Disclosing the quality-data falsification, and the management overhaul (2017)
A culture of profit first, under a distinguished name
At the root of this misconduct lies the way a composite manufacturer’s separated divisions had each been run against the single yardstick of their own profit. Quality assurance and quality audit sat inside divisions chasing that profit, so that delivery and margin pressure reached the inspection floor — an arrangement only articulated as a structural problem once it was pointed out from outside. That chairman and president Kawasaki acknowledged he had “only been looking at whether profits were there” was candid, and at the same time a measure of the gap between a company praised as first-rate and what was being left unattended beneath it.
Resignations and fines are a necessary settlement, but they do not by themselves replace a corporate culture. In the past too, each scandal brought an apology from the top and a pledge of prevention, and still the disposition that put divisional profit first remained. Whether quality assurance can be separated from the divisions, whether people on the floor can voice dissent — whether the distinguished name survives depends on the plain, long rebuilding that follows the single decision to disclose, and on how well it is done.
Revenue and net margin, FY2012–FY2022
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY2017 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Kobe Steel
- 1965 Nadahama, Amagasaki Steel and the Kakogawa works (1965)
- 1983 Buying Midrex and its natural-gas direct-reduction process (1983)
- 1996 Entering wholesale power: a coal-fired station inside the steelworks (1996)
- 2000 The Texas Instruments DRAM venture, and selling out to Micron (2000)
- 2002 Cross-shareholdings with Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Metal — and their unwinding 23 years later (2002)
- 2013 Shutting the upstream at Kobe and consolidating ironmaking at Kakogawa (2013)
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
Disclaimer
- This page is provided for general information only and is not investment advice, nor a recommendation to buy or sell any security.
- Figures are compiled independently and include our own estimates, approximations and machine-processed data; we make no warranty as to their accuracy or completeness.
- Sources are primarily each company’s securities reports and other public filings, but errors and omissions may remain.
- Any use of this information is at the reader’s own risk. Past performance does not indicate future results.
- Company names, logos and other marks belong to their respective owners.
Data API
Kobe Steel’s history, financials, executives and
shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.
Full specification →
| Method | Endpoint | Returns |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/companies.json | All companies |
| GET | /api/5406/manifest.json | Resource index |
| GET | /api/5406/history.json | History overview |
| GET | /api/5406/timeline.json | Chronology |
| GET | /api/decisions.json | All management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/5406/decisions.json | Management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/5406/decisions/{slug}.json | One decision (full dossier) |
| GET | /api/5406/executives.json | Executives |
| GET | /api/5406/shareholders.json | Major shareholders |
| GET | /api/5406/financials.json | Financial statements |
| GET | /api/5406/financials-longterm.json | Long-term results |
| GET | /api/5406/segments.json | Business segments |
| GET | /api/5406/regions.json | Sales by region |
| GET | /api/5406/workforce.json | Workforce |