Nexon

Company history

Founded
2002
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
2011
Founder
Jay-Woong Kim
Revenue · FYE Mar 2025
$3.2B (¥475bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2025
$614.8M (¥92bn)
Nexon: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

2002A Korean game on Japanese soil

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2008 · consolidated
Revenue$389M
Net income$79M
Net margin20.4%
FY2012 · consolidated
Revenue$1.4B
Net income$318M
Net margin23.4%
  1. 2002Nexon Japan established in Tokyo
  2. 2003Takes over a Japanese online-game business
  3. 2005Buys NEXON Korea from parent NXC — the “parent-flip”
  4. 2005MapleStory acquired from Wizet
  5. 2008Dungeon & Fighter — studio Neople acquired
  6. 2009Renamed Nexon Co., Ltd.
  7. 2011Lists on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (First Section)

In December 2002 the Korean online-game company NEXON Corporation — today NXC — set up Nexon Japan in Tokyo. It was conceived as a distributor, but in January 2003 it took over the online-game business of an existing Japanese firm and became the operator that ran Korea-made titles for Japanese players: localization, billing and customer support were handled in Japan, while the games themselves came from Seoul. That division of labour — one country makes, another serves — was fixed at birth and has shaped the company ever since.

The decisive move came in October 2005. The Korean parent carved out its PC online business into a new NEXON Corporation — today NEXON Korea — and handed every share to the Japanese subsidiary. The child had swallowed its parent’s core business: Tokyo became the group’s operating holding company and Seoul its development arm, the two-pole structure Nexon still runs on. Under it the group pulled in the titles that would define it, all built on the then-novel model of free play paid for by in-game items — MapleStory (acquired from Wizet in 2005) and, above all, Dungeon & Fighter, gained with the 2008 purchase of its studio Neople. Published in China by Tencent, Dungeon & Fighter turned a single Korean title into the engine of group profit.

Renamed simply Nexon in 2009, the company listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in December 2011 — an unusual thing for a Korea-born game business to do. President Seung-woo Choi led it to market while founder Jay-Woong Kim stayed with parent NXC. In that first listed year Korea earned Nexon roughly five times what Japan did. A Tokyo-listed company whose money was made abroad, explained every quarter in Japanese disclosures: the gap between where it was domiciled and where it earned would become its defining trait.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2013The Mahoney years: a few franchises, run deep

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2013 · consolidated
Revenue$1.6B
Net income$279M
Net margin17.4%
FY2018 · consolidated
Revenue$2.3B
Net income$975M
Net margin42.4%
  1. 2013Owen Mahoney becomes president
  2. 2015Record revenue and profit
  3. 2016Operating profit falls ~35% in a single year
  4. 2018New record, led by Dungeon & Fighter in China

In 2013 the American executive Owen Mahoney became president — a generational handover, but also the arrival of an outside professional manager, and with him the group’s strategic vocabulary changed. Mahoney would later describe a deliberate narrowing: concentrate only on deeply immersive games — easy to learn, extremely hard to master — and pass over casual and single-player, story-driven titles. Under him the portfolio took the shape it still has: a small number of long-running live-service franchises, run for years rather than replaced.

The strategy showed in the numbers, and so did its cost. Adopting IFRS, Nexon set records — then gave part of them back. Revenue and profit peaked in the year to December 2015, slipped the next year as the North American segment stayed in the red, then climbed to a new high by 2018 as the China business around Dungeon & Fighter, run by Neople, grew. The pattern — a peak, a plateau, another peak — is the flip side of concentration: when a handful of titles carry the whole group, a single franchise’s rhythm swings the results.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2019Buying a pipeline, and returning cash

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2019 · consolidated
Revenue$2.3B
Net income$1.1B
Net margin46.5%
FY2022 · consolidated
Revenue$2.7B
Net income$763M
Net margin28.4%
  1. 2019Embark Studios (Sweden) acquired
  2. 2020Record revenue in the pandemic year
  3. 2022First large buyback; moves to the Prime market

Even as it ran its established franchises, Nexon began buying the capacity to make new ones. In 2018 it brought development in-house by taking control of NAT Games — later NEXON Games — and in 2019 it acquired Embark Studios of Stockholm, the studio behind the later shooters The Finals and ARC Raiders. Embark was a bet on Western-market shooters, a genre Nexon had never mastered, and it meant running development on two distant footings at once — Korea for the money-makers, Sweden for the wagers.

