Capcom — Company History

Financial history 2006–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1979
Head office
Osaka, Japan
Listed
1993 · TYO: 9697
Founder
Tsujimoto Kenzo
Former names
I.R.M. (1979–81) · Sanbi (1981–89)
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$1.2B (¥195bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$345.2M (¥55bn)
Capcom: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1979From reselling electronic game machines to publishing console software

  1. 1979I.R.M. Corporation founded at Matsubara, Osaka with ¥10m capital
  2. 1981Nihon Capsule Computer established
  3. 1981Renamed Sanbi; head office moved to Habikino, Osaka
  4. 1983First in-house machine, the medal game Little League
  5. 1984Development and sale of commercial arcade video games begins
  6. 1985Console software business begins; CAPCOM U.S.A. established
  7. 1986Arcade titles ported to Nintendo's Family Computer
  8. 1989Sanbi absorbs the old Capcom and takes the name Capcom
  9. 1990Shares registered as an over-the-counter issue with the JSDA
  10. 1991Arcade Street Fighter II becomes a worldwide hit
  11. 1993CAPCOM ASIA established in Hong Kong
  12. 1993Listed on the second section of the Osaka Securities Exchange

Capcom began in May 1979 as I.R.M., a small Osaka firm buying in other makers' arcade cabinets and reselling them, and within a decade it had changed its name twice, built arcade games of its own, crossed into console software and put Street Fighter II in front of the world. Every step of that expansion was paid for out of the founder's own cash flow — a habit set in these first years and never since abandoned.

From arcade reseller to <em>Street Fighter II</em>

In May 1979 the founder, Tsujimoto Kenzo (辻本憲三), incorporated I.R.M. Corporation at Matsubara in Osaka Prefecture with capital of $43,478 (¥10m). The stated purpose was the development and sale of electronic-application game machines, and at the outset the business consisted chiefly of route sales — buying in arcade machines made by other firms and reselling them. In September 1981 the company was renamed Sanbi Co., Ltd. and moved its head office to Habikino in Osaka Prefecture; then in June 1983 a new company, the (old) Capcom Co., Ltd., was established at Hirano-ku in Osaka with capital of $42,109 (¥10m) to take charge of the sales side. “Capcom” is a contraction of CAPsule COMputer, a name meant to carry both senses at once: game software as a capsule packed with play, and a hard outer shell protecting what is inside from pirated copies and shoddy imitations. That it changed its name and its registered head office three times in the four years after its founding corresponds to the period in which it was feeling its way from the sale of electronic-application equipment towards the development and sale of video games of its own.

In July 1983 the company manufactured and sold the medal game Little League リトルリーグ as its first machine developed in-house, entering arcade game development in earnest. From May 1984 it began developing and selling commercial arcade video games, and in August 1985 it established CAPCOM U.S.A., INC. to put direct sales into the North American arcade market. In December of the same year it also took up the development and sale of home console software, entering the console market with 1942 for Nintendo's Family Computer. The following year, 1986, it ported arcade titles of its own making — Makaimura 魔界村 and Senjo no Ookami 戦場の狼 among them — to the Family Computer, accelerating the move from the arcade to console software. The shift of weight from a business selling arcade cabinets outright to one aiming at sales of several hundred thousand to several million copies per title in the console market at the height of the Family Computer era was carried out in parallel, within a few years of the founding.

In January 1989 Sanbi Co., Ltd. absorbed the (old) Capcom Co., Ltd., changed its name to Capcom Co., Ltd. and moved its head office to Higashi-ku, Osaka (now Chuo-ku, Osaka). Sales company, development company and holding functions were consolidated into a single entity, a capital structure that put the face of a console software publisher to the front. In October 1990 the shares were registered as an over-the-counter issue with the Japan Securities Dealers Association, securing a route to funding from the stock market. The arcade version of Street Fighter II, released in 1991, became a worldwide hit and fixed the competitive fighting game in the industry as a genre in its own right. From 1992 onwards, through conversions to home consoles, the series as a whole reached a sales scale of more than 20 million copies, and it was the starting point from which the Capcom name became recognised as a game software brand around the world.

