Daifuku

Company history

Financial history 1966–2025 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1937
Head office
Osaka, Japan
Listed
1961
Founded as
Sakaguchi Machine Works
Revenue · FYE Mar 2025
$4.4B (¥661bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2025
$521.9M (¥78bn)
Daifuku: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1937A machine shop that had to become something else

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1937Sakaguchi Machine Works founded in Osaka; forging and pressing machinery
  2. 1941Kanematsu invests and joins management
  3. 1944Renamed Kanematsu Kiko
  4. 1947Renamed Daifuku Kiko — “Osaka” + “Fukuchiyama”
  5. 1952Bühler licence: Bulk Veyor for bulk materials
  6. 1957Jervis B. Webb licence; conveyors for Toyota

Daifuku began in May 1937 as Sakaguchi Machine Works, an independent machine shop in Nishiyodogawa, Osaka, capitalized at ¥300,000 and employing about 150 people. Its main line was forging and pressing machinery for the steel industry — air hammers, rolling mills, plate levellers, hydraulic presses — plus cranes and dredgers. The Sino-Japanese war that broke out weeks later pushed Japanese steel into a historic expansion, and orders from the Osaka steelworks carried the shop through two capital increases and, in 1939, into a new plant at Mitejima, the site of its head office to this day, with a workforce near 400.

Growth came with a trading house behind it. From about 1939 the bridge builder Nippon Bridge and its parent Iwai & Co. took a hand in management; in May 1941 the general trading company Kanematsu invested and joined the board, and by the end of that year Iwai had withdrawn and Kanematsu stood alone. Textile traders squeezed by raw-material controls were moving into heavy industry, and Kanematsu had found its machine shop. Designated an Army- and Navy-supervised plant in 1943, the company built reciprocating engines for standard wartime ships alongside its presses and cranes, and in March 1944 it took the name Kanematsu Kiko. In March 1945 it dispersed production to a new plant at Fukuchiyama, north of Kyoto, to escape the air raids.

The name Daifuku was born of the occupation. In August 1947, with Kanematsu’s shareholding exposed to the antitrust law, Kanematsu Kiko became Daifuku Kiko — a coinage joining the dai of Osaka with the fuku of Fukuchiyama, proposed by the executive vice-president and liked for its auspicious ring in the China trade. The business behind the new name was in far worse shape. Even the Korean War boom missed it: the company carried an accumulated deficit of $166,667 (¥60m)$194,444 (¥70m) and came within a hair of defaulting, survived a boardroom argument over whether to continue at all, cut about 40% of its staff and sold the plants where it had started. Fukuchiyama was spun off in 1953 and sold in 1957, concentrating everything at Mitejima.

What saved it was borrowed technology. Cut off from further money by Kanematsu and left with nothing but its own machining skill, Daifuku Kiko pushed into materials handling. Kanematsu’s Masuda Kenjiro talked Switzerland’s Bühler into a tie-up, and in 1952 president Senoo travelled to Switzerland to sign it, bringing back the chain-in-trough Bulk Veyor for grain, coal and cement; the first unit went to a Yokkaichi warehouse, then to Ajinomoto, Tokyo Gas and the Yawata steelworks coal yards. The second thread ran to Detroit: in the summer of 1954 Kanematsu’s Taguchi Shigeo became the first Japanese to visit Jervis B. Webb, and in 1956, through a contact at Toyota Auto Body made on a plate-leveller sale, Toyota Motor adopted the Webb conveyor. The licence was formally approved in December 1957, and the forged chain at the conveyor’s heart — which no established Japanese maker would touch — was localized on the strength of the founding forging trade.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1958The material-handling specialist

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1966 · unconsolidated
Revenue$8M
Net income$278K
Net margin3.4%
FY1983 · unconsolidated
Revenue$206M
Net income$8M
Net margin3.8%
  1. 1961Lists on the Osaka Stock Exchange, second section
  2. 1963Komaki plant opens in Aichi
  3. 1969Promoted to the first section in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya
  4. 1975Hino plant (now Shiga Works) and Contec founded
  5. 1983Daifuku U.S.A. — first move into North America

The Webb conveyor arrived exactly as Japan began mass-producing cars. Toyo Kogyo (later Mazda) and a widening list of carmakers and warehouse operators followed Toyota, and by 1960 Daifuku Kiko was running at $3.3M (¥1bn) of annual sales and had repaid its borrowings from Kanematsu. Plate levellers, roller conveyors, stackers and cranes broadened the line; a plant at Komaki in Aichi opened in 1963 to sit close to the Tokai motor industry. Parent-company sales climbed from $27.5M (¥10bn) in the year to March 1969 to $127.7M (¥35bn) four years later.