From 2022 a second engine became capital returns. In February Nexon set a three-year share-buyback ceiling of $761.2M (¥100bn), and that April it moved up to the Tokyo exchange’s new Prime market. Revenue reached a fresh high, yet the geography did not change: the group grew larger while still leaning on China and Korea. The same cash also funded bets beyond games — a 2022 stake in the Russo brothers’ film studio AGBO, later written down by $338M (¥44bn) — a reminder that carrying its characters outside games was no surer a thing than the franchises it was meant to diversify away from.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2023New hands, a hard target

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2023 · consolidated
Revenue$3.0B
Net income$502M
Net margin16.7%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$3.2B
Net income$615M
Net margin19.4%
  1. 2023Jung-hun Lee becomes president
  2. 2024Dungeon & Fighter Mobile launches in China
  3. 2024The First Descendant launches worldwide
  4. 2024FY27 targets set; new shareholder-return rules
  5. 2025Renews its share buyback

In 2023 Jung-hun Lee, from NEXON Korea, became president, ending Mahoney’s decade and swinging leadership back from an outside professional manager to an executive rooted in the development floor. His first task was defensive: from late 2023 both pillars had stalled at once — Dungeon & Fighter in China and MapleStory in Korea — and the group’s results move whenever either one wobbles. The new team put diagnosing that slump ahead of any new launch or long-term plan.

The answer came from both directions in a single quarter. In May 2024 Dungeon & Fighter Mobile launched in China through Tencent and drove the franchise to record levels; that July the new IP The First Descendant arrived, taking about three-quarters of its sales in Western markets and giving Nexon its first real foothold in the North America it had long struggled in. In the strongest quarter China supplied some 42% of revenue, Korea 35%, the West 13% and Japan just 4% — proof of how far one title’s launch can redraw the map, and of how concentrated that map remains.

In September 2024 Nexon set out long-term targets: by the year to December 2027, revenue of $5.0B (¥750bn) and operating profit of $1.7B (¥250bn), with Dungeon & Fighter and MapleStory deepened and roughly a fifth of the growth to come from new IP. Alongside them came rules rather than intentions — a floor on return on equity, and a pledge to pay out at least a third of the prior year’s operating profit in dividends and buybacks, with the buyback programme renewed in 2024 and again in 2025. The disclosure style — bind the profit target, the payout and the investment appetite all in numbers — carries straight over from the professional-manager years, now in the hands of a leader from the code.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2005

The parent-flip: a subsidiary swallows its parent’s core business (2005)

What a reverse capital flow left behind

Normally, when a Japanese company expands abroad, the domestic parent sets up an overseas subsidiary and brings the local business under its wing. Nexon’s 2005 reorganization ran the other way: it chose to consolidate a business born in Korea into the Japanese corporate shell it had established first. Having acknowledged that the wellspring of its development strength lay on the Korean side, the decision to house the core of the business in a Japanese vessel nonetheless can be read as carrying a certain logic as a design for international growth. One can also detect an intent to keep the Japanese market — with its easier access to financing and to a public listing — open as a future option.

At the same time, the structure this single move created — Tokyo as the legal home, the breadwinner overseas — would govern Nexon for a long time to come. The framework in which the founding family stays at the very top of the group through an asset-management company while entrusting the front line of management to professional executives was also formed within this reorganization. That one corporate split and share transfer settled the skeleton of the capital structure and management system for the next twenty years is where the long reach of this decision shows itself.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2011

A Korean-born game company chooses to list in Tokyo (2011)

Choosing to be a company whose home and breadwinner don’t match

The reasons president Seung-woo Choi gave cannot be explained by the efficiency of fundraising alone. NASDAQ, being farther away, might well have offered advantages in name recognition or in the scale of what could be raised; yet the company chose proximity and the character of a place that was a “mecca of gaming.” To the question of where a game company should have its worth appraised, the decision of a Korea-born online-game company to choose the Japanese stock market can be seen to reveal a way of choosing location that goes beyond mere capital policy.

That said, this choice, at the very moment of listing, also saddled the company with a structural twist: its legal home and its main battlefield do not coincide. The path of continuing to explain profits earned in Korea, and later China, through Japanese disclosure formats and accounting standards has not changed even more than a decade on. In the paradox that Tokyo — chosen for its geographic closeness — thereafter became the place that endlessly translates the results of distant Korea and China, the character of this decision can be glimpsed.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Nexon full history in Japanese →

  1. Nexon Co., Ltd. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Nexon Co., Ltd. — earnings briefings (決算説明会), FY2024 Q1 and Q3.
  3. Toyo Keizai Online — 東洋経済オンライン (Toyo Keizai Inc.), 22 July 2020. toyokeizai.net.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →