Selling sixteen core stores to Daiei in the cash crisis — letting go of the earners, Atami included (1997)
Choosing to give up what earns
What Yaohan finally let go of — the company that had set out from a single store in Atami and flown across the world — was its domestic earners, Atami among them. Handing high-margin stores that should have been the core of any rebuilding to a competitor, in order to get past an imminent bond redemption, made sense in the logic of cash flow; in the logic of the business it was a choice to dig away the foundation of the core trade. What a company facing crisis defends first, and what it offers up, is a question this sale still puts to us today.
That Wada spoke at the press conference of continuing the China business tells you what kind of decision it was. If the order of priority placed not the domestic core but the overseas vision first, then the sale of sixteen stores was less a cause of the failure than a consequence of that ranking. Reorganisation followed six months after this purchase of survival at the price of the company’s best stores — a sequence that asks, as a matter of crisis management, how thoroughly improvised financing can destroy the seeds of a recovery.
Revenue and net margin, FY1992–FY1997
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY1997 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Yaohan
- 1990 Writing off the regulated home market: going abroad, and moving the group head office to Hong Kong (1990)
- 1994 Expanding on two fronts and raising ¥60 billion in the market — interest-bearing debt past ¥100 billion (1994)
- 1995 Shanghai Nextage and the 1,060-store plan — holding to China while the cash ran out (1995)
- 1997 Unable to redeem its convertible bonds, Yaohan files for reorganisation in September 1997 — the failure of a listed major retailer (1997)
- 1997 Taking Jusco as sponsor of the reorganisation — survival after the core stores were gone (1997)
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
Disclaimer
- This page is provided for general information only and is not investment advice, nor a recommendation to buy or sell any security.
- Figures are compiled independently and include our own estimates, approximations and machine-processed data; we make no warranty as to their accuracy or completeness.
- Sources are primarily each company’s securities reports and other public filings, but errors and omissions may remain.
- Any use of this information is at the reader’s own risk. Past performance does not indicate future results.
- Company names, logos and other marks belong to their respective owners.
Data API
Yaohan’s history, financials, executives and
shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.
Full specification →
| Method | Endpoint | Returns |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/companies.json | All companies |
| GET | /api/8198/manifest.json | Resource index |
| GET | /api/8198/history.json | History overview |
| GET | /api/8198/timeline.json | Chronology |
| GET | /api/decisions.json | All management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/8198/decisions.json | Management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/8198/decisions/{slug}.json | One decision (full dossier) |
| GET | /api/8198/executives.json | Executives |
| GET | /api/8198/shareholders.json | Major shareholders |
| GET | /api/8198/financials.json | Financial statements |
| GET | /api/8198/financials-longterm.json | Long-term results |
| GET | /api/8198/segments.json | Business segments |
| GET | /api/8198/regions.json | Sales by region |
| GET | /api/8198/workforce.json | Workforce |