Iwatani

Company history

Financial history 1965–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1930
Head office
Osaka, Japan
Listed
1949
Founder
Iwatani Naoji
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$5.7B (¥909bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$301.6M (¥48bn)
Iwatani: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1930Oxygen, carbide, and the gas nobody sold

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1930Iwatani Naoji opens an oxygen and carbide business in Osaka
  2. 1941Begins collecting and selling by-product hydrogen
  3. 1945Incorporated as Iwatani Sangyo
  4. 1949Listed on the Osaka Stock Exchange

Iwatani Naoji — the fourth son of a Shimane farming family, apprenticed at fifteen to a Kobe shipping agent — opened a shop in the port district of Osaka in May 1930 with his wife Sochi, selling oxygen, carbide and welding materials. Western Japan was then industrialising fast, and welding was spreading through shipyards, rolling-stock works and bridge builders; a supplier who met his delivery dates and controlled the quality of what he shipped effectively controlled his customers’ output. With no capital and no connections, the shop had a foothold in industrial gas within a decade.

In 1941 came the encounter that defined the company. Plants making hardened oils produced hydrogen as a by-product and, beyond what they used themselves, released essentially all of it into the air. Iwatani saw waste — mottainai — and set up a business buying the surplus and selling it on. Imported atomic-hydrogen welders were creating demand, but almost nobody was distributing the gas. Collecting a discarded gas and selling it was a natural extension of the oxygen trade, and it is the origin of what the industry now calls “Iwatani, the hydrogen company.”

The wartime years brought trading and shipping arms and, through a joint venture with a French industrial-gas company, plants in Shanghai, Tianjin and Guangdong that made it the largest oxygen producer on the Chinese mainland. In February 1945, six months before the surrender, the shop was reorganised as Iwatani Sangyo; the Osaka head office burned in the air raids that year and the business carried on regardless. It listed on the Osaka Stock Exchange in 1949.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1953Maruwi Propane, and the founder’s fifty-five years

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1965 · unconsolidated
Revenue$75M
Net income$2M
Net margin2.2%
FY1984 · unconsolidated
Revenue$1.8B
Net income$3M
Net margin0.1%
  1. 1953Maruwi Propane — Japan’s first national household LP gas brand
  2. 1964Maruwi Propane fuels the Tokyo Olympic cauldron
  3. 1969The hose-free cassette stove
  4. 1980Sakai LPG import terminal; direct imports from Saudi Arabia in 1981
  5. 1985Founder becomes chairman; industrial gas consolidated

At a high-pressure gas association meeting in 1952, Iwatani learned that Italian households cooked with liquefied gas from cylinders. Japanese kitchens still burned wood in a kamado, and the housewives who worked them did so in soot and smoke; propane was understood as an industrial fuel and nobody had considered building a consumer distribution network for it. In 1953, aged fifty, he launched Maruwi Propane — Japan’s first nationwide household LP gas business — turning an industrial gas trader into a consumer company.

Selling it required teaching it. From 1955 caravan teams toured the country, boiling water in shrine precincts to show that it could be done fast and without soot, and dealers were signed up region by region to sell a package of stove, cylinder and gas alarm. When the Tokyo Olympic cauldron was lit in October 1964, it burned Maruwi Propane. In 1969 Iwatani applied the same instinct to hardware, launching the Hosenon Cassette Foo, a portable tabletop stove with no hose — the founder had heard housewives complain that the hose was in the way at the dinner table, and switched the industry from refillable to disposable cartridges, borrowing the format from insecticide cans. More than 52 million have been shipped in the half-century since.

