Kakaku.com

Company history

Founded
1997
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
2003 · TSE 2371
Founder
Mitsuaki Makino
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$595M (¥94bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$118.9M (¥19bn)
Kakaku.com: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1997A student’s price-comparison site

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
  1. 1997Mitsuaki Makino launches the kakaku.com price-comparison site
  2. 2000Reorganized from Core Price into Kakaku.com, Inc.
  3. 2001Makino sells to ICP for about $20.6M (¥3bn); Yoshiteru Akita becomes president
  4. 2002Digital Garage takes a capital stake

Kakaku.com began in December 1997, when a twenty-four-year-old, Mitsuaki Makino, founded a small company called Core Price and launched the kakaku.com price-comparison site. The idea was simple and, for its moment, new: let a shopper see side by side the different prices each electronics retailer charged for the same product. It arrived just as the internet was entering Japanese homes — Yahoo Japan had opened in 1996, Rakuten in 1997 — and it carried, from the first day, the shape of the business Kakaku.com still runs on. It held no inventory and no stores; it charged the merchants it listed. The attention of the side comparing prices was what drew the listings from the side being compared.

Makino had designed the venture to end. He said afterwards that he had decided at the outset to quit once he had earned $4.1M (¥500m), and he built the company toward an early exit. By 2000 he had reorganized it from Core Price into Kakaku.com, Inc., giving the near-personal project the frame of a proper corporation.

In 2001, at twenty-eight, Makino sold kakaku.com to the investment firm ICP for about $20.6M (¥3bn) — more than five times the target he had set — and retired. Yoshiteru Akita, who ran ICP, stepped in as the second president, a founder’s departure flowing straight into the buyer becoming the operator. The following year Digital Garage, an internet-investment firm co-founded by Joichi Ito, took a large capital stake and made Kakaku.com a subsidiary, positioning it for the public market.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2002Listing, and the rise of Tabelog

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2002 · consolidated
Revenue$17M
Net income$4M
Net margin23.8%
FY2015 · consolidated
Revenue$296M
Net income$90M
Net margin30.4%
  1. 2003Lists on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Mothers market
  2. 2005Launches Tabelog; moves up to the First Section
  3. 2005A security breach forces a full shutdown of kakaku.com
  4. 2006Minoru Tanaka becomes president — a decade of unbroken growth
  5. 2012Dentsu becomes the lead shareholder (after Digital Garage and CCC)

Kakaku.com went public fast: it listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s Mothers market in October 2003, six years after its founding, and moved up to the First Section in 2005 — a pace that was striking even for an internet company. But the more consequential move of these years was not the listing. In 2005 Atsuhiro Murakami, who had joined the year before, launched Tabelog, a site of user-written restaurant reviews. He deliberately stood it up as a separate brand rather than an extension of kakaku.com, reasoning that the colour of competing on cheapness would bury the reviews that matter most in choosing a restaurant — and it grew into the company’s second pillar.

The pattern was the same one Makino had proven, moved to a new market: the people doing the reviewing supply the content for free, and the businesses being reviewed pay to be listed. Applied first to electronics prices and now to dining, that two-sided design produced margins few operators could match. Under Minoru Tanaka, who became the third president in 2006 and led for a decade, Kakaku.com posted ten unbroken years of rising revenue and profit, adding compare-and-review services in travel, film and autos by acquisition alongside its own sites.

The capital side, meanwhile, churned while the business did not. Digital Garage’s controlling stake was diluted through the IPO and later transfers; the lead shareholder passed to Culture Convenience Club and then, in 2012, to the advertising group Dentsu. Each buyer joined as a minority holder, and the management ran on undisturbed — a separation of ownership from operation that would define the company for the next decade.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2016Tabelog as the profit engine — and a contested company

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2016 · consolidated
Revenue$379M
Net income$120M
Net margin31.7%
FY2026 · consolidated
Revenue$595M
Net income$119M
Net margin20%
  1. 2016Shonosuke Hata becomes the fourth president
  2. 2022A court finds a Tabelog rating-algorithm change violated antitrust law
  3. 2024Atsuhiro Murakami, the creator of Tabelog, becomes president; record results
  4. 2026A buyout battle to take the company private — EQT versus LINE Yahoo

The fourth president, Shonosuke Hata, who took over in 2016, carried the growth on: revenue rose roughly forty-eight percent over the four years to the year ended March 2019, and the Kyujin Box job-search aggregator, launched in 2015, matured into a third pillar that eased the concentration of profit in Tabelog. But the platform model also showed its underside. The pandemic cut restaurant advertising and knocked revenue down about sixteen percent in the year ended March 2021, and a run of lawsuits over Tabelog’s rating algorithm — including a 2022 Tokyo District Court ruling that an algorithm change had violated antitrust law — put the neutrality on which the whole business rests on trial.

In April 2024 the presidency passed for the first time to the person who had built the largest profit source: Atsuhiro Murakami, the creator of Tabelog. Where every previous head had entered from outside — the buyer Akita, the banker Tanaka, the JT alumnus Hata — the company was now led by an insider who had made its biggest earner. Results reached records under and around the handover: revenue of about $523.9M (¥78bn) in the year ended March 2025 at an operating margin above thirty-seven percent, spread across three pillars in Tabelog, kakaku.com and Kyujin Box.

The very qualities that made Kakaku.com valuable then made it a target. Having diluted away any controlling shareholder, it entered 2026 as an independent company that others could bid to own. A buyout battle broke out over taking it private: the private-equity firm EQT, backed by the roughly thirty-eight percent held by Digital Garage and KDDI, against a higher counter-offer from LINE Yahoo. Once the higher bid appeared, the board could no longer keep recommending the original offer and shifted to neutrality — leaving open the question of who decides the fate of a listed platform with no controlling owner.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2002

A revolving door of major shareholders (2002)

Why the business held steady though its parent kept changing hands

What stands out in the history of Kakaku.com’s capital is that its major shareholder passed in turn from the founder to Akita, to Digital Garage, to CCC, to Dentsu and to KDDI — and yet the people running the business, and its direction, barely moved. The key was that Digital Garage, which held a forty-five-percent parent-company stake in 2002, quickly thinned that position down into equity-method territory through the stock listing and a 2009 transfer. With no majority shareholder left, every later buyer could join only as a minority holder of fifteen to twenty percent, without the power to replace management or reach deep into operations. Ownership of the capital moved from hand to hand, but the governance of the business ran on unbroken.

Each buyer’s aim was different — T-Point’s consumer data, repurposing reviews for online advertising, expanding the au economic sphere — but what they shared was a way of keeping their distance: taking a minority stake in a high-margin internet asset while leaving its independent operation untouched. That distance handed the departing shareholder a gain above its purchase price, gave the incoming shareholder a point of contact with a growth company, and left Kakaku.com itself with its managerial freedom intact. The block of stable shareholders that Digital Garage and KDDI consolidated from 2018, and that was spelled out as roughly thirty-eight percent in 2026, is the destination of a capital history built up over a quarter-century — and it leads straight into the question posed by the privatization battle: who decides the fate of an independent company that has no controlling shareholder.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2005

The kakaku.com breach and a self-imposed shutdown (2005)

What halting its flagship by choice showed a platform

What the 2005 breach laid bare was a paradox: the more traffic a site draws, the more that very drawing power can turn into an instrument of harm. Had it been the theft of personal data, the damage would have stayed with the owners of that data; but a tampering that infects visitors merely by their viewing the page swells the harm in proportion to how many come. The full shutdown Akita chose on 14 May was a decision to halt the breadwinner and throw away daily revenue — and, at the same time, the flip side of the fact that no other means was left to protect visitors from infection. That the only defensive option was a total stoppage reveals how thin the layers of defence were across internet services of the day.