Listing on the second section in Osaka, and building the overseas network

In July 1993 the company established CAPCOM ASIA CO., LTD. in Hong Kong, putting in place a sales and procurement base for the Asian region. In October of the same year its shares were listed on the second section of the Osaka Securities Exchange, a promotion in market classification three years after the over-the-counter registration. In June 1995 it established CAPCOM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and CAPCOM DIGITAL STUDIOS, INC. in the United States, extending the North American base into two arms, sales and development. These overseas establishments were not simply the opening of branch offices: they were pursued with the intention of putting three layers of function in place — local sales of arcade machines in the North American market, localisation of console software, and development on the ground at a United States studio. Reading early that the American market would become the largest consuming region for home consoles, and putting the local structure in place ahead of the domestic one, supported the rise in the overseas share of sales in later years.

In May 1994 the Ueno works was completed at Ueno in Mie Prefecture (now Iga), securing a domestic logistics base to handle the manufacture and shipping of console software. In July of the same year the head office building was completed at Uchihirano-machi, Chuo-ku, Osaka, and the registered head office moved there. The business base that had begun small in the founding years had expanded, fifteen years after incorporation, into a multinational development and sales structure spanning Osaka, Tokyo, North America and Asia. In April 1997 the company established Flagship Co., Ltd. as a specialist subsidiary for script and scenario production, dividing the upstream stages of game development into a separate function. Capcom in the first half of the 1990s was in the period in which it pushed the shift of weight from the arcade to console software and the construction of an overseas sales network in parallel, moving the mainstay of its business from a domestically centred arcade operator to a publisher supplying console software to the world market.

Founder Tsujimoto Kenzo's “live within your own size” and the business design of the early 1990s

The founder, Tsujimoto Kenzo, was an entrepreneur who had run a mobile candy-floss machine business and a food wholesaling operation from a base in Osaka, and who had been starting businesses within the commercial customs of the Osaka merchant world well before the founding of IRM in 1979. Even in decisions carrying heavy investment, such as the move to home consoles or the establishment of overseas bases, he consistently avoided expansion beyond the reach of the company's own funds and its bank borrowings, and held to covering all development and capital investment out of its own cash flow. When overseas studios were set up in the 1990s he chose to raise them from nothing as local subsidiaries rather than to acquire them, avoiding both excessive dependence on local partners and the payment of acquisition premiums. In a later interview the founder described this stance in his own words: it is fine for one's own size to grow. Investment and borrowing alike — do all of it within the reach of your own size.

Under this management stance, dependent on neither borrowing nor acquisition, the company sought to run even the rapid expansion phase of the console software business by funding the working capital of its overseas bases from head-office cash flow. In the late 1980s, when the sale of arcade cabinets and the development and sale of console software ran side by side, the differing lengths of the two businesses' earnings cycles made the management of inventory and working capital a problem for management in its own right; from the 1990s, once the centre of gravity of earnings had moved to console software developed in-house, a transition began from the conventional packaged business, in which development costs were recovered by sales at launch, to a structure in which they were recovered through continued selling over the long term. The establishment of the series titles that followed — Street Fighter II in 1991, Breath of Fire in 1993 and Biohazard バイオハザード in 1996 — rested on the development structure and the sales channels accumulated in this period.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1994Listing, expansion, and two restructurings that rebuilt the earnings base

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2006 · unconsolidated
Revenue$605M
Net income$59M
Net margin9.8%
FY2014 · consolidated
Revenue$966M
Net income$32M
Net margin3.3%
  1. 1994Ueno works completed in Mie; new head office building in Osaka
  2. 1995CAPCOM ENTERTAINMENT and CAPCOM DIGITAL STUDIOS established in the US
  3. 1997Flagship established for script and scenario production
  4. 1998Guidance cut; first post-listing net loss on the Mexican liquidation
  5. 1999Shares redesignated to the first section in Osaka
  6. 2000Listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
  7. 2002CE EUROPE established in the United Kingdom
  8. 2003CEG INTERACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT established in Germany
  9. 2003First restructuring: 60-month map, two-stage approval, shared engine
  10. 2006Daletto established
  11. 2007Tsujimoto Haruhiro becomes president; founder stays on as chairman and CEO
  12. 2008K2 and Enterrise become subsidiaries
  13. 2011Beeline Interactive Japan established
  14. 2012“Second restructuring” announced; amusement equipment and mobile reviewed
  15. 2012CAPCOM TAIWAN established

Between 1994 and 2014 Capcom finished the climb from a second-section Osaka listing to first-section listings in both Osaka and Tokyo, completed a three-pole sales network across America, Asia and Europe, and twice took a knife to its own structure. The first restructuring taught it to plan releases five years out; the second taught it what happens when it invests outside the reach of its own body.

