no warranty as to their accuracy or completeness.
- Sources are primarily each company’s securities reports and other public filings, but errors and omissions may remain.
- Any use of this information is at the reader’s own risk. Past performance does not indicate future results.
- Company names, logos and other marks belong to their respective owners.
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