From defeat in appliances to vending machines, and a subsidiary that stood on its own (1988)
Which markets to fight in, and which to withdraw from
The heart of this decision was refusing to cling to a market it had lost and shifting people and plant into an adjacent market it could win. In home appliances — a general consumer market — Fuji Electric’s disadvantage as a latecomer against the established majors was not going to be overturned. Choosing vending machines, then a mid-sized business market but one with room to grow, and going in with an integrated structure that carried manufacturing, financing and materials together, turned a half-idle Mie plant into an earner and eventually led to a separate listing for the subsidiary. What supported the turn was the speed with which the company admitted defeat and moved its resources.
Vending machines were not safe either. The soft-drink vending market began to shrink as convenience stores grew, and the business that had once rescued appliances was in turn washed over by the next change in its environment. Even so, the axis of judgement formed in the 1960s — cut loose early from fields where the first movers cannot be beaten, and move to where a latecomer can win — recurs throughout Fuji Electric’s restructurings, down to the carve-outs of substation equipment and logistics. Which markets to fight in and which to withdraw from: the question that began with defeat in appliances runs on into the later choice to concentrate on power semiconductors.
Revenue and net margin, FY1983–FY1993
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY1988 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Fuji Electric
- 1931 Cutting 205 people — 16% of the workforce — and the president with them (1931)
- 1935 Separating the telephone division: the founding of Fuji Tsushinki (1935)
- 2010 Concentrating investment on power semiconductors and power electronics (2010)
- 2012 Going to a pure holding company — and reintegrating nine years later (2012)
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
Disclaimer
- This page is provided for general information only and is not investment advice, nor a recommendation to buy or sell any security.
- Figures are compiled independently and include our own estimates, approximations and machine-processed data; we make no warranty as to their accuracy or completeness.
- Sources are primarily each company’s securities reports and other public filings, but errors and omissions may remain.
- Any use of this information is at the reader’s own risk. Past performance does not indicate future results.
- Company names, logos and other marks belong to their respective owners.
Data API
Fuji Electric’s history, financials, executives and
shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.
Full specification →
| Method | Endpoint | Returns |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/companies.json | All companies |
| GET | /api/6504/manifest.json | Resource index |
| GET | /api/6504/history.json | History overview |
| GET | /api/6504/timeline.json | Chronology |
| GET | /api/decisions.json | All management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/6504/decisions.json | Management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/6504/decisions/{slug}.json | One decision (full dossier) |
| GET | /api/6504/executives.json | Executives |
| GET | /api/6504/shareholders.json | Major shareholders |
| GET | /api/6504/financials.json | Financial statements |
| GET | /api/6504/financials-longterm.json | Long-term results |
| GET | /api/6504/segments.json | Business segments |
| GET | /api/6504/regions.json | Sales by region |
| GET | /api/6504/workforce.json | Workforce |