DeNA

Buying the Yokohama BayStars: baseball as advertising (2011)

Key decision·2011· DeNA — the full company history →

The upshot of reading a loss-making ball club as “the most effective advertising”

The core of this decision lies in reading a loss-making ball club not as a source of losses but as advertising spend that raised the company’s name recognition and brand — an idea that swapped the backward-looking ring of the word “deficit” for the vocabulary of investment. As President Moriyasu noted, citing annual advertising and promotion outlays of just under $250.7M (¥20bn), the aim was less to advertise a product than to make up for a recognition that lagged the scale of the business, and to run recruitment and user acquisition to advantage. Measured on the same yardstick as ordinary advertising, the effect of a club’s name being reported over and over on national news made an annual loss of a little over $25.1M (¥2bn) not necessarily a costly purchase — such a calculation appears to have been at work.

That said, reading the club purchase as advertising alone cannot fully explain the turn to profit that followed. Under Jun Ikeda, DeNA rebuilt attendance, and in 2016 it acquired Yokohama Stadium to run club and ballpark as one. Reworking a club it had written off as an expense into a business that earned from both the game and the venue is what brought a utilisation rate above 90% and a move into the black five years after the acquisition. The initial “advertising” account was the doorway for stepping in while accepting the loss; the corporate effort beyond it made the difference that turned expense into asset. The 2024 Japan Series title and record attendance were a destination on the extension of that line.

Revenue and net margin, FY2006–FY2016

Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY2011 onwards — after it was taken.

Source: securities reports

Read the full dossier in Japanese →

The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.

Other key decisions at DeNA


Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


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GET /api/2432/executives.json Executives
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GET /api/2432/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/2432/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/2432/workforce.json Workforce