SHIMZ-21: withdrawing from diversification and returning to the core (1991)

A plan laid at the height of the boom, overturned at the entrance to the slump

At the core of this decision is a paradox: a plan drawn up at the peak of a boom, overturned at the mouth of a recession. The 1985 Shimizu Spring Plan sketched a future spreading from construction-adjacent fields into other industries altogether; but the unprecedented construction boom that followed ironically made the core business loom larger still, and the diversification target was left hanging. The aggressive stance President Imamura Chisuke had voiced on taking office — “we will expand new fields such as development” — was pushed back by the reality of the bursting bubble barely half a year later. As the contemporary comment “belatedly” suggests, the return to the core business under SHIMZ-21 can be read as a judgement issued in pursuit of a market that had already turned.

It should not be overlooked, however, that this was not simply a shift to defence. Announced alongside the return to the core was an offensive in the Kansai market, long neglected: the new Kinki sales headquarters and the concentration of authority in a Kansai general manager were intended as a reallocation toward a new growth area, not as a shrinking equilibrium. That the industry’s reaction went no further than “let us see how they manage” suggests the numerical targets would still take time to realise. As the slump in orders after the bubble dragged on and cost reduction moved to the centre of management’s agenda, the course diverged somewhat from the heat of the original announcement of a long-term vision aiming at ¥3 trillion in sales by 2000.