Ebara

Company history

Financial history 1967–2025 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1905
Head office
Shinagawa, Tokyo, Japan
Listed
1949
Founder
Hatakeyama Issei
Revenue · FYE Mar 2025
$6.4B (¥958bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2025
$511.9M (¥77bn)
Ebara: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1905A theory, and the works built to survive it

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1905Inokuchi Ariya publishes the first theory of the volute pump
  2. 1912Hatakeyama Issei founds the Inokuchi-shiki works at Nippori
  3. 1919Fifteen volute pumps for Tokyo’s Tawaramachi and Mikawashima works
  4. 1920Incorporated as Ebara Manufacturing, in Ebara district
  5. 1938Haneda plant becomes head office and main works

Ebara begins with a paper rather than a product. In 1905 Inokuchi Ariya, a professor at Tokyo Imperial University, published the world’s first theory of the volute pump. A shop called Kunitomo Iron Works was founded to turn it into machinery and built prototypes to his designs — and then ran out of money and closed in the last years of Meiji. The physics had been right; the commercialization had failed anyway. Hatakeyama Issei, who had studied under Inokuchi on that shop floor, drew the obvious conclusion.

When he set up the Inokuchi-shiki Kikai Jimusho at Nippori in Tokyo in 1912, he kept design, manufacture and sales together in one house instead of farming any part of it out — a deliberate correction of what had killed Kunitomo, and the origin of a house style in which fluid engineering and precision machining are carried end to end. Japan’s pump market was then largely imported, with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Hitachi the only domestic rivals worth the name. Hatakeyama entered Tokyo City’s pump performance trials and won on the consistency that integrated production allowed; domestic machines began pushing the imports out.

In 1919 the firm delivered fifteen volute pumps to the Tawaramachi pumping station and the Mikawashima sewage works — record-sized machines for their day, and the order that settled both its engineering reputation and its finances. In 1920 it moved its works to Shinagawa in Ebara district and incorporated as Ebara Manufacturing with capital of ¥3 million, taking its name from the place it had moved to. By the early Showa years it held better than 60% of Japanese pump output, standing with Hitachi and Mitsubishi at the top of the domestic trade, and carrying a founding motto — “heat and sincerity” (熱と誠) — into its training of engineers. The Haneda works opened in 1938 as head office and main plant; Kawasaki followed in 1941; and in 1945 war damage forced production out of Haneda and into Kawasaki overnight.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1949Rebuilding, and three seeds

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1967 · unconsolidated
Revenue$68M
Net income$4M
Net margin5.3%
FY1974 · unconsolidated
Revenue$284M
Net income$10M
Net margin3.5%
  1. 1949Listed on the Tokyo and Osaka exchanges
  2. 1956Ebara Infilco founded — the water-treatment business begins
  3. 1964First overseas office (Bangkok); Ebara Service founded
  4. 1965Fujisawa plant — Japan’s first volume production of standard pumps
  5. 1968Additional listing in Sapporo

In May 1949 Ebara listed on the first sections of the Tokyo and Osaka exchanges, joining the postwar capital market with its main plant still half-repaired; production returned to Haneda in full in 1955. What followed was less a recovery than a widening. In 1956 it set up Ebara Infilco to make and sell water-treatment plant — the start of a line that would run through the 1994 absorption of that subsidiary and on to the founding of Swing in 2009, and the point at which a pump maker began selling systems rather than machines.

Two more legs arrived together in 1964: the first postwar overseas office, in Bangkok, and Ebara Service, which organized after-sales work into a business of its own — a natural fit for equipment that runs for decades and is maintained on site. In 1965 the new Fujisawa plant put standard pumps into volume production for the first time in Japan, giving Ebara a catalogue product to sell in quantity alongside its engineered-to-order machines; a Sapporo listing followed in 1968. By the end of the period the three seeds — pumps, water, service — were all in the ground.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1975Going global, and the seed nobody ranked first

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1976 · unconsolidated
Revenue$318M
Net income$11M
Net margin3.3%
FY2002 · consolidated
Revenue$4.5B
Net income-$143M
Net margin-3.2%
  1. 1975First overseas plant (Brazil); Sodegaura begins compressors and turbines
  2. 1987Vacuum equipment for semiconductors, at Fujisawa
  3. 1994Ebara Infilco absorbed into the parent
  4. 2000Elliott Company (US) acquired outright
  5. 2001Ebara Kyushu begins CMP tool production in Kumamoto

Overseas manufacturing began in 1975 with Ebara Industrias Mecanicas in Brazil, and the same November the Sodegaura plant started building compressors and turbines, turning rotating machinery into a business in its own right. Indonesia followed in 1979, the United States in 1981, Italy in 1989 (stainless pressed standard pumps), China in 1992. The logic was unusual for a commodity product: rather than compete on price alone, Ebara laid down sales and service networks country by country and sold responsiveness with the pump.

