Toyota Tsusho - Company History

Unlike the other sogo shosha, which grew out of textiles or mining, Toyota Tsusho began on the finance side of the car business. In October 1936 Toyota Motor set up Toyota Finance with ¥1 million to lend against sales of the domestic car it had just begun to build. Wartime controls soon made that lending unnecessary; in 1942 the firm was renamed Toyoda Sangyo and turned into a holder of the Toyoda group’s shares, and after the 1947 holding-company purge it was dissolved in 1948. Its trading division was carried on by a new company, Nisshin Tsusho, set up in Nagoya that July — a small house dealing in textile machinery, steel, fibres and fuel. In 1956 it took the name it still bears: Toyota Tsusho, a Toyota-group trader.

That it descended from a financier of car sales, not from car-making itself, fixed the shape of everything that followed — a house whose trading rights ran through a single customer, Toyota, and whose fortunes rose and fell with one industry. Through the 1960s and 70s it followed Toyota abroad: Toyota Tsusho America opened in 1960 as exports to North America grew, and the company listed in Nagoya in 1961 and on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1977, binding the Chubu-rooted group trader to the national capital markets while keeping its base in Nagoya.

Where rival trading houses spread across textiles, steel and chemicals, Toyota Tsusho stayed pinned to a single industry; its growth rate was, in effect, Toyota’s growth rate — steady, but capped. Real non-auto scale would wait half a century, until the mergers of the 2000s.

For its first sixty years Toyota Tsusho was less a general trading house than a procurement-and-logistics arm for Toyota, mid-ranked in its industry. The self-image began to change in 1985, when it raised its Tokyo branch to a second head office, and in 1987, when it took the English name TOYOTA TSUSHO CORPORATION — the rewriting of a Nagoya group trader into a company that meant to operate nationally and abroad. But the real break came through acquisition.

In April 2000 it merged with Kasho, and later that year absorbed part of Tomen’s steel operations. Then in April 2006 it took in Tomen — a general trader in the middle of its own restructuring — buying in one move the steel, chemicals, food, textiles and electronics businesses it had never built for itself. The merger ratio of 1-to-0.069 showed this was less a marriage of equals than a rescue-takeover by the fitter side. Yet the non-auto domains it thereby acquired became the pillars that would later set it apart from a mere Toyota procurement house.

The mergers lifted Toyota Tsusho out of its single-industry track and gave it the diversified footing on which the next decade’s overseas investments — renewable energy, electronics and Africa — would be built. In 2009 Shimizu Junzo handed the presidency to Karube Jun, who would carry the company into its largest bet yet.

2012 was the year Toyota Tsusho set its modern shape. Within twelve months it moved deeper into wind power by raising its stake in Eurus Energy (January), took control of the electronics-materials trader Elematec (March), and in December bought CFAO, the Paris-listed group that had spent more than a century building sales and distribution networks across Africa. The roughly €2.3 billion CFAO deal gave it something no other Japanese trader held: an African network not for oil or metals but for cars, pharmaceuticals and consumer goods — everyday distribution rather than resources. CFAO was made a wholly owned subsidiary in 2016.

The distinctiveness carried its own risk. In the year to March 2016, as commodity prices collapsed and the whole sogo shosha sector took writedowns, Toyota Tsusho booked a special loss of $851.7M (¥93bn) and a net loss of $401.5M (¥44bn) — a reminder that the markets it had chosen for differentiation, Africa and resources, carried volatility of their own. That June Karube handed the presidency to Kasuya Ichiro, who declared the company would not become an “all-threes” trader, competent at everything and outstanding at nothing, but would keep its sharp, distinctive positions.

The recovery was immediate. The year to March 2017, its first under IFRS, returned a profit of $962M (¥108bn), and the portfolio assembled from Kasho, Tomen and CFAO began to steady earnings that had once swung with a single industry. In 2018 the company reached upstream into the raw materials of electrification, investing in Australia’s Orocobre for lithium in step with Toyota’s shift to electric vehicles — a bet whose payoff, like the resource writedowns before it, would ride the volatility of the market it chose to enter.

In the early 2020s the twenty years of investment paid off at once. Rising commodity prices, recovering car production, African sales through CFAO and electronic components through Nexty Electronics all fed profit together, and revenue climbed from $61.1B (¥8.03tn) in the year to March 2022 to $68.9B (¥10.31tn) in the year to March 2025, with profit reaching $2.4B (¥363bn) — record highs, year after year, at a scale alongside the industry’s top trading houses.

More telling than the size was a change underneath it. Toyota Tsusho’s earnings had come loose from Toyota’s unit sales: a shift in model mix, more electronic devices per vehicle, and a move into metal processing lifted the profit earned per car, so that the company could make money even when new-car sales did not grow. “We have built a lean structure that earns even when new-car sales are flat,” its CFO Iwamoto put it — the decoupling confirmed in the numbers as much as in the words. The company also drew in its listed affiliates, making Eurus Energy wholly owned in 2022 and Elematec in 2025, pulling their earnings up to the parent.

In April 2025 Kasuya handed the presidency to Imai Toshimitsu, and under a new three-man leadership the company set out a medium-term plan targeting ¥450bn in profit and a return on equity above 15% by March 2028, with a total-payout ratio over 40% that, for the first time, put share buybacks and market value squarely on the management agenda. Reaching 15% ROE, the leadership conceded, would require unwinding cross-held shares — including the group’s own — and Imai signalled that Toyota Tsusho would, for once, knock on that door itself: the group trader that grew inside Toyota now moving to loosen its ties even at the level of its capital.