Halting Zama; toward an “optimal-growth company” (1993)
Touching the sanctuary, but unable to change the framework
Halting vehicle production at Zama was the first time a top-tier maker touched the “sanctuary” of domestic employment, and its symbolism was large. President Tsuji summing up Nissan as “a company that fails to see things through,” and pushing into cutting waste and capacity, was a clear break from management that had taken expansion for granted. The sharpness of the problem analysis, and the resolve to shoulder a painful decision, can be seen as a starting point for the rebuild that would run through to Ghosn’s reforms.
Even so, this rebuild stayed inside the old framework of holding to a full lineup and depending on the keiretsu. Cut capacity alone without narrowing the lineup, and the weight of fixed costs remains. The method of filling the missing profit through cost reductions at the keiretsu drained the strength of parts makers that were independent companies and bred friction in the relationship. As a result the year ended March 1995 still could not stop the losses, and the drastic measures — capital tie-ups and a rethink of the keiretsu itself — were carried over to the hands of Renault and Carlos Ghosn, arriving in 1999. That touching the sanctuary was still not enough, in fact, widened the reach of the next decision.
Revenue and net margin, FY1988–FY1998
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY1993 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
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The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Nissan Motor
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
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