Promotion to the first sections in Osaka and Tokyo, and the completion of the overseas network

In September 1999 the shares were redesignated to the first section of the Osaka Securities Exchange, and in October 2000 they were also listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Six years after the second-section listing in Osaka the company was a dual-listed first-section issue, occupying a place among Japan's listed entertainment companies alongside the console makers Nintendo and Sony. In November 2002 it established CE EUROPE LTD. in the United Kingdom as a European sales base, and in February 2003 CEG INTERACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT GmbH in Germany to reinforce sales and marketing functions on the European continent. The three-pole structure of the United States, Asia and Europe was complete by 2003, giving the company the shape of a global publisher with direct sales bases in every major region of the world console market.

On the development side, the generational change in consoles (the PS2, GameCube and Xbox generation) lengthened the development period for a single title and swelled development costs from several hundred million yen to the order of a billion yen and more. In the console software market of the 2000s, competition for shelf space at retailers grew fierce, and the tendency strengthened for a new title's fate to be settled in a short contest decided by the initial volume sold at launch. The company brought up series IP one after another — Biohazard, Street Fighter, Onimusha, Devil May Cry and Monster Hunter — seeking to stabilise earnings through the continued selling of series instalments; but under the contradictory pressures of lengthening development and shortening sales, managing the productivity of the development organisation rose to become the most important problem facing management. Delayed releases and after-the-fact impairment of development costs affected results by several hundred million yen per title, and the quarter-to-quarter swing in earnings was treated as a problem by investors.

The first restructuring — the 60-month map, two-stage approval and a shared engine

Across the years to March 2003 and March 2004 the company embarked on its first restructuring. It had three cores: (1) making the five-year title release plan visible in what was called the “60-month map”; (2) a “two-stage approval system” that screened the business viability of development proposals at two points; and (3) standardising the game engine across the company (later MT FRAMEWORK). The 60-month map is a mechanism for avoiding a bias of sales towards particular financial years and releasing series instalments steadily every period, managing development progress and the sales plan five years ahead on a single map. The two-stage approval system placed a viability screening both at the planning stage and at the stage of committing to full production, creating a mechanism by which a project could be stopped before development costs had swollen. The introduction of a shared engine standardised as reusable components the base technology that had until then been built up separately for each title in development, laying the ground for shorter development periods and lower development costs.

The results of the first restructuring appeared in the financial indicators from FY07 onwards. The annual report issued for the year to March 2010 summed these mechanisms up as having “taken root as a stable earnings base”. Making the release plan visible narrowed the width of the quarterly swing in earnings, and the introduction of the shared engine lowered both the absolute level of development cost per title and the amortisation burden. As the improvement in the profitability of the consumer business took hold, in July 2007 the founder Tsujimoto Kenzo handed the presidency to his eldest son, Tsujimoto Haruhiro (辻本春弘), and himself became representative director, chairman and CEO. It was a generational change in the presidency alone, a move to a two-headed structure in which the founder continued to carry the central axis of management as CEO — securing continuity in the “live within your own size” discipline held since the founding and in long-term investment judgement, while entrusting execution on the ground to the next generation. In June of the same year the company absorbed its subsidiary Flagship Co., Ltd., pressing on with the consolidation of development functions within the group.

The second restructuring — the mobile overreach and the review of the amusement equipment business

In the first half of the 2010s the spread of smartphones shifted the centre of the world game market from home consoles to mobile devices in a short space of time. In April 2011 the company established Beeline Interactive Japan Co., Ltd. (later Capcom Mobile), and alongside Enterrise Co., Ltd., acquired in November 2008, pressed on with investment in earnest in the mobile and social game field. In FY11 consolidated sales were $1.0B (¥82bn), with ordinary profit of $147.9M (¥12bn) and profit attributable to owners of the parent of $84M (¥7bn), a record high for sales; but the front-loaded investment in the mobile field emerged as a drag on the profit margin. In FY12 profit attributable to owners of the parent fell to $37.6M (¥3bn), a decline of about 55 per cent on the previous year, and the delay in monetising the mobile business and the shortfall of some titles against plan brought the instability of results into relief.

In its results for the year to March 2012 the company announced a “second restructuring”, beginning a fundamental review of low-margin businesses and a rebuilding of the business portfolio accompanied by the recognition of restructuring losses. It had two cores: (1) a continuing review of the amusement equipment business (pachislot machines and the like), and (2) selection and concentration in the mobile and social game business. The amusement equipment business went on lacking a stable structure, posting an operating loss of $6.2M (¥700m) in FY17, and by FY18 had shrunk to sales of $30.8M (¥3bn) and an operating loss of $24.5M (¥3bn), reducing its presence in the business portfolio. In the mobile field, while continuing to roll out collaborative titles developed in-house, the company pursued from 2016 an organisational reorganisation bringing together the production know-how peculiar to mobile and the marketing functions held within the group. In September 2017 Capcom absorbed Capcom Mobile Co., Ltd., settling the movement to integrate the small development studios it had taken as subsidiaries into the parent company's development functions.

The financial results of the second restructuring showed in the numbers from FY14 onwards. Consolidated sales contracted from $1.0B (¥102bn) in FY13 to $607.5M (¥64bn) in FY14, but this reflected the tidying of the business portfolio and a change in accounting classification, and the profitability of the core business, concentrated on consumer games, improved instead. FY14 operating profit was $100.2M (¥11bn), an operating margin of 16.5 per cent, and the structure changed such that clearing away the low-margin businesses let the earning rate of the main business come to the surface. The 60-month map and the shared engine put in place by the first restructuring served as the base on which the selection and concentration of the second restructuring could be executed, and the shrinking of the amusement equipment business and the stabilisation of consumer earnings advanced together.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2015RE ENGINE and digital sales behind twelve straight years of operating-profit growth

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2015 · consolidated
Revenue$531M
Net income$55M
Net margin10.3%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$1.1B
Net income$324M
Net margin28.6%
  1. 2017Biohazard 7, the first full RE ENGINE title, released
  2. 2018Monster Hunter: World launches worldwide on the same day
  3. 2018First 1:2 stock split; CAPCOM MEDIA VENTURES established
  4. 2020CAPCOM SINGAPORE established; digital passes 70% of sales
  5. 2021Second 1:2 stock split
  6. 2022CAPCOM PICTURES established
  7. 2023Swordcanes Studio becomes a subsidiary
  8. 2024Third 1:2 stock split; 66.7% of Minimum Studios acquired
  9. 2025Market capitalisation reaches ¥2,291.9bn at the end of May

From 2015 Capcom's growth stopped depending on which single title happened to land. An engine built in-house and a shift of most unit sales to digital download turned a catalogue of wholly owned franchises into repeatable revenue, carrying operating profit from $100.2M (¥11bn) in FY14 to $434.3M (¥66bn) in FY24 across twelve consecutive years of growth. The discipline had not changed; only the size of the body it was measured against.

RE ENGINE and the simultaneous worldwide launch of <em>Monster Hunter: World</em>

Having come through the second restructuring from 2014, the company set about developing its own game engine, RE ENGINE. RE ENGINE was positioned as the successor to MT FRAMEWORK, a next-generation engine whose main features were photorealistic graphics, VR support and simultaneous optimisation for multiple platforms. The first title released on it in earnest was Biohazard 7: Resident Evil バイオハザード7 レジデント イービル, published in January 2017; it sold 3.5 million copies worldwide by the end of the year to March 2017 and drew praise for bringing the original experience of the horror game to VR and for the finish of its photorealistic graphics. Monster Hunter: World, which followed in January 2018, lifted the sales scale of the series as a whole to a level it had never reached, through the first simultaneous worldwide release in the series and optimisation for home consoles.

