Licensing the transistor, exporting under the SONY brand (1955)
The single act of refusing to be a subcontractor
The heart of this decision was to give up the obvious commercial logic and bet on an intangible asset. An order for 100,000 units promised a cash-strapped newcomer immediate sales and a busy factory. Morita turned it down because he saw that so long as Sony built cheaply as a subcontractor it could compete only on price, and would never escape the position of being beaten down on cost. An own-brand earned nothing at first. Even so, Morita had grasped early that whether a manufacturer could own a product customers chose by name would decide its margin and its future.
A brand is not built overnight. For SONY to become a name that carried across the world, it had to wait for the transistor radios that followed and for later hits like the Trinitron and the Walkman. Yet without this one refusal of a large subcontract order, all that accumulation would have been buried under another company’s trademark. To own a brand, or to remain an excellent contract maker — the same question still faces Japanese manufacturers today, in an age of EMS and OEM. Sony’s answer was to stake everything on a name while it was still unknown: a choice that looks simple in hindsight and was, at the time, thoroughly unreasonable.
Revenue and net margin, FY1950–FY1960
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY1955 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Sony Group
- 1989 Buying CBS Records and Columbia Pictures: hardware meets software (1988–89)
- 1994 Entering games with the PlayStation (1994)
- 2014 Hirai’s select-and-concentrate: divesting VAIO and the battery business (2014)
- 2019 Refusing Third Point’s break-up demand; holding the group together (2019)
- 2021 Yoshida’s purpose management and the pure holding company (2021)
- 2025 Partially spinning off and re-listing the financial arm (2025)
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
Disclaimer
- This page is provided for general information only and is not investment advice, nor a recommendation to buy or sell any security.
- Figures are compiled independently and include our own estimates, approximations and machine-processed data; we make no warranty as to their accuracy or completeness.
- Sources are primarily each company’s securities reports and other public filings, but errors and omissions may remain.
- Any use of this information is at the reader’s own risk. Past performance does not indicate future results.
- Company names, logos and other marks belong to their respective owners.
Data API
Sony Group’s history, financials, executives and
shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.
Full specification →
| Method | Endpoint | Returns |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/companies.json | All companies |
| GET | /api/6758/manifest.json | Resource index |
| GET | /api/6758/history.json | History overview |
| GET | /api/6758/timeline.json | Chronology |
| GET | /api/decisions.json | All management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/6758/decisions.json | Management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/6758/decisions/{slug}.json | One decision (full dossier) |
| GET | /api/6758/executives.json | Executives |
| GET | /api/6758/shareholders.json | Major shareholders |
| GET | /api/6758/financials.json | Financial statements |
| GET | /api/6758/financials-longterm.json | Long-term results |
| GET | /api/6758/segments.json | Business segments |
| GET | /api/6758/regions.json | Sales by region |
| GET | /api/6758/workforce.json | Workforce |