The capital markets opened in step. Daifuku listed on the Osaka exchange’s second section in October 1961, Tokyo’s in July 1962 and Nagoya’s in October 1968, and in August 1969 — thirty-two years after its founding — it was promoted to the first section of all three at once.

Then the first oil shock hit a business made entirely of other companies’ capital spending. Parent sales fell from $127.7M (¥35bn) to $73M (¥21bn) and $59.2M (¥18bn), with ordinary profit down far harder. The response was to rebuild the production base: in April 1975 Daifuku set up the electronics subsidiary Contec and opened the Hino plant — today’s Shiga Works — midway between Osaka and Tokyo, fixing the policy of concentrating manufacturing on Shiga that would run until the Osaka plant was folded in in 1999. And in February 1983, a quarter-century after licensing Webb’s technology, it opened Daifuku U.S.A., its first overseas subsidiary, to sell automated guided vehicles and conveyor systems into the North American car plants — this time on its own account.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1984Becoming Daifuku — and buying the network

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1984 · unconsolidated
Revenue$196M
Net income$4M
Net margin2.2%
FY2014 · consolidated
Revenue$2.3B
Net income$73M
Net margin3.2%
  1. 1984Renamed Daifuku Co., Ltd.
  2. 2002Enters China with a Shanghai subsidiary
  3. 2007Acquires Jervis B. Webb — airports; Contec lists
  4. 2011Logan Teleflex (UK); North American companies consolidated
  5. 2013Wynright — e-commerce logistics in North America
  6. 2014BCS Group (New Zealand) — airports in Oceania

In May 1984 the company took the name it exports under: Daifuku Co., Ltd., closing the gap between the Japanese trading names it had carried since 1937 and the Latin script it needed abroad. Subsidiaries followed the customers — Canada in 1985, Singapore in 1986, then Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Korea and Indonesia between 1991 and 1995 — laying a supply network across the car, electronics and logistics industries of Asia on the back of Kanematsu’s trading reach. At home the 1990s ran the other way: peripheral businesses were pushed into subsidiaries while manufacturing was consolidated, the Osaka plant’s equipment moving to Shiga in March 1999.

China came next. Daifuku set up in Shanghai in March 2002 and added car-wash and conveyor ventures there in 2005, the same year it opened Daifuku India, while a 2004 purchase of Kito’s logistics-systems business filled out the product line. Then, in December 2007, it bought Jervis B. Webb outright — the company that had taught it chain conveyors fifty years earlier. What Daifuku wanted was not the symmetry but Webb’s airport baggage-handling business, a field it could not have built in the time available; the acquisition gave it a North American base in automotive and airports at a stroke. In March of the same year Contec listed on the Tokyo exchange’s second section.

Webb set the pattern for seven straight years of buying. Britain’s Logan Teleflex (2011) brought European airports; Daifuku Webb Holding, formed in 2011, gathered the North American companies under one roof; Hitachi Plant Technologies’ clean-room transport business (2012) added semiconductor and LCD handling; Wynright (2013) brought e-commerce warehouse automation in North America; and New Zealand’s BCS Group (2014) brought airports in Oceania. By the end of it, four businesses — airports, e-commerce logistics, automotive and semiconductors — were covered across North America, Europe, Greater China and Oceania, each acquired company renamed Daifuku and placed under a regional holding structure.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2015Boom years, and putting the house in order

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2015 · consolidated
Revenue$2.2B
Net income$81M
Net margin3.7%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$4.4B
Net income$522M
Net margin11.8%
  1. 2019Sales $4.2B (¥460bn) — 1.7× in four years
  2. 2022Contec taken private; parent moves to the Prime market
  3. 2024Year-end moved from March to December after 87 years
  4. 2025Terai Tomoaki becomes president; record operating margin of 15.3%

The network bought between 2007 and 2014 was waiting when three waves arrived together: e-commerce warehouse automation, semiconductor and electronics capital spending, and airport baggage systems. Consolidated sales rose from $2.2B (¥267bn) in the year to March 2015 to $4.2B (¥460bn) four years later, with operating profit up from $123.1M (¥15bn) to $501.8M (¥55bn) — 1.7 times the revenue, 3.7 times the profit. The pandemic’s surge in logistics automation pushed sales to $4.3B (¥602bn) by March 2023.

