Persol Holdings

Company history

Financial history 2009–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1973
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
2008
Founder
Shinohara Kinko
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$9.8B (¥1.56tn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$270M (¥43bn)
Persol Holdings: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1973Selling work the law had no name for

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1973Shinohara Kinko founds Temp Staff with $2,555 (¥700,000) in capital
  2. 1986Worker Dispatch Act takes effect; the business becomes legal
  3. 1999Dispatch liberalized in principle (negative list)
  4. 2004Manufacturing dispatch permitted

In May 1973 Shinohara Kinko registered Temp Staff in Tokyo with capital of $2,555 (¥700,000). Born in 1934, she had gone to Australia as a secretary in 1971 and found workplaces where men and women were staffed without distinction, and a temporary-staffing industry that did not exist at home. She came back at thirty-eight to a Japanese labour market in which a married woman could not get even routine clerical work — which is what she set out to sell.

The obstacle was legal as much as commercial: under the reading then given to the Employment Security Act, dispatching workers sat in a grey zone. Shinohara sold the service to client companies not as dispatch but in the form of clerical processing subcontracting, working the telephone from a room in her own home, signing up registrants through her own contacts and matching them to demand she had to go out and find. What she assembled, in effect, was a broker for a flow labour market that had no legal existence.

The law then caught up with the business. The Worker Dispatch Act passed in 1985 and took effect in July 1986, giving the trade legal standing; Temp Staff registered under it and widened its scope just as the bubble economy produced a surge in clerical volume and a shortage of graduate hires at the same moment. Branches opened across the major cities and registrants reached the tens of thousands. Deregulation carried it further — the December 1999 amendment made dispatch a negative-list business, liberalized in principle, and the March 2004 amendment opened manufacturing. Moving in step with each loosening of the statute, and adding engineering and specialist dispatch through job-specific subsidiaries, Shinohara’s single-business company became one of the largest staffing firms in Japan while she was still attending registration sessions in person.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2006A listing, and a shell built for buying

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2009 · unconsolidated
Revenue$2.6B
Net income$44M
Net margin1.7%
FY2012 · consolidated
Revenue$2.9B
Net income$44M
Net margin1.5%
  1. 2006Listed on the TSE; ~¥180bn sales, third in staffing
  2. 2008Merger with People Staff creates Temp Holdings
  3. 2009Tender offer for Nihon Techseed — engineering dispatch

Temp Staff listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in March 2006 and was assigned to the First Section, with consolidated sales of roughly ¥180 billion and third place in the domestic staffing industry. Public capital changed what kind of company it was — institutional investors, an IR function, external audit and J-SOX internal controls — but its more consequential effect was optional: with further amendments to the dispatch law and a shake-out of the industry both expected, listing gave the company the means to pay for acquisitions.

It used them in October 2008, merging with People Staff — a clerical staffing rival founded in the same year, 1973, with a strong customer base in Chubu and Kansai — by share transfer into a new joint holding company, Temp Holdings. Temp Staff was delisted and became a wholly owned subsidiary. Measured by the partner the deal was modest: People Staff’s ¥30.1 billion of sales was a little over a tenth of Temp Staff’s ¥228.9 billion. Measured by the form, it was decisive. In November 2009 the holding company launched a tender offer for Nihon Techseed (today Persol Cross Technology), an engineering-dispatch firm and the group’s first step outside clerical work. Sales for the year to March 2010 were ¥224.6 billion with net profit of ¥2.95 billion, in an industry contracting hard after Lehman — and the structure that would absorb nine straight years of acquisitions was already in place.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2013Building the federation

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2013 · consolidated
Revenue$2.5B
Net income$60M
Net margin2.4%
FY2017 · consolidated
Revenue$5.3B
Net income$159M
Net margin3%
  1. 2013Intelligence acquired for $526.6M (¥51bn) — doda and an
  2. 2016Kelly Services’ Asia-Pacific arm joins; PERSOL brand announced
  3. 2017Renamed Persol Holdings; Shinohara leaves the board
  4. 2017Programmed (Australia) acquired for ¥69.1bn

In April 2013 Temp Holdings bought Intelligence Holdings — spun out of Recruit in 1989, owner of the DODA (now doda) job-change media, the part-time listings title an and a graduate-recruiting business — for about $526.6M (¥51bn) including advisory fees, against Intelligence’s ¥69.8 billion of sales in the year to March 2012. Dispatch, placement and recruitment advertising now sat under one holding company. Consolidated sales rose from ¥233.2 billion in FY11 to ¥362.4 billion in FY13 and ¥401.0 billion in FY14, where the operating margin was still 5.85% — scale bought rather than grown, in pursuit of the industry leader, Recruit.