Under Fujimura Hiroyuki, president from 1986, the portfolio was rearranged around that reach. Ebara Infilco was absorbed into the parent in October 1994, pulling water treatment back in-house. In April 2000 Ebara bought the American Elliott Company outright — a world-scale maker of compressors and turbines, and the acquisition that made Ebara a global rotating-machinery firm. A quarter of a century later Elliott is the core of the Energy company and of Ebara’s hydrogen and decarbonization orders; in 2002 the business was separated as Ebara Elliott so that its returns could be managed on their own.

The business that would eventually carry the company was seeded almost in passing. In July 1987 Ebara built a precision machinery plant inside the Fujisawa works and began making vacuum equipment for the semiconductor industry — an application of pump technology, taken up in the middle of the bubble-era investment boom. Gases are not liquids, but handling fluid with precision is the same discipline. Then a customer suggested that a supplier of trusted vacuum pumps might as well try the production equipment too, and in 1992 Ebara reached for CMP tools, which planarize semiconductor wafers. Volume production did not start until Ebara Kyushu opened in Kumamoto in June 2001 — fourteen years after entry. In the company’s own plans of the time, semiconductors ranked behind the environment business.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2003Two stumbles, and the rebuilding of the rules

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2003 · consolidated
Revenue$4.5B
Net income-$246M
Net margin-5.5%
FY2019 · consolidated
Revenue$4.8B
Net income$214M
Net margin4.5%
  1. 2003Net loss of $245.9M (¥29bn) on gasification plant delays
  2. 2005Three product-based in-house companies
  3. 2007Vice-president’s embezzlement; Haneda works closed and sold
  4. 2010Swing founded with Mitsubishi Corporation and JGC
  5. 2015Shift to a nominating-committee company
  6. 2019Supreme Court upholds the Haneda asbestos judgment

The environment business, the one ranked first, broke. Tightened dioxin rules from 2002 sent municipalities rushing to replace incinerators, and Ebara won a large number of orders for gasification-melting furnaces — a plant type working on a different principle from the incinerators it replaced. Rework and slipped schedules followed, engineering margins collapsed within months, and in the year to March 2003 Ebara fell to a net loss of $245.9M (¥29bn), the heaviest single-year loss in its postwar history. In April 2005 it reorganized into three product-based companies — fluid machinery, environment, and precision & electronics — the framework under which semiconductors were still only the third business.

Then came a failure of a different kind. In 2007 a vice-president was found to have embezzled from the company; the president resigned over it and Yago Natsunosuke took the office. In September of the same year Ebara decided to close the Haneda works after sixty-nine years. The site went to Yamato Transport, which planned a distribution centre there, for about $717.5M (¥85bn), and Ebara booked an extraordinary gain of $614.8M (¥72bn) in the year to March 2008 — land bought before the war, converted into cash at a stroke, and enough to paper over the 2003 loss. Manufacturing moved to Sodegaura and, from 2010, to a new plant at Futtsu.

The sale left a bill. In January 2011 asbestos contamination was found on the Haneda site; complete removal delayed Yamato’s construction, and Ebara was sued for ¥8.5bn. It lost at the Tokyo District Court in 2014, at the High Court in June 2018 and at the Supreme Court in January 2019, paying ¥5.9bn plus interest, after taking a ¥6.4bn provision in the year to March 2016. Meanwhile the environment business was rebuilt away from contracting risk: waste treatment was consolidated into Ebara Environmental Plant in October 2009, and the water business became Swing, held equally with Mitsubishi Corporation and JGC from March 2010 — a move from building plants to running them. Maeda Toichi became president in 2012, and in June 2015 Ebara adopted a nominating-committee board structure, eight years after the embezzlement and closing the account on both stumbles.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2020The third business becomes the first

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2020 · consolidated
Revenue$4.9B
Net income$229M
Net margin4.7%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$6.4B
Net income$512M
Net margin8%
  1. 2023Five in-market companies; E-Plan 2025 splits growth from foundation
  2. 2024Record operating profit of $646.9M (¥98bn)
  3. 2025Hosoda Shugo becomes president, pledging $6.7B (¥1tn) in revenue

The seed of 1987 grew into the earner. In January 2023 Ebara abandoned the product-based structure — fluid machinery, environment, precision & electronics — for five companies defined by the markets they face: Building & Industry, Energy, Infrastructure, Environment, and Precision & Electronics. Organizing by type of machine had left several companies calling separately on the same customer; organizing by market let Ebara start from the customer’s problem and sell across a range that now runs from standard pumps to semiconductor tools.

The medium-term plan E-Plan 2025 then sorted the five into growth businesses (Precision & Electronics, Building & Industry) and foundation businesses (Environment, Infrastructure) — a change in how capital is handed out rather than in what is owned, since nothing was sold. Led by semiconductors, the year to December 2024 produced a record operating profit of $646.9M (¥98bn), and Hosoda Shugo, president since March 2025, has pledged revenue of $6.7B (¥1tn). The concentration is also the exposure: semiconductor demand moves in waves, and the businesses parked among the foundations are the successors of the ones that lost $245.9M (¥29bn) in 2003.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1987

Entering semiconductor dry vacuum pumps, and CMP tools (1987)

The order in which it took on a field not its own

When Ebara reached for CMP tools in 1992, it was not trying to make itself an equipment maker. Having earned trust with vacuum pumps, it was told by a customer that it might as well try the production equipment too, and that, Nambu Isao has said, is where the business began. The change from a company that supplies parts into a company that sells equipment was one Ebara took on at a customer’s request rather than as a design of its own. Internally, semiconductors were ranked behind the environment business; this decision was not carrying the company’s name on it.