The success of Monster Hunter: World was the turning point that raised the digital share of console software sales. The company's digital sales ratio had stayed in the thirty per cent range up to FY16, but with a sales model combining the simultaneous worldwide release with DLC (downloadable add-on content) it passed 50 per cent in FY19 and reached the seventy per cent range in FY20. Digital sales stand clear of retailers' inventory risk and discounting pressure, and even titles several years past release can be made to sell again through continuing price measures — annual price cuts and sales at particular moments. The company built a pricing strategy of stepping a title sold at about $60 immediately after release down to the $10 and $5 levels over roughly five years, maximising units and profit across a selling period of about five years per new title. The earnings contribution of repeat sales established a structure that supports development investment in new titles.

The in-house engine and the commitment to 10 per cent profit growth every year

The commitment to “10 per cent profit growth every year” declared by president Tsujimoto Haruhiro became the goal that symbolised the company's management stance from FY13 onwards. Operating profit expanded roughly sixfold, from $100.2M (¥11bn) in FY14 to $434.3M (¥66bn) in FY24, and the run of twelve consecutive years of operating profit growth continues. The operating margin also rose 22 points, from 16.5 per cent in FY14 to 38.8 per cent in FY24, a level high even by comparison with others in the industry. Use of the in-house RE ENGINE contributed both to lower development costs per title and to more stable quality, supporting a structure in which several series instalments — Monster Hunter, Biohazard, Street Fighter and others — could be released reliably every period at a sales scale above a million copies each. As of FY24 development investment had reached the order of $330M (¥50bn) a year, and the company had established a structure in which, across new releases and continued selling together, eighty per cent of annual unit sales were digital.

In a Famitsu interview in May 2023, at the milestone of the company's fortieth anniversary, president Tsujimoto Haruhiro said that Capcom would bring up the game industry as content able to compete globally, making the wider selling of its own IP in overseas markets explicit as the main axis of Capcom's medium- and long-term strategy. In an interview with the digital edition of Nikkei Business he also set out the message of using the strength of game intellectual property to open up the world market under its own power, and the stance of developing overseas markets through its own IP and its own sales channels, rather than through tie-ups with foreign publishers, has been consistent. This lies on an extension of the founder Tsujimoto Kenzo's “live within your own size” discipline: rather than expansion through overseas M&A or borrowing, growth is to be realised through an in-house engine and the worldwide roll-out of its own IP — a management stance the company still carries forward now, forty-six years after its founding.

Three stock splits and a ¥2 trillion market capitalisation — where “live within your own size” arrived

The company carried out 1:2 stock splits three times, in April 2018, April 2021 and April 2024, widening the base of individual investors and improving the liquidity of the shares. On dividend policy it made a “consolidated payout ratio of 30 per cent” explicit from the year to March 2017, putting in place a framework combining a stable dividend with stepped increases linked to results. The annual dividend for FY24 was ¥70 on a post-split basis, a payout ratio of 33.7 per cent, and for FY25 a plan has been set out to raise the year-end dividend to ¥22 (¥40 for the year, a payout ratio of 34.5 per cent). Market capitalisation expanded roughly fifteenfold, from $1.6B (¥128bn) in FY11 to $12.9B (¥1.95tn) in FY24, and reached $15.3B (¥2.29tn) at the end of May 2025. The price-to-book ratio rose from 1.84 times in FY11 to 6.77 times in FY24, achieving a structural break from the market valuation under which game software makers have historically been placed at a low PBR.

Consolidated employees increased by about 1,100, or 40 per cent, from 2,681 in FY14 to 3,766 in FY24, as the expansion of the development structure continued. The company has kept up the recruitment of more than 150 new graduates every period, developing internally both its response to the technical evolution of game graphics (animator posts in particular) and the technical staff who build and run the in-house engine. As of FY24 the number of developers had reached about 3,094 (digital contents business), and together with 213 in amusement facilities and 150 in amusement equipment the group carried 3,457 business employees in all. The founder Tsujimoto Kenzo's management philosophy — “it is fine for one's own size to grow” — marks, in the combination of its own IP, an in-house engine, digital sales and continued selling, the point at which forty-six years of building a business structure have arrived.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

The turning points, read in full: what was at stake, what was chosen and what the revenue did around it. The Japanese edition is the edition of record and carries the sourced dossier behind each decision — background, options weighed, outcome — linked under every decision.

