Rorze

Company history

Financial history 2002–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1985
Head office
Fukuyama, Hiroshima, Japan
Listed
2016
Founder
Sakitani Fumio
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$814.4M (¥129bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$120.1M (¥19bn)
Rorze: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1985The rule: only what would be news worldwide

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1985Sakitani Fumio founds Rorze in Fukuyama
  2. 1986Clean robot for wafer transfer — MTBF over eight years
  3. 1993Clean transfer robots for large FPD glass substrates
  4. 1996Overseas in one year: Singapore, Taiwan, the US, and Haiphong
  5. 1997Shares registered over the counter

Sakitani Fumio was born in 1945 to a farming family in Ibara, Okayama, fixed radios as a schoolboy, and never left electrical circuits. He dropped out of engineering school, developed a marine Loran receiver in Tokyo, and at 28 came home to work his way through the local semiconductor industry — eight employers in all, covering both front-end and back-end processes, ending as a development manager at Tatsumo. In March 1985, at 40, he set up Rorze in Fukuyama with $41,923 (¥10m) of capital to make motor-control equipment. Neither a semiconductor cluster nor a startup hub, Fukuyama made Rorze an independent from nowhere in particular. The name comes from Lhotse, the 8,516 m peak that adjoins Everest — the mountain that makes Everest look impressive: a company meant to hold up the world’s leading firms from underneath.

The founding rule was severe. Nothing that competitors already sell; only products that would be news worldwide. A stepper-motor driver came in September 1985, an ultra-compact controller in May 1986, and in December 1986 the product that made the company: a clean robot for handling wafers. In semiconductor fabrication, a particle smaller than cigarette smoke ruins a die, so wafers must move without human hands and without shedding dust. Rorze packed its own driver and controller into one twentieth of the volume of rival units, made the electrical and mechanical sections replaceable as a single block, and sealed the arm’s rotating joint with magnetic fluid to stop dust escaping. Customers measured mean time between failures at over eight years.

The first two years lost money on sales of about ¥60 million; the clean robot doubled revenue to ¥130 million in the year to February 1988 as equipment makers adopted it. Cash was precarious throughout — when the Tokyo businessman who had guaranteed a ¥100 million bank loan went bankrupt in 1987, the loan survived only because a banker who believed in Sakitani valued his father’s farmland to the last yen. Rorze demanded payment in advance in return for world-class specifications, took venture-capital money that eventually amounted to a roughly 40% holding, and widened its range: vacuum clean robots in 1989, dual-arm in 1992, then large glass substrates for flat panels from 1993 — a field customers pulled it into, since some 80% of LCD production trouble occurred in substrate handling. In 1996 it went abroad in a single year — Singapore, Hsinchu, California, and in October a factory in Haiphong, Vietnam — and in December 1997 registered its shares over the counter, twelve years after founding.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1998Design here, build there

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2002 · consolidated
Revenue$53M
Net income
Net margin
FY2008 · consolidated
Revenue$132M
Net income$13M
Net margin9.6%
  1. 2000300 mm wafer handling; Kyushu plant opens
  2. 2003Korean subsidiary lists on KOSDAQ
  3. 2004Moves up to the JASDAQ exchange
  4. 2008Peak revenue of $131.6M (¥14bn) before the crash

The Vietnamese plant was the structural decision. Sakitani had compared China and Vietnam and chosen the latter for a workforce that kept delivery dates and for aluminium among the cheapest anywhere; design and sales stayed in Fukuyama, volume manufacturing moved to Haiphong. What that split bought was not merely lower cost but a cost base low enough to survive the violent swings of semiconductor capital spending — the condition on which everything Rorze did afterwards depended.

The rest of the decade was spent following the industry’s generations. A carrier stock station for 300 mm wafers arrived in July 2000 as the industry moved up from 200 mm; a Kyushu plant opened that November, giving three manufacturing sites across Vietnam, Kyushu and Fukuyama. The Korean subsidiary listed on KOSDAQ in November 2003, Rorze itself moved up to the JASDAQ exchange in December 2004, and a Shanghai subsidiary followed in 2008.

Sakitani also tried to build a cluster around himself. A Saturday study group started in the company canteen in 1992 became BISTEC, an association of 34 local firms and individuals founded in September 1993 with him as chairman, aimed at growing semiconductor skills in a region known for textiles and machinery. Business tracked the boom: revenue rose from ¥6.6 billion in the year to February 2002 to $131.6M (¥14bn) in the year to February 2008, with recurring profit of $17.4M (¥2bn).

Read the full history in Japanese →


2009Three-quarters of the business, gone in a year

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2009 · consolidated
Revenue$90M
Net income$0K
Net margin0%
FY2014 · consolidated
Revenue$134M
Net income$4M
Net margin2.8%
  1. 2010Revenue falls to $41M (¥4bn); first major loss
  2. 2011Rebound to ¥11.0 billion
  3. 2014Revenue recovers to ¥14.2 billion

Lehman hit Rorze where it was thinnest. Revenue fell from $131.6M (¥14bn) in the year to February 2008 to ¥8.4 billion a year later and then to $41M (¥4bn) in the year to February 2010, with a recurring loss of $11.4M (¥1bn) — the worst collapse in the company’s history. When chipmakers stop investing simultaneously, orders for the robots built into their equipment stop simultaneously too, and there was almost nothing else to hold the revenue line: Rorze sold machines and, for the most part, that was the end of the transaction. The weakness of a build-and-deliver model with little service or consumables income was now on the record.

