Concentrating investment on power semiconductors and power electronics (2010)
Reading again what exactly was concentrated
A president who said he “came up through devices, so I know the fear of overinvestment” pulled forward a $569.7M (¥50bn) capacity expansion, stacked equipment into the Matsumoto and Suzuka plants, and finally went as far as a $1.4B (¥212bn) partnership with Denso. What this concentration reduced was not the number of businesses. Heavy electricals, vending machines and instrumentation were all kept; only the destination of investment and technical development was tilted toward power semiconductors and power electronics. Holding the breadth of a general electrical maker while narrowing the earnings engine to one is a different kind of choice from a focus that discards breadth.
Demand at the chosen destination, though, has not risen smoothly. SiC fell short of the medium-term plan as battery-EV growth slowed, and inventory adjustment in automotive electronics persists. The company’s global share is 6.1%, and the gap with Infineon’s 25.2% has not narrowed. That record profits continued anyway appears to owe to power electronics having several outlets beyond semiconductors — a 40% domestic share in uninterruptible power supplies for data centres, and grid-scale storage batteries among them. How well concentration works depends on the altitude at which the axis is defined.
Revenue and net margin, FY2005–FY2015
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY2010 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Fuji Electric
- 1931 Cutting 205 people — 16% of the workforce — and the president with them (1931)
- 1935 Separating the telephone division: the founding of Fuji Tsushinki (1935)
- 1988 From defeat in appliances to vending machines, and a subsidiary that stood on its own (1988)
- 2012 Going to a pure holding company — and reintegrating nine years later (2012)
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
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