GungHo Online Entertainment

Company history

Founded
1998
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
2005 · TSE 3765
Founder
SoftBank–OnSale joint venture
Revenue · FYE Mar 2025
$622.8M (¥93bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2025
$9.4M (¥1bn)
GungHo Online Entertainment: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1998A failed auction venture becomes a game operator

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
  1. 1998Onsale founded as a SoftBank / OnSale online-auction venture
  2. 2002Exits auctions; renamed GungHo Online Entertainment
  3. 2002Ragnarok Online service begins in Japan
  4. 2004Capital tie-up with Game Arts adds development

GungHo began in July 1998 as Onsale, Inc., a company wholly funded by SoftBank and set up in the Nihonbashi district of Tokyo. It was a joint venture with the American auction operator OnSale Inc., which took 40%, and the plan was simple: transplant the booming U.S. online-auction business straight into Japan. Masayoshi Son’s younger brother, Taizo Son, became president in 2000 and was the public face of the online business.

The plan collided almost immediately with Yahoo! Auctions, launched in September 1999. Free listings and traffic from the Yahoo! search engine gave it roughly 90% of the domestic market within two years; Onsale never won share and pulled out of auctions in 2002 — losing its founding business just four years in. The defeat left a lasting lesson the company would draw on for decades: trailing a front-runner yields limited returns.

In August 2002 the firm renamed itself GungHo Online Entertainment and pivoted to a different trade entirely. Its new core was the Japanese operating rights to Ragnarok Online, an MMORPG built by South Korea’s Gravity. GungHo would now run games other studios had made — a contract-operator model that defined the company for the next decade, until it finally built a hit of its own.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2005A listed mid-tier online-game operator

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2005 · unconsolidated
Revenue$52M
Net income$5M
Net margin8.8%
FY2011 · unconsolidated
Revenue$120M
Net income$18M
Net margin14.6%
  1. 2005IPO on the Osaka Hercules market
  2. 2008Acquires Gravity, the Korean Ragnarok developer
  3. 2011Acquires console studio Acquire (sold 2023)

In March 2005 GungHo listed on the Osaka Securities Exchange’s Hercules market for emerging companies. The stock ran from a ¥1.2 million offer price to more than ¥20 million at its peak, a poster child of the new-market bubble. GungHo used the moment to spread out — into portals, a game portal called GungHo Games, and consumer titles — even as the core business remained the operation of Ragnarok Online.

The expansion overreached. A 2007 delay to Ragnarok Online 2 and trouble in the portal business pushed the company into the red, and it restructured, unwound a joint venture and raised fresh equity to repair its balance sheet. Then, in April 2008, GungHo bought its own supplier: it took control of Gravity, the Korean developer of Ragnarok, turning from a licensee into a vertically integrated group that owned both the development and the operation — the organisational base for the global Ragnarok rollout of the 2020s.

For all that, through the late 2000s GungHo stayed a mid-tier company: revenue around ¥10 billion and operating profit of ¥1–2 billion. More than a decade after its founding it had not outgrown the venture stage, and the transformation, when it came, would arrive from an entirely different quarter — a smartphone.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2012Puzzle & Dragons, and the SoftBank years

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2012 · consolidated
Revenue$323M
Net income$103M
Net margin31.8%
FY2016 · consolidated
Revenue$1.0B
Net income$256M
Net margin24.8%
  1. 2012Puzzle & Dragons launches on iOS
  2. 2013SoftBank becomes GungHo’s parent
  3. 2013Joint 51% stake in Supercell (~$1.5B); sold within a year
  4. 2016SoftBank exits; GungHo independent again

In February 2012 GungHo released Puzzle & Dragons on iOS, a puzzle-RPG from a team led by Daisuke Yamamoto. It deliberately rejected the "social" mechanics then driving DeNA and GREE, pairing pure gameplay with free-to-play item billing — and it caught fire. Consolidated revenue leapt from $323.3M (¥26bn) in FY2012 to $1.7B (¥163bn) in FY2013, peaking at $1.6B (¥173bn) in FY2014. Market capitalisation briefly passed Yahoo Japan and touched Nintendo’s level; Morishita said in 2013 he meant to "surpass Nintendo." For the first time, an operator of borrowed IP was earning on a title of its own.

The hit pulled its old backer back in. In April 2013 SoftBank — the original 1998 founder — raised its stake and made GungHo a subsidiary. That October the two jointly took 51% of Finland’s Supercell, maker of Clash of Clans, for about $1.5 billion; GungHo held only 20% and sold the stake back to SoftBank within a year. The episode showed GungHo folded into SoftBank’s global investment portfolio rather than steering it.

SoftBank then unwound the tie as quickly as it had made it: parent in April 2013, mere "other affiliate" by June 2015, and no relationship at all by August 2016. GungHo moved from JASDAQ to the Tokyo Stock Exchange First Section in 2015 and to Marunouchi’s JP Tower in 2016 — an independent company once more. Its distance from SoftBank had run a full arc: 1998 joint venture, 2002 independence, 2013 parent, 2016 independence.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2017After the hit: global Ragnarok, activists, a split at the top

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2017 · consolidated
Revenue$823M
Net income$200M
Net margin24.3%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$623M
Net income$9M
Net margin1.5%
  1. 2020Ninjala launches on Nintendo Switch
  2. 2024Acquires Alim, maker of Brave Frontier
  3. 2026Morishita to chairman/CDO; Sakai becomes president & CEO

Puzzle & Dragons peaked in FY2014 and then eased into decline as rivals such as Monster Strike took share; revenue slid from its ¥173 billion peak toward the ¥90-billion range. Yet the economics stayed strong — operating margins in the 30–47% band and essentially no debt. Through the 2020s a new pillar emerged from the 2008 acquisition: Gravity’s mobile Ragnarok titles (Ragnarok Origin, Ragnarok M) took off across Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, roughly tripling Gravity’s revenue and cutting Puzzle & Dragons’s share of group sales below half by FY2022 and to about a third by FY2023.

