Timee

Company history

Financial history 2020–2025 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
2017
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
2024
Founder
Ogawa Ryo
Revenue · FYE Mar 2025
$229.2M (¥34bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2025
$35.4M (¥5bn)
Timee: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

2017A failed startup, a debt, and the dishwashing pitch

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 2017Ogawa Ryo founds Recolle in Kunitachi, Tokyo (apparel service)
  2. 2018Renamed Timee; spot-work service launches in August
  3. 2019Seven Bank tie-up for same-day transfers; Osaka and Fukuoka offices

Timee began as something with no connection to spot work at all. In August 2017 Ogawa Ryo, then a business student at Rikkyo University, set up Recolle in Kunitachi, Tokyo, to build an apparel service that suggested clothes suited to a user’s build and taste. Investor advice pushed the idea back and forth until it settled on a try-and-get-a-discount scheme aimed at women. With an angel investment all but agreed, Ogawa concluded that he did not have it in him to spend years running on someone else’s money, and closed the company down.

What the closure left him was a debt of $2,717 (¥300,000). Working part-time jobs to pay it off, he found himself asking why an application had to go by e-mail when an app could finish the whole thing. Write a résumé, travel to an interview, wait for the wage to be transferred later — counting those three frictions from the worker’s side became the blueprint for the next business. As the origin of a recruiting service it is unusual: it starts not from an employer’s hiring problem but from what the founder had been made to pay himself.

The company was renamed Timee in June 2018 and the spot-work service launched that August, with Ogawa building the first app himself and student friends supplying the earliest workers. Clients came from cold-calling restaurants, and the pitch he used there was “just the dishwashing over lunch” — not a day, not a half-day, but one task in the two busiest hours. The finer the slice, the more gaps a worker with no résumé and no interview can fill, and the job-board unit of “three days a week or more” comes apart before it is ever reached. Workers were drawn by same-day pay: a May 2018 patent covering payment received before the work, a June 2019 tie-up with Seven Bank for routine bank transfers, and a May 2019 patent handling the employment contract and clock-in/out through a QR code — the checks that had to fill the space left by the deleted résumé. Offices opened ahead of the registered-user numbers that would have justified them, because selling a task-by-task carve-out to small restaurants one shop at a time could never be done by phone and app alone.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2020When the restaurants closed

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2020 · unconsolidated
Revenue$5M
Net income-$11M
Net margin-240%
FY2021 · unconsolidated
Revenue$12M
Net income-$13M
Net margin-107.7%
  1. 2020April revenue falls to a third of pre-pandemic; pivot to logistics
  2. 2021Itochu capital and business alliance; Moriyasu Isao joins as COO

By 2020 roughly 60% of listings were restaurant-related, which meant revenue rode directly on restaurant opening hours. When COVID-19 closed them, sales began falling in February and by April stood at a third of their pre-pandemic level; FY2020 revenue was $4.3M (¥461m) against an ordinary loss of $11.2M (¥1bn). The same concentration that had made a task-slicing pitch work so well in restaurants also fixed the size of the loss.

The answer was to change job categories rather than the business. Restaurant work fell from around 60% of listings to a few percent, and light warehouse work and delivery took its place; revenue was back at pre-pandemic levels within about a year, with FY2021 revenue of $11.8M (¥1bn), 2.8 times the prior year — though the ordinary loss widened to $12.6M (¥1bn) as the spending needed to capture growth landed ahead of the revenue. What made the swap possible was that the business had never been defined by an industry. Handing a short, unfamiliar task to an inexperienced worker and paying that same day worked identically in a kitchen and in a warehouse; from the handoff side, dishwashing and sorting are the same thing, and picking and packing are if anything easier to slice than prep and service. The design alone, however, would not have produced a destination: parcel volumes were surging and warehouses were short of hands at exactly that moment.

Growth on the new base was then financed from outside. In August 2021 Timee entered a capital and business alliance with Itochu covering sales support, and in September raised about $48.3M (¥5bn) — a $36.4M (¥4bn) third-party allotment plus borrowing. In October it recruited Moriyasu Isao, formerly president of DeNA, as chief operating officer: a company whose staff averaged around thirty took on a manager used to running a large corporation and a trading house’s sales network at the same time.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2022Borrowing against the money it fronts

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2022 · unconsolidated
Revenue$47M
Net income$2M
Net margin4.8%
FY2023 · unconsolidated
Revenue$115M
Net income$13M
Net margin11.2%
  1. 2022First profit: FY2022 ordinary profit of $875,390 (¥115m)
  2. 2023$92.5M (¥13bn) in bank borrowings; cumulative funding about $286.8M (¥40bn)

The funding mix drifted steadily toward debt. Timee raised $139.3M (¥18bn) in working capital in November 2022, and in September 2023 took $92.5M (¥13bn) in borrowings alone from Mizuho, MUFG and Resona, bringing cumulative funding since launch to about $286.8M (¥40bn) in five years. Spot work pays the worker the same day and collects from the client later, so the faster gross transaction value grows, the more cash the company must front. That weakness was precisely what made bank debt available: the swelling advance was evidence of growth, and growth in transaction value was a repayment story a lender could underwrite. In FY2022 operating cash flow was an outflow of $14.9M (¥2bn), covered by a financing inflow of $15.7M (¥2bn).

FY2022 was also the year the business crossed into profit: revenue of $47.3M (¥6bn) yielded an ordinary profit of only $875,390 (¥115m), but a company that had been losing around a billion yen a year was in the black. FY2023 then jumped to revenue of $114.9M (¥16bn) and operating profit of $13.9M (¥2bn), with headcount reaching 708. Because the model depends on area sales staff visiting clients, revenue growth tracks headcount growth almost step for step — and it was the turn to profit that made it possible to fund working capital from banks rather than from venture capital in the first place.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2024The IPO, the incumbents, and life beyond brokerage

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2024 · unconsolidated
Revenue$178M
Net income$18M
Net margin10.4%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$229M
Net income$35M
Net margin15.5%
  1. 2024IPO on TSE Growth; market cap $1.0B (¥157bn) on day one
  2. 2024Mercari, Recruit and Persol all present in spot work
  3. 2025Acquires Sukima Works — first M&A in eight years
  4. 2025Fiscal year-end moved from October to April

Timee listed on the TSE Growth Market on 26 July 2024. Against an offer price of $10 (¥1,450) the shares closed their first day at $11 (¥1,650), giving a market capitalisation of $1.0B (¥157bn) — the largest IPO of the year, six years after the service launched, with its founder aged twenty-seven. At listing there were 7.7 million registered workers and 254,000 client locations, and clients pay Timee a fee of roughly 30% of the wages they pay workers, so growth in transaction value converts directly into revenue. Ogawa kept just over 19% of the stock and was candid that he did not much mind the ratio, accepting that shareholders could one day remove him.

The listing and the arrival of the incumbents fell in the same year. Mercari entered spot work with Mercari Hallo in March 2024, Recruit was preparing its own service by the autumn, and Persol’s Shareful had been running since 2019; the market reached 17 million users by May 2024. Timee’s case for holding its ground rested on two administrative facts. Earning $581 (¥88,000) or more in a month at the same employer brings a worker into social insurance, so applications have to be blocked automatically — a function Timee had built into its payment system — and running several services at one site scatters labour administration worker by worker. Together those push each site to settle on a single service, which favours whoever covered all 47 prefectures first; about 600 of roughly 1,000 employees sat in area support, a deployment built up over five years. Ogawa conceded that the same reasoning reverses if a large rival puts enough people on the ground.

After listing, the company pushed outward from pure brokerage into the work on either side of it: Field Managers placed inside logistics sites (at one client, Timee came to cover about 45% of outsourced labour cost, and was advising on staffing and floor layout), long-term hiring support piloted across 40 companies and 270 sites, and a permanent-placement service whose “Timee résumé” carries work records and ratings instead of schooling and career history. In August 2025 it bought all the shares of Sukima Works, a contract operator of logistics warehouses — its first acquisition in eight years — so that a client asking it to “just run the whole thing” could be answered with a contract to perform the work rather than a brokerage. FY2025 closed with revenue of $229.1M (¥34bn), operating profit of $45.1M (¥7bn) and 1,268 employees, but a year-end market capitalisation of $1.0B (¥150bn), slightly below the first-day figure: revenue five times higher over three years, and a market pricing the durability of the growth rather than the growth.

