Relo Group

Company history

Financial history 2000–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1967
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
1999
Founder
Sasada Masanori
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$955.4M (¥151bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$130.9M (¥21bn)
Relo Group: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1967Minding the empty houses of Mitsui

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1967Nihon Kenso founded in Tsuwano, Shimane
  2. 1978Approved contractor for Mitsui & Co. company housing
  3. 1979Caretaking begins for Mitsui transferees’ homes
  4. 1984Renamed Nihon Relocation Center — "the real founding"
  5. 1989US joint venture with Mitsui & Co.

Sasada Masanori founded Nihon Kenso in March 1967 in Tsuwano, a town in rural Shimane, doing new build and interior work on housing for wage earners. What changed the company was a contract: in September 1978 it became an approved contractor for maintenance of Mitsui & Co.’s company housing and dormitories, and in October 1979 it began caretaking the homes left empty by Mitsui employees posted elsewhere in Japan and abroad.

The work itself was unglamorous — airing and cleaning an empty house, forwarding post, handling the neighbours — and unprofitable for ordinary rental agents. But framed differently it was a service standing between three parties: the transferee, the family, and the employer’s HR department, which would pay for it because it made overseas postings possible. That triangulation, laid on top of a builder’s ordinary work of maintaining a building, was the invention. In May 1984 the company renamed itself Nihon Relocation Center; seventeen years after founding, its main business was no longer construction.

Sasada later called that renaming "the real founding of the company," and traced it to a January 1983 magazine article about American relocation firms that handled everything for a transferee in one place — property sale, leases, housing at the destination, jobs for the family, car and furniture leases, tax. If that was possible, then what he had built for one client could be built for Japanese employees generally. He signed more than fifty corporate customers in a year. By 1985 the revenue model had settled into three layers — fees on new placements, monthly management fees on an accumulating book of homes, and renovation work when the transferee returned — which is still the shape of every business the group has built since.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1993A second product for the same customer

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2000 · unconsolidated
Revenue$132M
Net income$4M
Net margin2.8%
FY2000 · unconsolidated
Revenue$132M
Net income$4M
Net margin2.8%
  1. 1993Fukuri Kosei Club — outsourced employee benefits
  2. 1999Shares registered over the counter
  3. 1999Regional benefit joint ventures with local utilities and firms
  4. 2000Relo Net widens relocation into moving support

Caretaking ends when the transferee comes home. What did not end was the list of roughly four thousand HR departments the company now dealt with — and in September 1993 it put a second product in front of them: Fukuri Kosei Club, outsourced employee benefits. Japanese companies were caught between the fixed cost of their own resort facilities and employees who wanted more varied leisure; a membership scheme giving access to affiliated hotels and facilities converted that fixed cost into a monthly fee per head.

It took several loss-making years to work, and what finally made it work was not selling but the financial crisis: companies that sold their resort houses came looking for a replacement, and a scheme designed for smaller firms was entered by large ones. That there was something to offer at that moment was the product of five or six years Sasada had spent calling on small companies. The catalogue started with nine hotels and one sports facility.

The company registered its shares over the counter in September 1999, thirty-two years after founding. It then took regional partners into the benefits business as distribution channels — joint ventures with Aso Cement in Kyushu in 1999, Nagoya Railroad in Chubu and Chugoku Electric Power in 2000 — and in July 2000 launched Relo Net, widening relocation from empty-house caretaking to support for moving generally. By the end of the decade the two pillars were both business-to-business, both sold through HR, and both stock-based.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2001Holding the lease, and holding the cash flow

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2001 · unconsolidated
Revenue$128M
Net income$4M
Net margin3.2%
FY2018 · consolidated
Revenue$2.0B
Net income$98M
Net margin4.8%
  1. 2001Split into operating subsidiaries; pure holding company
  2. 2002Enters subleasing of corporate housing
  3. 2009Equity stake in Nihon Housing
  4. 2011Listed on the TSE First Section
  5. 2016AIRINC acquired; renamed Relo Group

In July 2001 the company split itself into operating subsidiaries — relocation into Relocation Japan, benefits into Relo Club — and became a pure holding company, Relo Holdings. Splitting the businesses meant their profitability could be judged separately, which is the precondition for buying more of them. In 2002 it took the further step of subleasing company housing: instead of acting as the landlord’s agent for a fee, it signed the lease itself, absorbing vacancy periods and restoration costs, and charged companies for taking the trouble away.

From there growth came from stock contracts funding acquisitions without much debt: Redac in the United States in 2005, an equity stake in the housing manager Nihon Housing in 2009, Panasonic Excel International in 2014, and in 2016 AIRINC, whose databases of cost-of-living, housing and tax information by location were less a business than the data foundation for what the group intended to buy next. The holding company renamed itself Relo Group the same year.

The Tokyo Stock Exchange second section came in 2010 and the first section in 2011, forty-four years after founding. Under the successive "Olympic Operation" medium-term plans, operating profit roughly doubled from ¥8.7bn to ¥17.8bn between FY2014 and FY2018, and the group passed sixty consolidated subsidiaries. Managed company housing stood at 63,000 units and benefit-club membership at 2.84 million as the group prepared its largest move yet.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2019The overseas detour, and the return home

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2019 · consolidated
Revenue$2.3B
Net income$119M
Net margin5.2%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$955M
Net income$289M
Net margin30.3%
  1. 2019BGRS acquired; debt rises to ¥69.3bn
  2. 2020¥9.5bn goodwill impairment on BGRS
  3. 2022BGRS combined with SIRVA; Relo holds 23%
  4. 2024¥47.6bn written off; ¥27.8bn net loss
  5. 2024SIRVA stake sold — exit from global mobility
  6. 2024Record domestic year: revenue ¥142.9bn

In June 2019 Relo Group consolidated BGRS, the world’s third-largest global relocation firm, intending to support Japanese companies’ expatriates abroad as well as at home. Interest-bearing debt went from ¥17.8bn to ¥69.3bn. Then COVID-19 stopped international assignment almost entirely. A ¥9.5bn goodwill impairment was taken on BGRS in FY2019 — one year after the purchase — and net profit fell from ¥13.0bn to ¥3.8bn.

The 2022 combination of BGRS with SIRVA, in which Relo took 23% of the merged holding company and pulled roughly ¥20bn of cash back out, was meant to fix it. Instead the merged company carried about $600m of debt from earlier private equity ownership, and could not pay it down through a pandemic; then US monetary tightening raised its interest cost sharply while higher mortgage rates cut the number of relocations. SIRVA was downgraded to CCC in March 2024, Relo wrote off ¥47.6bn of SIRVA-related assets in full, and net profit swung from ¥20.8bn to a ¥27.8bn loss, with equity ratio briefly at 13%. The stake was sold in August 2024.

The domestic businesses moved the opposite way throughout. FY2024 brought record revenue of ¥142.9bn and operating profit of ¥30.4bn, hitting the ¥30bn target of the third Olympic Operation. Between FY2010 and FY2024 managed company housing rose from 63,000 to 278,000 units, rental management from 18,000 to 122,000, benefit-club members from 2.84 million to 7.27 million, and hotel guests twenty-three-fold — the group taking share from competitors for whom outsourcing was a side business while they were weakened by the pandemic. The fourth Olympic Operation, from FY2026, points the balance sheet freed by the overseas exit at domestic stock businesses and at buying regional hotels and inns whose owners have no successor.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1993

Launching outsourced employee benefits as a second pillar (1993)

What it means to put another product on the same list

Sasada Masanori’s motive for going into this business was not of the kind that finds a growth market; it lay in a sense of crisis about the core business tapering off. Caretaking is a contract that ends when the transferee returns, and if companies pull back from overseas no new ones come in. What remained in hand was only the point of contact — the HR departments of some four thousand large companies. The idea of putting another product in front of that contact point is less an advance into a new field than a reuse of a relationship already held. That the company endured several years of losses was also because there was no other candidate for the next pillar.

What put the business on track was not its own selling but the financial crisis and corporate asset restructuring. Companies that had sold their resort houses went looking for a replacement scheme, and large firms entered a system designed for smaller ones. But that there was a product to offer at that moment was owed entirely to the five or six years Sasada had spent calling on small companies. The thin catalogue that began with nine hotels and one sports facility grew into a business with 7.27 million members at the end of the year to March 2025.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2002

Moving into subleasing corporate housing (2002)

The business of taking the name on the contract

What was new in this judgment was not the discovery of a market but the rewriting of the name on the contract into its own. In caretaking, the company remained the landlord’s agent and its income was a fee per property. In subleasing, it becomes the tenant itself, taking on the vacancy periods and the cost of restoring the property. What the company pays for is having that trouble put outside. The handling — hearing out work that HR departments carry but cannot process, and turning it into a product — was the same as with the benefits club in 1993.

The trouble taken on came back as difficulty in management. A single sublease contract straddling a fiscal period produced the first decline in operating profit since listing. It was the result of unit numbers growing while the reporting system still delivered monthly figures at the end of the following month, and it was the first thing Saito Naofumi, brought in from outside as president, pointed to. A company that began by looking after empty houses now leases 278,000 units of company housing itself, as of the end of March 2025, and rents them to corporations.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2019

Entering global relocation with BGRS, and exiting five years later (2019)

The assets it bought, and the time it could not buy

What this investment bought was fourteen locations across eight countries and a customer list including Fortune Global 500 companies. Judged by the way the group had built up company-housing management and benefits at home, extending the same event — the transfer — downstream and overseas is a coherent choice. But whereas the domestic businesses stood on monthly accumulation of membership fees and managed units, the acquired company’s revenue was flow-based, tied to the number of transfers occurring and to home sales. The reasons the CFO gave at the time of exit were exactly these: vulnerability to a pandemic, and dependence on flow revenue.

Looking at the breakdown of the impairment, what was lost was not only the ¥25.5bn purchase price. The ¥10.0bn of receivables and ¥9.9bn of loans that accumulated after the combination fall alongside ¥27.6bn of preferred shares. That the group diluted its equity holding to 23% while remaining a creditor pushed the total loss to nearly twice the acquisition amount. It wrote off ¥47.6bn in the year to March 2024, and closed the following year with net profit of ¥43.3bn on a ¥18.7bn gain from selling its Nihon Housing shares. What filled the hole opened abroad was a domestic stake it had held since 2009.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Relo Group full history in Japanese →

  1. Relo Group, Inc. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports) and earnings briefings.
  2. Yano Report (ヤノ・レポート) no. 690, November 1985 — "Nihon Relocation Center."
  3. Sasada Masanori, interview — 証券アナリストジャーナル (Securities Analysts Journal), October 1999.
  4. Full Japanese edition, with fuller detail and per-decision pages: the-shashi.com/tse/8876/.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Relo Group’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/8876/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/8876/history.json History overview
GET /api/8876/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/8876/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/8876/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/8876/executives.json Executives
GET /api/8876/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/8876/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/8876/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/8876/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/8876/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/8876/workforce.json Workforce