The load on the party that accepted it, however, was not light. The scheme of combining the polishing and cleaning sections into one unit was opposed even by the sales department, and for a long stretch the company ground up and threw away wafers worth $632 (¥80,000) apiece; fourteen years passed between entry and the standing of a volume production site in Kumamoto. Most of the corporate projects of the 1980s did not survive as businesses, and CMP tools were the exception. That a business begun because a customer asked for it became the largest source of profit thirty years later is the result of enduring for more than a decade after being asked, and has to be read separately from the merits of the decision to enter.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1999

Tilting away from pumps into the environment business — gasification furnaces under the dioxin rules (1999)

On reading a change in the rules as demand

Tighten the regulation and the plant gets replaced. That reading was itself correct, and public-sector orders for municipal waste treatment equipment swelled from $3.8B (¥429bn) to $6.2B (¥748bn) in two years. What Ebara got wrong was not the size of the demand but the maturity of the product it held out to meet it. The gasification-melting furnace was technology good enough to license to ABB, but not technology with twenty years of running in municipal service behind it. That $245.9M (¥29bn) was lost to rework and slipped schedules appears to have come from a gap on the delivering side rather than from a misread of demand.

Even so, to call the tilt reckless would be unfair. For Fujimura Hiroyuki, who had closed the Kawasaki plant in 1983 and directed the reassignment of 1,400 people, keeping a new growth business alive was a duty owed to avoiding job cuts, and the environment business was one he had raised while it ran ten years of losses. It may be precisely because he had something to protect that he could not let a regulatory tailwind go by. That after thirty years of searching for a second pillar the earner turned out to be semiconductors — filed at the time in a corner marked “new fields” — shows that the hits and misses of diversification do not fall in the order set out in the plan.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2010

Spinning out environment and water, and letting Mitsubishi Corporation and JGC into the water company (2010)

On loosening self-reliance

The core of this decision is not that the water business was carved out and opened to outsiders, but that Ebara changed the way it had run its environment business — building and operating everything itself — into a form in which the capital, too, was shared. A business whose returns swung with turnkey plant contracting, and which had produced a net loss of $140.1M (¥13bn) in the year to March 2009, was rebuilt into a company held in equal thirds with Mitsubishi Corporation and JGC. The trade-off shows through: the technology stays in-house, while the money and the overseas network are borrowed from others.

The slogan of a Japanese water major, though, did not bear fruit as imagined. The profitable overseas projects stayed in the hands of the European water majors, the overseas water businesses of Japanese firms remained small, and sixteen years later Ebara let go of its own Swing shares. That the joint venture settled toward operating domestic water infrastructure appears to be the three partners’ revision of the gap between the overseas strategy proclaimed and the orders actually won. Moving into shared ownership a business too heavy to carry alone remains, whatever the outcome, one of the options available.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2023

Five in-market companies, and E-Plan 2025’s split of growth from foundation (2023)

Deciding by selection without folding anything

What Ebara did not do in this reorganization expresses its character better than what it did. It sold not one business. It kept all five lined up and changed only how the money is handed out, sorting Precision & Electronics and Building & Industry as growth businesses and Environment and Infrastructure as foundation businesses. As CFO Fuchita Tetsuya put it, Ebara is the best owner of every one of its businesses; the path of demonstrating selection and concentration through withdrawal was not chosen. The experience of folding wind power and fuel cells in the 1990s seems to have worked not as a pain of shedding businesses but as a discipline applied before adding them.

That way of deciding, however, may hold only for as long as Precision & Electronics earns half of the group’s profit. Semiconductor demand runs in waves, and President Hosoda Shugo has himself said that “good fortune attracts trouble,” invoking the rebuilding from the slump of the 2000s. Environment and Infrastructure, placed among the foundation businesses, are the successors of the businesses that produced the $245.9M (¥29bn) loss of 2003. As long as it aims at $6.7B (¥1tn) with its earnings leaning on a single pillar, the design of its capital allocation will be tested once more at the next turn of the wave.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Ebara full history in Japanese →

  1. Ebara Corporation — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Kigyo no Rekishi: Meiji Hyakunen『企業の歴史 : 明治百年』, chapter on Ebara Manufacturing (Keizai Shunjusha, 1968).

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


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Data API

Ebara’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/6361/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/6361/history.json History overview
GET /api/6361/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/6361/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/6361/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/6361/executives.json Executives
GET /api/6361/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/6361/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/6361/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/6361/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/6361/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/6361/workforce.json Workforce