Owning the customer meant owning the supply. In August 1980 Iwatani completed its own LPG import terminal at Sakai, twenty-seven years after Maruwi Propane launched, and from February 1981 imported directly from Saudi Arabia under a contract with Petromin — replacing procurement through Japanese trading houses just after the second oil shock. The industrial-gas side was consolidated into a single subsidiary by a three-way merger in 1985. That December, at eighty-two, Iwatani Naoji moved up to the chairmanship after fifty-five years in which every new business — surplus hydrogen, household propane, the cassette stove, direct crude-country imports — had been his personal initiative.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1986Quality over volume, and a bet on hydrogen

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2006 · unconsolidated
Revenue$5.5B
Net income$20M
Net margin0.4%
FY2012 · consolidated
Revenue$8.3B
Net income$132M
Net margin1.6%
  1. 2000Makino Akiji becomes president: “from volume to quality”
  2. 2002Exit from detached housing; Japan’s first hydrogen station opens for testing
  3. 2006HydroEdge — the first commercial liquefied-hydrogen plant
  4. 2013Third liquefied-hydrogen plant; central research institute opens

The founder’s departure left a company with three gas businesses, a culture in which one man’s judgement drove every decision, and more than a dozen peripheral ventures that had been kept alive at low returns through the long post-bubble slump. Two short presidencies passed before Makino Akiji took over in April 2000. A career industrial-gas man who had turned the Nagoya branch from seventeenth of eighteen to first, and who had spent 1989 seconded to Union Carbide in the United States studying liquefied-hydrogen production, he made “from volume to quality” the governing principle — halving the number of directors, pushing authority to younger managers, and thinning head office.

In July 2002 he liquidated five subsidiaries and left the detached-housing business entirely, thirty-six years after Iwatani had entered it. The housing losses were not exploding, but in a market in structural decline every year of delay deepened the wound. Clearing the founder-era ventures over the following few years created the financial room for what came next.

That same February, Iwatani opened Japan’s first hydrogen supply station for demonstration testing — at a time when a fuel-cell vehicle cost around $798,212 (¥100m) and essentially no customer for one existed. Industry observers questioned the economics; Makino was continuing a conviction the founder had voiced since 1941, that the age of hydrogen would come. In 2004 Iwatani formed HydroEdge with Kansai Electric Power and Sakai LNG, and in 2006 Japan’s first commercial liquefied-hydrogen plant began operating at Sakai, using LNG cold energy to make liquefaction efficient. It supplied rocket fuel for JAXA launches, high-purity hydrogen for semiconductors and chemicals, and — eventually — the stations. Plants in Chiba (2009) and Yamaguchi (2013) took national capacity to 120 million cubic metres a year.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2013Commercialising “Iwatani, the hydrogen company”

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2013 · consolidated
Revenue$6.7B
Net income$82M
Net margin1.2%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$5.9B
Net income$270M
Net margin4.6%
  1. 2014Japan’s first commercial hydrogen station, at Amagasaki
  2. 2022Toki Systems Solutions acquired — hydrogen dispensers brought in-house
  3. 2024Becomes largest shareholder of Cosmo Energy Holdings
  4. 2025Withdrawal from the Australian CQ-H2 hydrogen project

In July 2014 Iwatani opened Japan’s first commercial hydrogen station, at Amagasaki — a year ahead of the Toyota Mirai going on sale, and in line with a 2011 joint declaration by thirteen carmakers and energy companies to have a hundred stations ready. By 2026 it operated 52 in Japan and 10 in the United States, the largest commercial hydrogen supply chain in the country. Passenger fuel-cell cars never arrived in the numbers assumed; the weight shifted to commercial vehicles — Tokyo’s fuel-cell buses, joint truck trials in Fukushima, and Iwatani’s own fuel-cell trucks delivering gas cylinders. In 2022 it bought Toki Systems Solutions, a leading maker of hydrogen dispensers, for just under $152.2M (¥20bn), integrating the chain from equipment to retail.

In March 2024 Iwatani did something it had never done: instead of building a network itself, it bought into someone else’s. It paid $749.4M (¥105bn) for a further stake in Cosmo Energy Holdings, taking 20.07% of the votes, and signed a capital and business alliance in April aimed at converting a national fuel-retail network towards hydrogen and materials. The market was cold at first — analysts said the synergies were unclear and the shares fell nearly 10% — but joint hydrogen stations and equity-method income followed within months.