Recovery was slow and repeatedly interrupted. Revenue came back to ¥11.0 billion in the year to February 2011, then sagged through ¥10.3 billion and ¥9.4 billion before reaching ¥14.2 billion in the year to February 2014 — the one-to-two-year oscillation that is the natural rhythm of semiconductor equipment. What blunted it, gradually, was the Vietnamese cost base and a slowly widening base of maintenance and consumables revenue. Sakitani, president since 1985, ran the company through the whole of the downturn; as the thirtieth anniversary approached, the question was who would take it next.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2015Succession, and the AI build-out

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2015 · consolidated
Revenue$106M
Net income$7M
Net margin7%
FY2026 · consolidated
Revenue$814M
Net income$120M
Net margin14.8%
  1. 2015Fujishiro Yoshiyuki succeeds the founder as president
  2. 2016Designated to the TSE First Section
  3. 2017Rorze Lifescience formed; second Vietnamese plant in Bac Ninh
  4. 2023Acquires the wafer-cleaning maker EIAS; 28% operating margin
  5. 2025Record revenue of $831.3M (¥124bn)

In May 2015 Sakitani moved up to chairman and Fujishiro Yoshiyuki — born in 1980, joined in 2006, head of software solutions by 2009 — became president. He is Sakitani’s son-in-law, an unusual line of succession for an owner-founded venture, and the handover was staged: the founder retired to adviser in 2017. The market caught up quickly. Revenue reached ¥19.9 billion in the year to February 2016 and ¥24.7 billion the year after; Rorze moved to the Tokyo Stock Exchange Second Section in January 2016 and was designated to the First Section that August, nineteen years after its over-the-counter registration.

Fujishiro pushed the company’s clean-handling and precision-control skills into medicine — a cell-culture device in 2015, an automated CO2 incubator in 2016, and in March 2017 a Tsukuba affiliate taken over outright and renamed Rorze Lifescience. It was a genuinely small start: under 1% of consolidated revenue in the year to February 2018. Meanwhile the core business kept swinging with the cycle — ¥52.2 billion in the year to February 2018, up 2.1 times, then ¥31.4 billion the next year, down 40% — while the manufacturing footprint spread to a second Vietnamese site in Bac Ninh in 2017 and a European base in Saxony in 2019.

Then the AI and advanced-node build-out arrived, and Rorze took all of it. Revenue climbed from ¥37.1 billion in the year to February 2020 through ¥50.8 billion, ¥67.0 billion and ¥94.5 billion, with an operating margin of 28% in the year to February 2023; after a pause it reached a record $831.3M (¥124bn) in the year to February 2025, with operating profit of $213.8M (¥32bn). With that money Fujishiro bought adjacencies — the wafer-cleaning maker EIAS in March 2023, Nanoverse Technologies in the US and the research-services firm Genostaff in 2024 — four acquisitions in all since entering life science. The ownership remains what it was: at February 2025 Sakitani personally held 35.12% of the shares, alongside trust banks and institutions in the ranks below. The company is more concentrated than it looks in another sense too — of 4,402 consolidated employees, 3,063 are in Haiphong and 244 at the Fukuyama parent.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1996

Building the volume plant in Haiphong and splitting development from manufacturing (1996)

Hand over the volume, keep the finishing

What was placed in Haiphong in 1996 was volume production of standard products, not the processes that touch the customer. Frames, covers and software were fitted in the country where the equipment was going, and low-volume custom work was finished in Japan. President Sakitani Fumio put it as keeping the places where value is added in Japan. The division of processes began from a judgement made as customer IC makers, finding domestic production uneconomic, shifted manufacturing overseas: that maintenance alone in the destination countries would not amount to a business.

The balance of that division, however, shifted over time. Of 4,402 consolidated employees in the year to February 2025, 3,063 are gathered in Haiphong, while the parent in Fukuyama holds only 244. Rather than design and volume production being separated, the structure has become one in which the country doing the manufacturing holds most of the people. That a typhoon in 2024 affected production was arguably the other side of the same coin. A design that entrusts volume production to a single country lowers costs and, at the same time, means taking on that country’s circumstances as your own.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2023

Serial acquisitions into peripheral equipment and life science (2023)

Why buy adjacencies at the top of the cycle

Buying up unrelated fields in the middle of record profits can look like a comfortable company spreading its investments. But at the core of it is not comfort so much as memory. Revenue that ends when the machine is sold had its fragility exposed once already, in the year to February 2010, when sales fell by roughly 90% from the peak and the company slid into a recurring loss. Precisely because it knows in its bones that thinning orders thin the profit directly, it makes sense to seed revenue sources less exposed to the cycle — maintenance, contract research — while results are running hot. EIAS’s analysis and cleaning work, and Genostaff’s contract research, can both be seen in that light.

That said, it is hard to say the diversification has borne fruit yet. Life science was under 1% of consolidated revenue in the year to February 2018 and remains some distance from being a pillar that supports the parent. Nanoverse of the US is a startup founded in 2022, and whether its equipment reaches volume production is a question for later. The four acquisitions have widened the outline of the business, but nothing has grown into what could be called a second earnings pillar. Whether groundwork laid against the weakness of selling machines outright pays off may not be measurable until the next time semiconductor investment thins.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Rorze full history in Japanese →

  1. Rorze Corporation — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Chogin Soken L — 長銀総研L, March 1996.
  3. Kiho Hokuto — 季報ほくとう, October 1996.
  4. Tsusan Journal — 通産ジャーナル (Research Institute of International Trade and Industry), September 1997.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Rorze’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/6323/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/6323/history.json History overview
GET /api/6323/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/6323/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/6323/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/6323/executives.json Executives
GET /api/6323/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/6323/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/6323/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/6323/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/6323/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/6323/workforce.json Workforce