Shrinking sales atop a swelling balance sheet drew activists. Consolidated equity grew from $732.9M (¥89bn) in FY2015 to $850.2M (¥129bn) in FY2024 even as revenue fell, and Strategic Capital built a stake and pressed, at successive shareholder meetings, for better capital efficiency — arguing that new IP such as Ninjala and LET IT DIE had not become durable earners and that the idle cash should be put to work. FY2025 revenue of $622.8M (¥93bn) and operating profit of just $34.1M (¥5bn) lent weight to the critique.

In January 2026 GungHo announced that Kazuki Morishita — president since 2004 — would move to chairman and Chief Development Officer, while CFO Kazuya Sakai became president and CEO on 1 February 2026, ending a 22-year run. The design split the company in two: the man who built Puzzle & Dragons keeps command of development, while capital allocation and shareholder dialogue pass to a finance executive, with executive pay tied harder to results. Whether separating the maker from the allocator settles the activist standoff — or whether the market wants a deeper change — is, at this writing, undecided.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2012

Betting on an original title: Puzzle & Dragons (2012)

From contract operator to original-IP company — and the cost of dependence

The heart of this decision lies less in chasing the methods that were leading the market than in concentrating development resources on a kind of fun the company itself believed in. A firm that had lost to Yahoo! Auctions in its Onsale days and scraped by on contract operation bet on a single title of its own, beholden to no outside IP — and in doing so rewrote its very character. It was with this one title that GungHo crossed over from a pure operator into a company whose weapon was its own development.

At the same time, that explosive growth created a new structure: dependence on a single title. Puzzle & Dragons’s annual revenue peaked in the year ended December 2014 and then turned to a gentle decline, and from then on GungHo would keep searching for a pillar to replace this one work — nurturing new IP, taking the Ragnarok series overseas. That the success of refusing to trail the front-runner and raising a title of its own went on to define the company’s central challenge for more than a decade mirrors the difficulty common to hit-dependent game companies.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2013

Co-investing with SoftBank in Supercell — and selling out a year later (2013)

A year absorbed into the parent’s investment strategy

The significance of this episode is that while GungHo tasted a scale of global investment beyond what its own will could reach, the initiative in deciding it appears to have sat with the parent, SoftBank. GungHo’s stake stopped at 20%, and the speed of the decisions — from acquiring the shares to selling them — was beyond what a mid-tier company grown large on a single title could have managed on its own. The brief ten-month holding period shows that the deal was treated less as GungHo’s own business strategy than as one part of the parent’s investment portfolio.

Indeed, the capital relationship with SoftBank stayed fluid thereafter. In June 2015 the parent became merely an "other affiliate," and by August 2016 the tie was severed entirely, leaving GungHo to set out again as an independent company. The Supercell investment and its swift reversal, in that sense, capture a passage in which GungHo swung between the opportunities of sitting under a parent’s umbrella and the value of keeping its capital independent.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2026

A CEO handover under activist pressure: Morishita to Sakai (2026)

Does splitting development from capital allocation resolve the conflict?

The division of labour — Morishita devoting himself to development while Sakai takes charge of capital allocation — can be read as an attempt to satisfy two demands at once: to preserve the influence of the man who created Puzzle & Dragons, while answering the improvement in capital efficiency that shareholders wanted. In fact the company’s moves — a raised dividend, share buybacks, the cancellation of treasury stock — went some way toward the underuse of cash that Strategic Capital had flagged. But the fact that Strategic Capital, whose proposals again failed to pass at the March 2026 meeting, went on buying still more shares shows that the reshuffle was not, in itself, the end point of the conflict.

What this configuration asks is whether dividing the management structure can answer the doubts over capital efficiency, or whether something more drastic — such as taking the company private — is what is being demanded. It is not unusual for activists to file proposal after proposal against a company that holds abundant equity yet lacks a pillar of growth; but in GungHo’s case, because the question reaches even to the founding family’s shareholding, the shape of any resolution is hard to foresee. How far the new structure — development chief and management chief pulled apart — can win back the market’s regard is, as of this writing, still not settled.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— GungHo Online Entertainment full history in Japanese →

  1. GungHo Online Entertainment, Inc. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Diamond Online — ダイヤモンド・オンライン (Diamond Inc.), 13 June 2013. Article.
  3. Bloomberg, 30 May 2013 (Morishita on aiming to surpass Nintendo).
  4. ITmedia News — ITmedia NEWS, 25 March 2013; 9 January 2026. 2026 report.
  5. e-Xtreme — エクストリーム, 2 July 2019. Article.
  6. 4Gamer — 4Gamer, 29 December 2022. Article.
  7. gamebiz — gamebiz, February 2024; 9 January 2026.
  8. Nihon Keizai Shimbun — 日本経済新聞 (Nikkei Inc.), 3 February 2016.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →