Capcom

Company history

Founded
1979
Head office
Osaka, Japan
Listed
1990 · TSE 9697
Founder
Kenzo Tsujimoto
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$1.2B (¥195bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$345.2M (¥55bn)
Capcom: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1979From arcade dealer to Street Fighter II

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
  1. 1979Kenzo Tsujimoto founds IRM Co., Ltd. in Matsubara, Osaka
  2. 1983First in-house arcade machine, the medal game Little League
  3. 19851942 for the Famicom — first home title; CAPCOM U.S.A. set up
  4. 1989Renamed Capcom Co., Ltd.
  5. 1990Shares registered over-the-counter
  6. 1991Street Fighter II — a global hit; 20M+ across the series

Capcom began in May 1979 as a reseller, not a maker. Kenzo Tsujimoto — an Osaka entrepreneur who had earlier run a mobile cotton-candy-machine business and a food wholesaler — founded IRM Co., Ltd. in Matsubara, Osaka, with capital of $43,478 (¥10m) to develop and sell electronic game equipment, and at first simply bought other firms’ arcade machines and sold them on. Renamed Sanbi in 1981, the business set up a separate sales company, the original Capcom, in 1983. The name — from CAPsule COMputer — cast a game as a capsule packed with play, sheathed in a hard shell that guarded its contents from piracy and cheap imitation. Three changes of name and head office in four years traced a company feeling its way from selling hardware toward developing its own.

The turn to in-house creation came fast. In 1983 Capcom built its first original arcade machine, the medal game Little League; in 1984 it began developing coin-op video games; in 1985 it set up CAPCOM U.S.A. to sell directly into North America and, that December, entered home software with 1942 for Nintendo’s Famicom. Within a few years the centre of gravity shifted from selling arcade cabinets outright to shipping home titles by the hundreds of thousands and millions per game, as arcade hits such as Ghosts ’n Goblins and Commando were ported across.

In 1989 Sanbi absorbed the original Capcom to become Capcom Co., Ltd., and in October 1990 registered its shares over-the-counter with the securities dealers’ association — a first channel to the market. Then, in 1991, the arcade Street Fighter II became a worldwide phenomenon: it fixed the competitive fighting game as a genre, and through home ports the series passed twenty million units, making Capcom’s name a global software brand. All of it was built under Tsujimoto’s mi-no-take discipline — funded from the company’s own cash, without borrowing or acquisitions, with overseas arms started as local subsidiaries rather than bought.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1994Listings, franchises, and two restructurings

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2006 · unconsolidated
Revenue$605M
Net income$59M
Net margin9.8%
FY2014 · consolidated
Revenue$966M
Net income$32M
Net margin3.3%
  1. 1996Resident Evil launches
  2. 1998First post-listing net loss (Mexico wind-up, U.S. write-down)
  3. 2000Listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange First Section
  4. 2003First restructuring — the 60-month map and a shared engine
  5. 2007Kenzo Tsujimoto hands the presidency to Haruhiro Tsujimoto
  6. 2012Second restructuring — retreat from mobile

The 1990s and 2000s built the global publisher. A new Osaka head-office building and a domestic distribution plant opened in 1994; U.S. sales and development arms followed in 1995, a scenario studio in 1997, then a march up the market — the Osaka Second Section in 1993, the First Section in 1999, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange First Section in 2000 — with European bases in Britain (2002) and Germany (2003) completing a three-pole U.S.–Asia–Europe network by 2003. On that network Capcom stacked owned franchises: Resident Evil (1996), then Onimusha, Devil May Cry and Monster Hunter. But in 1998 it posted its first net loss since going public, winding up a Mexican subsidiary and writing down a U.S. holding company — losses it chose to take all at once, in keeping with mi-no-take.

As console generations turned, a single title could take years and swell from hundreds of millions to over a billion yen to make, while retail turned on opening-week numbers — long development against short selling. Capcom’s answer was its first restructuring of 2003–04: a “60-month map” that laid five years of releases on one sheet, a two-stage greenlight that could kill a project before its budget ballooned, and a shared in-house engine (later MT Framework). The gains showed from the year to March 2007; that June, founder Kenzo Tsujimoto handed the presidency to his son Haruhiro Tsujimoto while staying on as chairman and CEO.

Then the smartphone era arrived, and Capcom over-invested in it. Record sales of $1.0B (¥82bn) in the year to March 2011 gave way to a roughly 55% drop in net profit the next year as mobile bets squeezed margins. The second restructuring of 2012 pulled back from amusement equipment and mobile and re-centred the company on console games. Sales fell — to about ¥64.3bn in the year to March 2014 — but with the low-margin businesses stripped out, the operating margin of the core rose to 16.5%, and the underlying profitability surfaced.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2015The RE Engine and the digital shift

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2015 · consolidated
Revenue$531M
Net income$55M
Net margin10.3%
FY2026 · consolidated
Revenue$1.2B
Net income$345M
Net margin27.9%
  1. 2017RE Engine’s first title, Resident Evil 7
  2. 2018Monster Hunter: World — first worldwide launch; first 1:2 stock split
  3. 2020Digital passes 70% of unit sales
  4. 2022Moves to the TSE Prime market
  5. 2024Operating profit ¥65.8bn — a 12th straight year of growth
  6. 2025Market capitalisation tops ¥2 trillion

Out of the second restructuring came a new in-house engine. The RE Engine, successor to MT Framework, was built for photoreal graphics, VR and simultaneous optimisation across platforms. Its first commercial title, Resident Evil 7 (January 2017), sold 3.5 million units by the year’s end; Monster Hunter: World (January 2018), the series’ first simultaneous worldwide release, then pushed the franchise to a scale it had never reached.