Overseas expansion followed the same method. A 2010 share purchase agreement with the American staffing group Kelly Services became, in July 2016, a joint venture under which Kelly Services (Singapore) and sixteen subsidiaries across ASEAN and South Asia moved onto Temp Holdings’ balance sheet — Kelly’s brand and customers, Japanese capital. Panasonic AVC Technology (2013), Panasonic Excel Staff and P&P Holdings (2015) added engineering, manufacturing and sales-promotion staffing. By FY14 the group had more than twenty consolidated subsidiaries and 12,587 employees.

In July 2017 the holding company renamed itself Persol Holdings and put the Persol prefix on every subsidiary, discarding the Temp Staff name used for forty-three years — a statement that the federation was meant to be one company. Three months later it acquired the ASX-listed Programmed Maintenance Services for ¥69.1 billion; Programmed had A$2.691 billion of sales, some ¥235 billion. FY17 sales reached ¥722.1 billion and goodwill ¥102.1 billion, with the operating margin holding at 5.0%. The warning came in the same accounts: of ¥14.6 billion in extraordinary losses, ¥5.6 billion were impairments at PERSOL KELLY subsidiaries and ¥8.6 billion in recruiting. And in June 2017 Shinohara left the board after forty-four years, holding 11.25% herself with 5.22% moved to her foundation; Mizuta Masamichi, who had joined through the Intelligence deal and run its integration, took over as CEO.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2018Five SBUs, and a tenfold gap

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2018 · consolidated
Revenue$6.5B
Net income$71M
Net margin1.1%
FY2026 · consolidated
Revenue$9.8B
Net income$270M
Net margin2.7%
  1. 2018Ten domestic subsidiaries reorganized into Persol Temp Staff and BPO
  2. 2019“Work and Smile” vision; an closed, resources moved to doda
  3. 2020Five-SBU structure; COVID; Wada Takao becomes CEO
  4. 2023IFRS adopted; BPO SBU created; Persol Cross Technology formed
  5. 2024Career at 21.3% margin against Asia Pacific at 2.46%

Mizuta spent his presidency folding in what had been bought. In October 2018 seven dispatch subsidiaries were merged into Persol Temp Staff and three BPO firms into one — ten companies reorganized at a stroke. Avantistaff was acquired in 2019, and the Fuji Xerox Learning Institute (now Persol Research and Consulting) took the group into training. In October 2019 the group vision became “Work and Smile,” recasting the founder’s argument about women and work as a purpose for the whole federation; a month later Persol closed an, the 1982 part-time listings title that had been one of the industry’s big three, and concentrated its recruiting resources on doda.

In April 2020 the group moved to five Strategic Business Units — Staffing, Career, Professional Outsourcing, Asia Pacific and Solution — devolving operating authority to SBU heads and leaving the holding company with strategy and capital allocation. COVID arrived in the same month. FY20 sales slipped to ¥950.7 billion and operating profit fell 34% to ¥25.7 billion, while Asia Pacific turned ¥251.4 billion of sales into a ¥2.2 billion operating loss — its third consecutive loss since Programmed. Wada Takao, a Temp Staff insider who had run the Staffing SBU, succeeded Mizuta with two tasks: fix Asia Pacific, grow Career. FY21 recovered to ¥1,060.8 billion of sales and ¥48.1 billion of operating profit, but the spread had widened: Career at 9.84%, Staffing at 6.88%, Asia Pacific at 0.36%.

The response was to keep tidying. In January 2023 three engineering firms were merged into Persol Cross Technology; in April the Solution SBU was replaced by a BPO SBU; and from the first quarter of the year to March 2024 Persol voluntarily adopted IFRS, so that overseas investors could compare the Australian business with its peers. Scale kept climbing — ¥1,327.1 billion in FY23 and ¥1,451.2 billion in FY24, roughly double the figure of the year Shinohara stepped down — while the operating margin fell from 5.85% in FY14 to below 4%. FY24 shows why plainly enough: Career, grown in-house around doda, earned ¥30.4 billion on ¥142.4 billion of sales, a 21.3% margin; Asia Pacific, bought, earned ¥11.7 billion on ¥476.1 billion, a margin of 2.46% — a gap of roughly ten times. Shinohara still held 11.74% at the end of March 2025, and 18.78% counting her foundation. What she handed on was a federation; what remains unfinished is making it one company.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2008

