Entering the stepper business — a second pillar in semiconductors (1980)
The shadow inside the winning formula
The heart of this decision was that it was not a retreat forced by crisis but a deliberate carrying of the company’s deepest technology out beyond a mature core business. The optical glass and precise positioning built for cameras mapped directly onto the accuracy that semiconductor miniaturisation demanded. When the sidelined build-to-order group offered up the technology it had been nursing to the needs of the age, this proud old firm gained a second face — “the Nikon of semiconductor equipment.” A company long chided for being slow to diversify was, in a single turn, counted among diversification’s success stories.
And yet a shadow already lay across the very strength that made the entry possible. Answering Japan’s chipmakers one machine at a time, and taking share through direct sales and close attachment to the user, was the finest formula there was — so long as the customers were gathered in Japan. In 1984, when President Fukuoka showed his composure — “we have ten years of accumulated stepper technology; we will not be caught so easily” — the distant cause of the later reversal was already inside the shape of the business. How to raise a second pillar is bound up, inseparably, with the question of what that pillar is leaning on to stand.
Revenue and net margin, FY1975–FY1985
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY1980 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Nikon
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
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Data API
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| Method | Endpoint | Returns |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/companies.json | All companies |
| GET | /api/7731/manifest.json | Resource index |
| GET | /api/7731/history.json | History overview |
| GET | /api/7731/timeline.json | Chronology |
| GET | /api/decisions.json | All management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/7731/decisions.json | Management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/7731/decisions/{slug}.json | One decision (full dossier) |
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| GET | /api/7731/shareholders.json | Major shareholders |
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| GET | /api/7731/financials-longterm.json | Long-term results |
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