Key decision · 1998

Liquidating the Mexican subsidiary and writing down the US holding company (1998)

What the decision to drop appearances left behind

Tsujimoto's words about choosing a loss-making set of accounts “having dropped all appearances” can be read as a judgement of a rather rare kind among Japanese managers of the time. For a founder who leased rather than owned his head office and who had held up “live within your own size” as his creed, the decision to recognise unrealised losses in one go rather than defer them lay on an extension of that management philosophy. The story that he recognised losses beyond even the range the audit firm had pointed to reflects a consistent pattern of judgement: choosing what will help the management numbers of the future over dressing up the numbers of the present.

The reading Tsujimoto offered at the time — that software development is entering an age strongly governed by a company's financial constitution — appears in hindsight to have anticipated, already then, the later RE ENGINE era in which development investment of tens of billions of yen became ordinary. Without the decision to deal with the wound of 1998 before the finances were damaged, the financial base supporting the run of consecutive profit growth from the 2010s onwards might have taken a different shape.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2012

Key decision · 2012

The second restructuring — the mobile overreach and the review of the amusement equipment business (2012)

What a second restructuring showed

As the name “second” indicates, this was not Capcom's first restructuring. If the first restructuring of 2003–04 was a defensive reform that put the management of development and sales in order, the one in 2012 can be seen as a painful exercise in selection and concentration, forced by an investment in a growth market that had turned against the company. Experiencing a 55 per cent fall in profit in the period after the one that set a record for sales confronted the company with the danger that investment in a growth field could shake the consumer business that was its core.

Ironically, the lessons of the mobile field cut away here also seem to have turned the company, some years later, towards a different technical investment in RE ENGINE. Whether it could admit the failure of an investment while the financial wound was still shallow, and re-aim the business, may be one reason for the later result of twelve consecutive years of profit growth. The founder's phrase “live within your own size” appears to have been tested precisely at this moment.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2017

Key decision · 2017

The in-house RE ENGINE and the shift to digital and DLC sales (2017)

From selling once to selling again

The shift from selling a package once to selling digitally over time can be read as more than a switch of sales channel. Moving from a business betting on initial volume immediately after release to one that recovers a catalogue over several years was also an attempt to win back, for management, the time needed to keep producing hits in a game industry where development costs have swollen to the order of tens of billions of yen. It was a transition that came off only because an in-house technology, RE ENGINE, and a sales design of DLC and pricing meshed at the same moment.

How long this structure holds, though, remains an open question today. The higher the digital ratio climbs above seventy per cent and the more the company leans on repeat sales, the stronger the recoil may be when the next new title misses the wave of a console generation. The “live within your own size” creed the founder Tsujimoto Kenzo preached was a philosophy of restraint in investment and borrowing; that the decision to commit, on an extension of it, to the technical investment of an in-house engine now supports twelve consecutive years of profit growth seems to reflect the company's next problem — how to hold technology and discipline together.

This decision in Japanese — the full sourced dossier →


References & sources

This English edition follows the Japanese one chapter by chapter. The Japanese edition remains the edition of record: it carries the source-by-source citations, the financial tables and the shareholder and executive records. 日本語版(詳細)— Capcom full history in Japanese →

  1. Capcom Co., Ltd. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports), including the 沿革 corporate-history sections of the 27th term (year to March 2006) and of the filings for the years to March 2012, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2018 and 2019, and the consolidated statements for the years to March 2012 and 2017.
  2. Capcom Co., Ltd. — Integrated Report 2025; Business Strategy and Plan for the year to March 2013; the message from the COO on the official site.
  3. Nikkei Business — 日経ビジネス (Nikkei BP): 18 Dec 1995 and 23 Feb 1998, both interviews with president Tsujimoto Kenzo on the delayed software development and on the swing into loss. Nikkei Business digital edition, 1 Dec 2023.
  4. Famitsu.com — ファミ通.com (Kadokawa Game Linkage), 1 May 2023, interview with president Tsujimoto Haruhiro at the fortieth anniversary.
  5. Wedge — Wedge (Wedge Inc.), 20 Aug 2021, on the founding of Capcom and the origin of the name.
  6. gamebiz — gamebiz, 12 May 2020, on the digital share of sales reaching 76.8 per cent in the year to March 2020.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →



Data API

Capcom’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET. Full specification →

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