The unfinished part is the legal one. In April 2026 nine workers across Tokyo and four neighbouring prefectures were reported to be preparing suit against the largest spot-work intermediary over shifts cancelled by clients just before the start date, with neither wages nor travel costs paid. The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare had held in July 2024 that, absent specific terms, an employment contract may be taken to form when the worker applies, and operators rewrote their terms accordingly; the claims concern losses arising before those revisions. The problem sits on the other side of the very design that removed the résumé and the interview — screening removed makes it easy for both sides to commit, and just as easy for the client to withdraw. Separately, in December 2025 Timee moved its fiscal year-end from October to April, because closing work collided with the November–December peak of its clients’ business; the transitional six months to April 2026 produced operating profit of $24.1M (¥4bn), with revenue on a twelve-month equivalent basis of $245.5M (¥39bn), up 25.7%, and net profit alone short of plan after a $2.2M (¥350m) impairment on Needer, a Korean spot-work operator.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2020

Moving the core of its listings from restaurants to logistics (2020)

What changed was the industry, not the way work was handed over

To summarise this as changing direction quickly in a crisis is to miss its core. What changed was the industry, not the way work was handed over. Delete the résumé and the interview, give a short unit of work to someone with no experience, pay the wage that same day — because the business was defined by that process, the closure of the restaurants that supplied 60% of listings did not stop Timee from carrying the same mechanism over to warehouses. Washing dishes and sorting parcels were, from the handoff side, indistinguishable.

A general-purpose design does not, however, create somewhere to go. As Ogawa himself noted, listings were falling in virtually every industry and only logistics was rising: the external condition of warehouses short of hands amid stay-at-home demand was what made the transfer work at all. And the ordinary loss in the year after the shift was wider than the year before it; profitability had to wait until the year to October 2022. What to hold fixed and what to leave variable — that choice of definition set the range of moves available in the middle of the crisis.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2023

Funding working capital with unsecured, unguaranteed bank debt — about ¥40.3bn raised in total (2023)

A capital policy that turned a weakness into the argument

Explaining unsecured, unguaranteed borrowing at under 1% interest as simply the reward for good results makes the reasoning too easy. With equity funding across the market down 27.3% year on year, the heart of Timee’s ability to borrow was that it turned the weakness of its business — cash going out first, because workers are paid the same day — into the argument it made to lenders. A growing advance is also evidence that transaction value is growing, and CFO Yagi Tomoaki, formerly of MUFG Bank, was in a position to put that reframing into a bank’s own language.

That said, the policy did not bring lightness alone. Interest-bearing debt of $56.6M (¥8bn) at the October 2023 year-end exceeded equity of $44.1M (¥6bn): money carrying an obligation to repay stood thicker than shareholders’ capital. Unlike equity, debt keeps its repayment dates even when transaction value slows. That the founder still held just over 19% of the shares after listing is a result obtained by shouldering that repayment pressure.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2025

Acquiring Sukima Works and entering contract operation of logistics warehouses (2025)

An acquisition that admitted the limits of brokerage

Calling this a first M&A does not describe what it was. What Timee acquired was not a new market but the function of performing work its brokerage could not absorb. Once penetration at sites with a Field Manager reached 45% and clients began saying “just do all of it for us,” a company that only stands between the posting and the payment has nowhere further to go. That it bought another company for the first time in its eighth year is itself the evidence that such a territory exists beyond brokerage.

Whether the purchase returns a profit is not yet knowable. The “non-spot-work” segment, which includes contract operations, is still expected to post losses beyond the year to April 2026, and with the acquisition price undisclosed there is no way from outside to weigh the outlay against the result. The reorganisation that moves the Field Manager business into the acquired company has only just begun, and it is too early to call contract work a pillar alongside brokerage. It will be decided by whether a business that carries direct costs can be made to pay while the labour shortage lasts.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Timee full history in Japanese →

  1. Timee, Inc. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Timee, Inc. — earnings briefing materials (決算説明会資料), FY2025 and FY2026.
  3. Timee, Inc. — 事業計画及び成長可能性に関する事項 (business plan and growth potential disclosures), FY2025 and FY2026.
  4. Timee, Inc. — listing-time results disclosure and corporate news releases, 2018–2026.
  5. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare — 厚生労働省 view on the formation of an employment contract upon application in spot work, July 2024.
  6. Spot Work Association — スポットワーク協会 policy on cancellation by the employer after a contract has formed, March 2026.
  7. Interviews with and remarks by Ogawa Ryo in the Japanese business press, 2021–2026.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Timee’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/215A/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/215A/history.json History overview
GET /api/215A/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/215A/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/215A/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/215A/executives.json Executives
GET /api/215A/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/215A/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/215A/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/215A/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/215A/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/215A/workforce.json Workforce