Monster Hunter: World also turned a corner on distribution. Capcom’s digital sales ratio, stuck in the 30s (through the year to March 2016), passed 50% by 2019 and reached the 70s by 2020. Digital sales sit outside the retailer’s inventory risk and discount pressure, and a catalogue title keeps re-selling for years through staged price cuts — from roughly $60 at launch down to $10 and $5 over about five years — so repeat sales of older games now fund the development of new ones.

Under Haruhiro Tsujimoto’s pledge of “10% profit growth every year,” operating profit climbed from $100.2M (¥11bn) in the year to March 2014 to $434.3M (¥66bn) a decade later — a twelfth straight year of growth — while the operating margin rose from 16.5% to 38.8%. Three 1:2 stock splits (2018, 2021, 2024) and an explicit 30% consolidated payout ratio drew in retail investors; market capitalisation topped $15.3B (¥2.29tn) in May 2025 and the price-to-book ratio rose from 1.84 to 6.77, breaking out of the low valuation the game sector had long carried. It is the high point of the founder’s self-financed creed — reached not through borrowing or takeovers but through owned IP, an in-house engine and a digital catalogue.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1998

Booking a loss on purpose: winding up Mexico, writing down the U.S. holding company (1998)

What a decision to drop the pretense left behind

Tsujimoto’s remark that he “dropped the pretense” and chose loss-making books can be read as, for a Japanese manager of that era, a rather unusual call. For a founder who leased rather than owned his head-office building and preached mi-no-take management, deciding to clear unrealised losses in a single stroke rather than carry them forward sat squarely along the line of his philosophy. The anecdote that he recognised losses beyond even what the auditors had flagged reflects a consistent pattern of judgment — choosing what helps the future numbers over dressing up the present ones.

Tsujimoto’s reading at the time — that “software development is entering an age strongly governed by a company’s financial health” — reads almost as a premonition of the later RE Engine era, when development budgets of tens of billions of yen became ordinary. Had he not chosen in 1998 to clean the wound before it could damage the balance sheet, the financial base that underpins the run of consecutive profit growth from the 2010s might have taken a different shape.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2012

The second restructuring: the recoil from over-investing in mobile (2012)

What a second restructuring revealed

As the label “second” makes plain, this was not Capcom’s first restructuring. If the first, of 2003–04, was a “defensive” reform that brought development and sales under management control, the one in 2012 can be read as a painful exercise in selection and concentration after a bet on a growth market backfired. Posting a 55% profit decline in the year after a record-sales year brought home to the company how an investment in a growth field could shake its core console business.

Ironically, the lessons of the mobile business it cut loose here seem in part to have pointed the company, a few years later, toward another technology investment — the RE Engine. Whether it could admit the failed investment while the financial wound was still shallow, and re-narrow its focus, was arguably one cause of the later run of twelve straight years of profit growth. The founder’s phrase, mi-no-take management, looks to have been tested at precisely this moment.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2017

The RE Engine and the shift to digital, catalogue sales (2017)

From one-off sales to repeat sales

The move from selling a package once to selling a digital title continuously can be read as more than a mere switch of sales channel. Shifting from a business that bets on opening-week units to one that recovers a catalogue over several years was also an attempt — in a game industry where development budgets have swelled into the tens of billions of yen — to win back for management the time needed to keep producing hits. It came together only when the in-house RE Engine technology and the sales design of DLC and price strategy meshed at the same moment.

That said, how far this structure can be sustained remains an open question today. The higher the digital ratio climbs past 70% and the more the company leans on repeat sales, the sharper the recoil could be should the next new title miss the wave of a console generational change. The mi-no-take management that founder Kenzo Tsujimoto preached was a philosophy of restraint over investment and borrowing; that a decision to commit, along that same line, to the technology investment of an in-house engine now underpins today’s twelve straight years of profit growth reflects the company’s next challenge — how to reconcile technology with discipline.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Capcom full history in Japanese →

  1. Capcom Co., Ltd. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports), annual reports and integrated reports.
  2. Wedgeウェッジ (iSMedia), 20 Aug 2021. Wedge Online.
  3. Famitsu — ファミ通.com, 1 May 2023 (Haruhiro Tsujimoto interview, on Capcom’s 40th anniversary). famitsu.com.
  4. Nikkei Business — 日経ビジネス電子版 (Nikkei BP), 1 Dec 2023. business.nikkei.com.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →