Abandoning the display business and concentrating on semiconductor inspection (2009)
Not a spread, but the one point you can win
The core of this decision is that although it was forced by crisis, it was not a defensive contraction but an offensive concentration. Two pillars are meant to hold the company up when one of them sinks. But when capital spending in both fields moves with the same economic wave, spreading the bet removes no risk at all. What Okabayashi Osamu chose was not to prop up two sinking pillars evenly, but to throw away the one he could not win with and move the resources to the one he could. When diversification stops being a defence, concentration becomes the weapon of the niche mid-sized firm — a paradox this decision brings into view.
Concentration, of course, pays hugely when it lands and narrows your escape routes when it does not. What let Lasertec make that wager work was the lightness of owning no factory, a company culture that grew more confident the harder the technology became, and the nerve to move first on EUV while the market was still invisible. Beyond the monopoly it won lies a new problem — dependence on the semiconductor cycle. The choice of 2009, to give up half of revenue, stands as a case in which preferring the sharpness of focus over the comfort of a spread turned a small company into a very large one.
Revenue and net margin, FY2004–FY2014
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY2009 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Lasertec
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
Disclaimer
- This page is provided for general information only and is not investment advice, nor a recommendation to buy or sell any security.
- Figures are compiled independently and include our own estimates, approximations and machine-processed data; we make no warranty as to their accuracy or completeness.
- Sources are primarily each company’s securities reports and other public filings, but errors and omissions may remain.
- Any use of this information is at the reader’s own risk. Past performance does not indicate future results.
- Company names, logos and other marks belong to their respective owners.
Data API
Lasertec’s history, financials, executives and
shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.
Full specification →
| Method | Endpoint | Returns |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/companies.json | All companies |
| GET | /api/6920/manifest.json | Resource index |
| GET | /api/6920/history.json | History overview |
| GET | /api/6920/timeline.json | Chronology |
| GET | /api/decisions.json | All management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/6920/decisions.json | Management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/6920/decisions/{slug}.json | One decision (full dossier) |
| GET | /api/6920/executives.json | Executives |
| GET | /api/6920/shareholders.json | Major shareholders |
| GET | /api/6920/financials.json | Financial statements |
| GET | /api/6920/financials-longterm.json | Long-term results |
| GET | /api/6920/segments.json | Business segments |
| GET | /api/6920/regions.json | Sales by region |
| GET | /api/6920/workforce.json | Workforce |