The refunds and compensation, and a full system overhaul rebuilt from the operating system up, were less an investment to recover lost sales than an outlay to hold on to trust once it had been damaged. Price comparison as a business rests on users believing that its information is accurate and its pages safe to view; once that trust collapses, the traffic, the advertising and the referral fees all thin out together. Paying the price of a roughly ten-day shutdown and the leak of more than twenty thousand email addresses, what Kakaku.com put first was not near-term sales but the recovery of its reputation for being safe. The episode remains as one that, early in the company’s expansion, made it confirm that for a platform, safety is the precondition of the service.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2005

Launching Tabelog and building a second pillar (2005)

A dining platform built next to price comparison

At the starting point of Tabelog was the motive, common to new ventures, of thinning a dependence on the successful founding business, kakaku.com. What was chosen here was not to extend kakaku.com’s features to take in dining, but deliberately to stand up a separate brand. Bring in the colour of competing on cheapness, and the reviews that matter most in choosing a restaurant get buried — Murakami’s reading of this led a company that had made its name in price comparison to decline to lend its own banner to the new venture. It was a design that took the same user-posting method and moved it to a different banner, changing only the market it handled. The crux of the decision lay in carrying kakaku.com’s strengths — posts, a database and search — into dining while cutting the brand alone away.

That separate brand, over twenty years, changed places to become the company’s breadwinner. An online-reservation referral charge, alongside listing fees, underpinned its revenue; in sales it reached the largest in the group, and even after a thirty-percent drop during the pandemic it recovered to $223.9M (¥34bn) in the year ended March 2025. Rather than stacking a second business onto an extension of the founding one, it stepped into a market of different demand under a separate brand and grew it there to top-tier scale. Two businesses — price comparison and dining reviews — that differ in what they handle and how they charge have been bound together by the same posting-based operating philosophy. Tabelog’s launch can be read as an account of how the answer to single-business risk was prepared not by imitation or acquisition but as a new venture stood up in-house.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2026

The privatization buyout battle and LINE Yahoo’s counter-bid (2026)

The highest price, or the lead shareholder’s wishes

The heart of this battle lies in the fact that, over an independent company with no majority controlling shareholder, a buyer offering a higher price and a buyer backed by the lead shareholder collided head-on. In taking a listed company private, the board and the special committee are asked first about the common interest of shareholders — above all, whether the price is fair to minority shareholders. Once a higher competing proposal appeared, it became hard to keep recommending that shareholders tender to the original offer, and the Kakaku.com board’s shift to neutrality was the logical consequence. At the same time, as long as Digital Garage and KDDI, holding roughly thirty-eight percent, decline to tender and side with EQT, there also exists a structure in which a high price alone cannot settle the matter.

Several buyout proposals raining down on a company with no controlling shareholder set the maximization of shareholder value and the question of to whom the running of the business should be entrusted — the location of control — to be fought out on the same ground. Bidding the price up competitively is desirable for minority shareholders; yet the buyer that puts up the highest figure is not necessarily the best steward. Whether Digital Garage, teamed with EQT, would prize the continuity of the business, or whether the integration of search, advertising and commerce that LINE Yahoo envisions would raise corporate value further — as of this writing there is no answer. This fight over the fate of an information platform that has kept its independence poses, in living form, the question of how to weigh price against steward when a listed company with no controlling shareholder becomes a target for acquisition.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Kakaku.com full history in Japanese →

  1. Kakaku.com, Inc. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Nikkei — 日本経済新聞 (Nikkei Inc.), 6 Feb 2024. nikkei.com.
  3. Nikkei — 日本経済新聞 (Nikkei Inc.), 7 Feb 2024 (print) and 25 Aug 2010 (print).
  4. 経営プロ — interview with former Kakaku.com president Minoru Tanaka. keiei.proweb.jp.
  5. 新R25, 6 Sep 2018 — Mitsuaki Makino interview. r25.jp.
  6. 東洋経済オンライン — Toyo Keizai Online, 8 Jun 2016. toyokeizai.net.
  7. Tokyo District Court judgment, June 2022 — the 食べログ (Tabelog) rating-algorithm suit.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →