Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1981 · unconsolidated
Revenue$518M
Net income$26M
Net margin5.1%
→
FY2008 · consolidated
Revenue$3.7B
Net income$132M
Net margin3.5%
The founder handed the company to his eldest son in 1981 and took it back two years later, and the second son who received it in 1985 held a maturing home market by setting his own brands against each other rather than against the trade. Sales moved from $517.8M (¥114bn) in the year to March 1981 to $3.7B (¥386bn) in the year to March 2008, and the period closed with the two acts that defined it: a counter-bid that swallowed the rival Myojo Foods, and the shift to a holding company.
The eldest son dismissed, and the start of the Ando Koki era
In 1981 Ando Momofuku installed his eldest son Ando Koju as president, only to dismiss him in all but name in 1983, two years into the term, and take the chairmanship and presidency himself. Momofuku said that when he warned Koju about being frequently away from the company and missing important internal meetings, the answer came back that if it had come to that he would rather resign. Koju for his part replied that his father let no one speak at board meetings, and that while he was abroad on business his father had altered the articles of association to strengthen the chairman's powers. In 1985 Momofuku passed the presidency to his second son, Ando Koki (安藤宏基). Koki was born in October 1947 in Osaka Prefecture, graduated from the faculty of commerce at Keio University in March 1971, joined Nissin in July 1973 and became a director in May 1974.
Koki had thought up the product name Demae Iccho while still reading commerce at Keio, and after graduating studied marketing in the United States before joining Nissin on the development side. When he took his father a yakisoba in a disc-shaped container, Momofuku objected that it took up too much space on the shelf and that the name was no good, but agreed once the equipment investment, estimated at ¥150 million, was cut to ¥50 million — and this U.F.O. was a hit. In 1985 Nissin was earning $628.9M (¥150bn) a year from ramen, and Cup Noodles, developed in 1971, accounted for 40 per cent of sales. The collapse of the credit union he had chaired before founding the company had left its lesson, and Nissin ran as a rule without borrowing. In March 1988 the Tokyo head-office building was completed in Shinjuku, Tokyo and the Tokyo branch was renamed the Tokyo Head Office; that October the Central Research Institute, housing the Food Research Institute and the Food Safety Research Institute, was completed at Kusatsu, Shiga Prefecture.
The method of pressing with patents did not change abroad. When Toyo Suisan moved to begin producing cup noodles in the United States, Nissin sued in the local courts, claiming that this touched its own patents; Toyo Suisan sued in turn to have the Nissin patents invalidated, and the two were locked in litigation. On 20 February 1979, in a personal letter signed by executive vice-president Togami Mineji, Nissin proposed two things: that both sides withdraw their suits, and that Toyo Suisan, having entered the United States, pay what the letter called a greeting fee. The sum named was $434,783 (¥100m), but when Toyo Suisan said it would make this known to the Japanese ministries and to the other firms in the trade, Nissin gave way, and a settlement was reached on terms allowing each side free use of the other's patents. In most of the litigation over cups, Nissin was the plaintiff.
Brand managers, and Raoh, the last to arrive
In the spring of 1990 Nissin introduced a brand-manager system. What had been two people, one for bag noodles and one for cup noodles, became eight by brand — Cup Noodles, Raoh, Donbei, Yakisoba U.F.O., Demae Iccho and others — with production, selling, new launches and responsibility for profit on the brand in question all resting on one person. Koki set them against each other inside the company: it is only to be expected that Raoh eats into some of our other products. Cannibalisation is fine; the one being eaten is the one at fault
(Nikkei Business, 10 May 1993). By 1995 there were ten brand-manager offices for ramen alone and 14 counting yoghurt and confectionery, with profit centres placed at nine branches so that the business was managed on two axes at once. Each manager had sales and profit targets, and annual pay rose on meeting them. The channel Nissin put its weight behind through this system was the convenience store: in 1993 the split of sales by channel was 36 per cent convenience stores, 30 per cent mass retailers and 34 per cent other shops.
Fresh-type cup ramen was commercialised by Myojo Foods in July 1991, with Toyo Suisan and Shimadaya Honten following. All of them had trouble with the firmness of the noodles measured against real ramen, and sales did not grow even when prices were cut in effect. Nissin had set up a 13-strong development team reporting directly to Koki inside the Shiga development laboratory in the spring of 1990, and for the two years until the finished product emerged in May 1992 it worked on nothing else, without long weekends or the Obon break, resting only on Sundays. The crux was how to reconcile two opposed requirements: alkaline kansui water to give the noodles their bite, against the complete sealing by acidification that long keeping demanded. Nissin Raoh went on sale in the Tokyo area in September 1992, one year and two months behind Myojo, at a suggested retail price of ¥250, the same as the firms that had gone first and ¥100 above a conventional instant cup noodle. Even so it recorded sales of $58.5M (¥7bn) in the first six months, and from November 1992 it held first place by value across roughly 1,800 FamilyMart stores in the Kanto region.
The instant-noodle market in 1992 came to 4.75 billion servings, of which Nissin held 34.5 per cent, followed by Sanyo Foods with 15.6 per cent, Toyo Suisan with 15.5 per cent, Myojo Foods with 9.1 per cent and Acecook with 7.6 per cent. The market was worth about $3.8B (¥480bn) on a maker-shipment basis, and in cup noodles alone Nissin held close to 40 per cent, with Cup Noodles by itself earning $552.6M (¥70bn) a year. Growth in volume, however, ran at only 1 to 2 per cent a year over the decade, and the operating margin had fallen from 8.0 per cent in the year to March 1989 to 7.3 per cent in the year to March 1993. Outside instant noodles the company took stakes in quick succession in York Co., Ltd. (ヨーク本社) in July 1990, Piggy Foods Co., Ltd. in January 1991 and Cisco Co., Ltd. (シスコ) in February 1991. Annual sales reached $1.8B (¥200bn) in March 1993, and in November 1995 cumulative domestic sales of Cup Noodles passed 10 billion servings. In October 1996 the Shizuoka plant was completed at Yaizu, Shizuoka Prefecture as an integrated noodle works, and in November 1999 the Instant Ramen Museum opened at Ikeda, Osaka Prefecture.
Late abroad, and the acquisition of Myojo Foods
The building of bases in Asia spread out from the establishment of Nissin Foods Co., Ltd. in the Tai Po district of Hong Kong in October 1984. In March 1989 Nissin took a stake in Beatrice Foods Co., (HK) Ltd. (now 永南食品有限公司), and in December 1994 its first production base inside China (珠海市金海岸永南食品有限公司) began operating. Even so, as of 2004 Nissin was still behind Toyo Suisan in the United States and its share in China stood at only 3 per cent. In 1998 it reached a basic agreement to take a stake of more than 30 per cent in Indofood, Indonesia's largest instant-noodle maker, and the deal fell through soon after. In 2003 it settled on a tie-up in China with Uni-President of Taiwan, and that too was returned to a blank sheet. Its own funds were ample: consolidated equity stood at 70.4 per cent of assets in the year to March 2003, and cash and deposits were above $1.4B (¥160bn). Momofuku said: for anything where the return is clear, we can put out ten or twenty billion yen
(Nikkei Business, 23 February 2004).
At the end of October 2006 the American investment fund Steel Partners launched a hostile tender offer at ¥700 a share for Myojo Foods, one of the major instant-noodle makers. Myojo had held its place since the 1960s as one of the four big specialists alongside Nissin, Acecook and Sanyo Foods — a competitor. Asked to intervene, Nissin began a counter-tender on 16 November at ¥870 a share, ¥170 above Steel's ¥700. Steel's offer failed, with no shareholders having tendered when its acceptance period closed on 27 November, and Nissin and Myojo reached a basic agreement on 21 December. A share exchange effective 31 March 2007 made Myojo a wholly owned subsidiary, and its listing was cancelled on 27 March. The Japan Fair Trade Commission held that the case — a combined share of about 35 per cent in bag noodles and about 60 per cent in cup noodles — would not substantially restrain competition, citing the bargaining power of retailers over price and the competitive pressure from adjacent markets.
The milestones of scale continued: consolidated annual sales of $2.5B (¥300bn) in March 2001, and cumulative worldwide sales of Cup Noodles of 20 billion servings in August 2003. In May 2005 Nissin established a food-safety research and development company (日清(上海)食品安全研究開発有限公司) in Minhang, Shanghai, and in 2007 the founder Ando Momofuku died. In June 2008 Nissin made Nikki Foods Co., Ltd. a wholly owned subsidiary. That October it moved to a holding-company structure, changing its name to Nissin Foods Holdings Co., Ltd. and establishing Nissin Food Products Co., Ltd., Nissin Chilled Foods Co., Ltd., Nissin Frozen Foods Co., Ltd. and Nissin Business Support Co., Ltd. by incorporation-type company split. Ando Koki became representative director, president and chief executive of the holding company. In January of that year Nissin had raised instant-noodle prices by 7 to 11 per cent, and domestic sales volumes in the instant-noodle market fell by roughly 20 per cent immediately afterwards. That experience stayed with the company: when wheat prices rose again in 2011, it announced an increase in North America from July while holding off on any rise at home.