Growth was accompanied by structural tidying aimed squarely at foreign investors. In March 2022 Daifuku made a tender offer for its listed subsidiary Contec and took it private in April, ending fifteen years of the parent–subsidiary double listing that the June 2021 revision of the Corporate Governance Code had put under scrutiny for its conflict with minority shareholders; the parent itself moved to the Tokyo exchange’s Prime market in the same restructuring. In June 2024 it moved its financial year-end from 31 March to 31 December — a nine-month transitional period — ending eighty-seven years of March closing so that consolidation with calendar-year overseas subsidiaries, and comparison with foreign peers, would run on one basis.

Leadership turned over alongside. Shimodai Hiroshi, who came up through the factory-automation and logistics-systems sales side and drove the global build-out, moved to representative director and chairman in 2025, handing the presidency to Terai Tomoaki, whose career ran through clean-room transport and the overseas subsidiaries. The line held: consolidated sales for the year to December 2025 reached $4.4B (¥661bn) with operating profit of $673.6M (¥101bn), a 15.3% margin and the best in the company’s history. What remains for Terai is the question the acquisitions posed — how to point a four-axis global structure, assembled by purchase, at the next round of growth.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1957

Licensing Bühler and Jervis B. Webb: the turn to materials handling (1957)

Technology borrowed, technology kept

Daifuku Kiko could bring in Bühler’s and Webb’s technology because its parent Kanematsu had cut off its funding and it had been driven to the point where its own engineering was the only thing left to rely on. The accumulated deficit had reached ¥60–70 million; roughly 40% of the workforce had been let go and plants had been sold. Masuda Kenjiro talked the other side’s representative round and brought a world-class partner to a company deep in the red. It was the choice of a machine shop with its retreat cut off that opened the road into materials handling.

That said, the tie-ups did not bring stability at once. Localizing the forged chain came with no end of difficulty, and — as the near-collision between the earlier Bühler agreement and the Webb licence showed — holding two lines of borrowed technology at the same time demanded constant adjustment. Even so, the judgement of these years, splicing the forging skills of the founding trade onto transport technology from outside, became the foundation of the specialist maker that would later stretch as far as airports and e-commerce logistics. Where a company borrows its technology, and what it keeps as its own, is where the success or failure of a change of business shows.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1983

Daifuku U.S.A.: the first move into North America (1983)

Returning to the market it borrowed its technology from

Filed away as one more instance of a Japanese manufacturer going abroad, the timing of this move is hard to see. Where Daifuku went was the home ground of Jervis B. Webb, the company from which it had borrowed automotive transport technology in 1957. What it carried with it was a product line it had raised itself in Japan — Japan’s first automated guided vehicle, the Pronto, and the Rack Building System of high-bay automated warehouses. The sense that it had finished converting borrowed technology into products of its own is what appears to have set the timing.

The 1983 subsidiary did not, however, immediately become a pillar in North America. It remained a single site serving car plants, and the North American base that includes airports and e-commerce logistics was not in place until the stretch from the 2007 acquisition of Jervis B. Webb to the 2013 purchase of Wynright — a full quarter-century after the founding. An overseas market opens not in the year a company puts a subsidiary there, but in the year it has something it can sell.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2007

Buying Jervis B. Webb — its own former licensor — and entering airports (2007)

From the taught to the buyer

Recorded as the purchase of an airport business in North America, the implication of this acquisition is lost. What Daifuku took in full was Jervis B. Webb, founded in 1919 — the company that in 1957 had taught it chain-conveyor technology. Japan’s first integrated line at a plant built solely for passenger cars was assembled with that borrowed technology. Over half a century, the taught and the buyer can be seen to have changed places.

Read as the closing of a circle, though, the acquisition parts company with the facts. What Daifuku was after was airport baggage handling, a field that would have taken it far too long to build alone; the Webb name became Daifuku Airport America, and a corporate name that had run since 1919 did not survive. Two years after the purchase the financial crisis cut consolidated sales by nearly 40%, and years passed before the results showed in the numbers. A technology licence, it can be said, is not a relationship in which the lender stays on top forever.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Daifuku full history in Japanese →

  1. Daifuku Co., Ltd. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Daifuku Kiko: Vanguard of Materials Handling『大福機工 : 運搬機械の前衛(ポケット社史)』 (Diamond, 1967).
  3. Keizai Shunjusha — A History of Enterprise: A Century of Meiji, “Daifuku” (『企業の歴史 : 明治百年』, Keizai Shunjusha, 1968).

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Daifuku’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/6383/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/6383/history.json History overview
GET /api/6383/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/6383/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/6383/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/6383/executives.json Executives
GET /api/6383/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/6383/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/6383/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/6383/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/6383/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/6383/workforce.json Workforce