Company history

In October 1984 Kameda listed on the Niigata Stock Exchange, the first rice-cracker maker ever to go public. Capacity kept rising — a second Kameda plant in 1987 — but the question of the period was no longer volume. A 1986 日経ビジネス feature framed it exactly: could a maker built on mass-producing standards adapt to many products in small lots, as consumer tastes fragmented? The company that had reached the top by industrialising was now being asked to rework the premise of that industrialisation.

It answered partly by assembling a group. A 1992 merger with Kameda Arare brought in a logistics company and a souvenir-confectionery maker as wholly owned subsidiaries, giving Kameda its own route from factory to shelf and access to counters other than the supermarket. Overseas, the first step came in 1989 with a capital and business alliance with SESMARK FOODS of the United States — later TH FOODS — to make and sell thin-baked usuyaki crackers locally; it became an affiliate in 1993. Thailand followed the same year. Kameda did not build its own plants abroad; it rode on local companies, partly because the texture of a rice cracker depends on how the rice is cooked and dried, and taste has to be tuned on the ground.

Not every door stayed open — a Vietnamese joint venture entered in 1996 was dissolved in 1998. And the reason for going out was pressure at home: the post-bubble recession plus the record cold summer of 1993, which cut the rice harvest and pushed raw-material costs straight into the income statement. In September 1994 Kameda began selling Yume Gohan, a low-protein cooked rice for chronic kidney patients — its first product outside confectionery — followed by table rice, a soft porridge for people with difficulty swallowing, and in 2000 a plant-based lactic-acid yoghurt. In March 2000 the Niigata exchange merged into the Tokyo Stock Exchange and Kameda’s shares moved to the TSE second section.

Consolidated sales were $528.4M (¥66bn) in the year to March 2002 and $1.0B (¥80bn) nine years later — about 2% a year. Ordinary profit over the same span more than doubled. Margin was growing; the market was not. By the mid-2000s holding first place and continuing to grow had become two different problems, and everything Kameda did outside rice crackers and outside Japan follows from that.

On the product side it bought its way into channels: Toyosu (department stores) and Nisshin Seika (upmarket supermarkets) in 2004, alongside the theme-park and souvenir business acquired earlier. Assigning a separate company to each type of shelf let the group cover price points it could not reach itself — though it also made it awkward to sell a souvenir product through a supermarket, a tangle left for the 2020s to undo. Abroad, Kameda mixed its methods by partner and market: a wholly owned venture in Qingdao (2003), a joint venture in Tianjin with Taiwan’s Tingyi (2005), KAMEDA USA (2008), subsidiaries in Thailand, Vietnam, India, Cambodia. The Tingyi partnership did not last — Kameda sold out of Tianjin in 2012 — the miscalculation being less the market than a partner whose target products and return thresholds never aligned with its own.

Two acquisitions in successive years changed what the company was. In 2012, the year it moved up to the TSE first section, it took in Mary’s Gone Crackers, an American organic and gluten-free cracker maker — early to a shift in US eating. In 2013 it bought Onisi Foods, the leader in long-life alpha-rice for emergency stockpiles, a business that moves on disaster preparedness and a five-year government replacement cycle rather than on snack seasonality. Sales jumped 14% in a single year to March 2014. In 2018 the company formally declared the shift it had been making all along: from confectionery to food.

The medium-term plan announced in May 2018 declared the move from confectionery into food, and missed its numbers in year one: four of the top brands lost sales, and management later admitted its responses had come too late. The real constraint sat in the plant — rice crackers take a long time from raw material to packaging, and that length was the bottleneck on cost. Kameda concluded the upstream steps could be shortened and completed a compressed line for its senbei products in 2021. Meanwhile the pandemic arrived as a tailwind: stay-at-home snacking pushed Kameda no Kaki no Tane, and consolidated sales passed ¥100 billion for the first time in the year to March 2019 and held that level.

Then came the year that exposed the limit. In 2022 a competitor halted operations and the whole trade’s supply requests converged on Kameda. It ran its plants flat out, but existing capacity and headcount were not enough; prioritising supply delayed new launches and promotional proposals, and when the rival returned Kameda handed back shelf space it had briefly won. Management told the 2024 shareholders’ meeting plainly that it had lost share, and that the largest cause was its own failure to solve the supply chain. Operating profit fell 26% in the year to March 2023 and net profit halved. Overseas had been an operating loss for five straight years. In June 2022 the leadership changed: Juneja Lekh Raj, an Indian-born researcher who had joined as vice-president in 2020, became chairman and CEO, with Takagi Masanori as president.

From 2023 the company put profit ahead of sales — raising prices, cutting unprofitable items, concentrating on four core brands, and stating flatly that it would not go back to competing on price. Share slipped, which it accepts as the consequence. In 2025 it made two opposite calls in North America in successive months: selling Mary’s Gone Crackers in May, and in June taking full ownership of TH FOODS — the partner of thirty-six years — at an acquisition cost of $421.7M (¥63bn). Sales rose 34% to ¥138 billion in the year to March 2026, though the leap in net profit came largely from a one-off ¥20.5 billion gain on the step acquisition. In the same year Kameda withdrew from the low-protein rice that had been its first step outside confectionery in 1994. It now calls itself a “Rice Innovation Company” — a phrase that only works so long as domestic rice crackers keep earning, and management itself lists their profitability and capital efficiency as the company’s own unresolved problem.