Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1987 · unconsolidated
Revenue$51M
Net income$8M
Net margin16.5%
→
FY2021 · consolidated
Revenue$4.9B
Net income$1.8B
Net margin36.6%
The listing on the Osaka Securities Exchange in 1987 handed Keyence money a fabless company barely needed, and the thirty-five years that followed were spent proving the model could run without its author. Direct sales, standard products, value pricing and no factories of its own produced operating margins above 40%, the highest share price in Japan and pay that rose with profit — and in December 2000 Takizaki handed the presidency to a salaried successor to find out whether the rule would hold when he was no longer the one applying it.
Listing on the Osaka Second Section, and ¥60.1bn raised from the market
In October 1987 the company listed its shares on the Second Section of the Osaka Securities Exchange, raising about $144.5M (¥21bn) in a public offering. The equity ratio, 62.6% in the year ended March 1987 before the listing, jumped to 90.3% for the year ended March 1988 and 90.6% for the year ended March 1989. In December 1989 it listed on the Second Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and in September 1990 on the First Sections of both the Tokyo and Osaka exchanges; the listing and two subsequent public offerings together raised $415M (¥60bn) directly from the equity market. Under a business model with no factories, investment in premises after the listing amounted only to a production control centre established in September 1990 and a new head office and laboratory completed in August 1994.
The capital policy at the listing was framed on the premise that the founder's stake would be maintained. As of 20 March 1989 Takizaki Takemitsu held 25.69% and T.T. Co., Ltd. (ティ・ティ), the Takizaki family's asset-management company, 18.84%. Adding the 1.66% held by Takizaki Miyako (滝崎美弥子), the founding family's side came to roughly 45%. The secondary offering at the listing was limited to the two million shares Takizaki released, of which the lead underwriter Nomura Securities took one million. For the year ended March 1989 sales were $106.3M (¥15bn) and operating profit $45.6M (¥6bn), an operating margin of 42.9%, with net profit of $20.2M (¥3bn). A workforce of 438 sold directly to end users from 21 sales offices nationwide, and exports were only 6.3% of sales.
Pay tied to operating profit, and the loop it set going
In late April 1991 Keyence shares, listed on the First Sections in Tokyo and Osaka, overtook Nintendo to record the highest share price in Japan. Takizaki returned a generous share of that exceptional profitability to his staff. Each month 10% of operating profit was distributed to every employee in proportion to base pay, so that a high operating margin fed straight through into remuneration. In a young company with an average age of 28, annual pay reached $74,344 (¥10m) once past 30. Takizaki said, in future I want not only the share price but the pay to be the highest in Japan
(Nikkei Business, 24 June 1991), turning into a system his view that it was only natural for staff doing high-value-added work to be paid highly. The profitability itself came from a management that ran ahead of demand, digging out the latent demand that customers themselves have not noticed
(Nikkei Business, 24 June 1991).
Through the 1990s the company owned no factory of its own at all: a single manufacturing subsidiary made the portion of products that required advanced production and development technology, and the rest of production was contracted out to partner plants with no capital ties. Subcontracted processing costs were only 16% of manufacturing cost, with raw materials making up nearly 80%. The structure turned some $15.3M (¥2bn) of processing fees and a little under $76.4M (¥10bn) of materials into products worth about $458.4M (¥60bn). Fabless production cannot answer build-to-order and forces build-to-forecast, but the company made forecasting work by always keeping products launched within the previous two years at 30% of sales. Director Hashimoto Norimasa (橋本憲正) said, the price and the performance are decided before development is even begun
(Shukan Toyo Keizai, 4 April 1998), and products that did not pay were never put on the market. As of 1998 rather more than half of the 1,100 staff were in sales, gross margin was just under 80% of sales, and the operating margin was above 40%.
In January 1995 Takizaki said, we never had any intention of becoming a specialist sensor maker; this is a provisional form
(Nikkei Business, 16 January 1995), placing the continuity of profit above the field of business as his criterion of judgement. In 1998 the company came third in a corporate value creation ranking that picked out companies using shareholders' equity efficiently. As of 2003 its high profitability rested on three things: the development strength to turn out a stream of products that were the first in the world or the first in the industry, fabless production, and consultative selling through direct sales. Takizaki said, what creates added value is technology and science. Not the past
(Nikkei Business, 27 October 2003), and explained the fossil displayed at the head office with the line Keyence has no need of a past
(Nikkei Business, 27 October 2003), disclosing his policy of never compiling a company history.
Succession away from the founder, and presidents from outside the family
In December 2000 Takizaki stepped down as president to become representative director and chairman, handing management to Sasaki Michio (佐々木道夫). He had been president for 26 years counting from the incorporation of 1974. The year ended March 1999 brought a sharp fall in both sales and profit, but the combination of direct sales and fabless production was not changed. As he put it in later years, when people say charisma, the image is of someone who decides everything himself. It is not like that — unless you delegate authority, convey the way of thinking and think together with the front line, good ideas do not come out
(Nikkei Business, 27 October 2003); he avoided decisions that rested on one person and moved them along by delegation instead. In 2015 he retired to director and honorary chairman, standing back from day-to-day management.
Yamamoto Akinori (山本晃則) became president in December 2010 and Nakata Tamotsu (中田有) in December 2019. Both were promoted from within, and no one was brought in from the founding family. In April 2023 Takizaki again said, I have no intention of handing it to my own son either
(Nikkei Business, April 2023), rejecting family succession. On taking office Nakata positioned the company's competitive advantage as something rivals could not imitate, saying, changes in the environment cannot be forecast. We do not even draw up a medium-term management plan; we concentrate on steadily working out what should be done
(Nikkei Business, 18 February 2022). Yamamoto's presidency ran nine years and Nakata's six, to October 2025.
After the founder stepped back, the three principles of direct sales, standard products and value pricing remained the criteria of management. The remuneration system kept its link to operating profit: as of 2015 a fixed share of each month's profit was paid out once every three months, from directors down to ordinary employees. Average length of service lengthened from 8.0 years around 2005 to 11.1 years in 2015, and over the same period the headcount rose by more than half. Average pay rose from $136,054 (¥14m) for the year ended March 2014 to $189,130 (¥21m) for the year ended March 2018, and reached $162,195 (¥23m) for the year ended March 2023. For the year ended March 2021, sales and operating profit were three times what they had been ten years earlier, and the headcount, just under 8,400, about 2.7 times.