Merging with People Staff into the Temp Holdings joint holding company (2008)

A merger chosen for its form, not its partner

Measured from the partner’s side, what this merger brought in looks small. People Staff’s ¥30.1 billion of sales was a little over a tenth of Temp Staff’s ¥228.9 billion, and its Tokai customer base was in later years absorbed along with the name itself. If the decision nevertheless appears to have settled the following nine years, the reason lies in the form rather than the substance. A structure in which a share transfer creates a new holding company and operating companies are lined up beneath it as subsidiaries is excessive for taking in one firm, but appropriately built for taking in a second and a third. Had the company remained a single operating business led by its founder, neither Nihon Techseed nor Intelligence could have been accommodated by the same procedure.

That structure, however, raised the speed of acquisition while deferring the question of how to bind together the companies it lined up. The reorganization of ten domestic subsidiaries from 2018, the move to an SBU system, and the difference in profitability between the businesses it bought and the businesses it grew in-house all appear as consequences of holding them side by side. A structure that makes merging easy is not the same as having merged — the form chosen in 2008 was a means of gaining scale and, at the same time, an acceptance of a question that would stay with management long afterwards.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2013

Buying Intelligence Holdings to take in job-change media and placement (2013)

What it means for a staffing firm to buy the point of contact with jobseekers

Read as a pursuit of scale, this acquisition is only half visible. What Temp Holdings obtained for ¥51.4 billion was a company with ¥69.8 billion of sales and, at the same time, the first screen a jobseeker opens when they begin to think about changing jobs. A staffing firm stands in the position of sending its registrants out to openings at client companies; its relationship with the jobseeker can be formed only through the brokering of work. To hold job-change media and placement is to hold that relationship outside dispatch as well. The 2019 decision to close an and gather everything into doda can likewise be read as aimed not at collecting media but at narrowing the point of contact.

Even so, a gap remained between the business it bought and the business it grew, in profitability and in amplitude alike. The margin of the Career business reached three times that of dispatch, while under COVID its profit all but vanished. High profitability is the other face of high sensitivity, and group results have moved along carrying both the stability of dispatch and the swings of placement. Whether the 2013 choice — to line up subsidiaries across every segment of the labour market — produced a structure resilient to the economic cycle, or merely housed businesses of different amplitude under one roof, remains a question that can still be asked.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2017

Acquiring Australia’s Programmed Maintenance Services outright (2017)

On buying the size of a market

On paper the logic of this acquisition leaves little room for objection. The largest market in Asia-Pacific is Australia, and buying the leading company in that market whole puts you near the top faster than building sites one at a time. Consolidated sales did in fact grow from ¥592.0 billion to ¥925.8 billion in two years, closing on the target of ¥300 billion in overseas revenue. But the size of a market and the profit one’s own company can earn in it are different quantities. That Australia’s staffing market is the largest in the region does not mean the company bought there will run at Japanese levels of profitability. The reason given for the impairment was a single line: the earnings that had been assumed could no longer be expected.

The other thing that remains is the question of where to place a facilities-maintenance business. At the time of the acquisition Programmed drew sixty percent of its EBITA from Maintenance; it was an infrastructure contractor as much as a staffing company. Measured on the yardstick of human-resources services this is an alien business, and it has been kept inside the human-resources segment to this day. That the 有価証券報告書 went on to state a lower priority for large overseas acquisitions, and that an investment committee was established, reads as remorse over the size of the sum and, at the same time, as a re-examination of how far the company had looked into what it was buying.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Persol Holdings full history in Japanese →

  1. Persol Holdings (formerly Temp Holdings) — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports), years ended March 2009 through March 2025.
  2. Persol Holdings — 決算説明会資料 (quarterly and full-year earnings presentations) and integrated reports, including segment profitability by SBU.
  3. Temp Holdings — 適時開示 (timely disclosures) on the acquisition of Intelligence Holdings, April 2013, and of Programmed Maintenance Services Limited, October 2017.
  4. Temp Staff and People Staff — 株式移転計画 and merger disclosures on the establishment of Temp Holdings, October 2008.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Persol Holdings’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/2181/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/2181/history.json History overview
GET /api/2181/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/2181/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/2181/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/2181/executives.json Executives
GET /api/2181/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/2181/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/2181/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/2181/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/2181/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/2181/workforce.json Workforce