The supply side has been harder. The mid-term plan targets operating profit of ¥65bn for fiscal 2027 and hydrogen revenue of ¥200bn by fiscal 2030, but the Australian projects meant to feed it collapsed: after a change of state government in Queensland withdrew funding, Iwatani exited the CQ-H2 green hydrogen venture in March 2025 and wrote off both that and US station assets. What absorbs such blows is the rest of the group. Of $5.8B (¥883bn) in fiscal 2024 revenue, integrated energy supplied 43%, industrial gases and machinery 31%, and materials — rare earths, battery materials, mineral sands — 23%, the last having doubled its operating profit in five years. Ninety-five years on, the founder’s conviction is still being carried by businesses he built to pay for it.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1953

Maruwi Propane: LP gas for the household (1953)

The prototype of a philosophy that controls the downstream

What the Maruwi Propane decision demonstrates is a nose for markets that lie outside the existing flow of trade rather than along the extension of the existing business. Moving from wholesaling industrial cylinders to factories and shops into a consumer business that reaches the household kitchen changed not only the goods handled but the very point of contact with the customer — it was a bet on remaking that contact. Aiming at the territory city-gas infrastructure did not reach was a choice that turned the weakness of arriving late into an advantage.

What makes the shift interesting is that it was not left as a one-off product launch: over fifteen years the company built the skeleton of a distribution system — dealers, filling depots, affiliated sales companies. The integrated supply chain from upstream to downstream, symbolised by the Sakai LPG import terminal of 1980, was an investment that only had meaning because of the consumer distribution network established in 1953. The habit of thinking in terms of how to make a product that arrives in the hands of ordinary people reappears repeatedly as the basic form of Iwatani’s later expansion, hydrogen included.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2000

Makino’s “volume to quality”: exiting housing, investing in hydrogen (2000)

How to judge the turn from volume to quality

The core of this decision was not a response to financial crisis but a judgement, taken in the mild headwind of the post-bubble slump, about how to wind up the inheritance of the founder’s generation. The detached-housing business was not haemorrhaging at speed, but in a market in long-term decline the structure was one where every postponement of the exit deepened the wound. That Makino moved to liquidation barely two years after taking office showed an execution that kept “from volume to quality” from being a slogan.

That said, starting demonstration testing of a hydrogen supply station was advance investment at a time when fuel-cell vehicles barely existed, and whether it was the right management judgement is still debated more than twenty years on. Passenger fuel-cell cars did not spread as far as originally assumed, while commercial-vehicle demand and the scale-up of liquefied-hydrogen production have continued. The choice to direct the capacity freed by tidying up peripheral businesses into hydrogen casts a long shadow today, as a decision that re-asked where a company’s strength should lie rather than how large it should be.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2023

Taking a 20% stake in Cosmo Energy Holdings (2024)

The price of a full bet

The market’s initial reaction was cool. Against Iwatani’s move to take on, in a single block, the shares held by the former Murakami fund, analysts repeatedly said the synergies were unclear, and the share price fell nearly ten per cent immediately after the announcement. A financial structure requiring more than $711.7M (¥100bn) of borrowing to be repaid within a year appears to have fed speculation about an equity raise as well. The combination — an energy trading specialist folding an oil refiner’s holding company into equity-method accounting — was not one whose aim could be read at a glance.

Yet barely six months after the alliance, concrete fruit began to appear in the form of jointly opened hydrogen stations and equity-method investment income. The criticism about higher interest-bearing debt remains, but whether a judgement described as a “full bet” can have an effect beyond the single business of hydrogen — taking in Cosmo’s entire fuel-supply network — is a point on which views will divide according to how far the collaboration deepens. How far the explanation of synergies that the market demanded at the outset can be made concrete through the alliance committee will decide what this decision is worth.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Iwatani full history in Japanese →

  1. Iwatani Corporation — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports) and earnings materials.
  2. A History of Enterprises: One Hundred Years of Meiji『企業の歴史:明治百年』, Keizai Shunjusha, 1968 (chapter on Iwatani Sangyo).

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Iwatani’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/8088/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/8088/history.json History overview
GET /api/8088/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/8088/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/8088/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/8088/executives.json Executives
GET /api/8088/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/8088/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/8088/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/8088/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/8088/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/8088/workforce.json Workforce