Restructuring after Burberry — Iwata’s turn away from department stores (2017)
The author’s view
The prescription in Iwata’s medium-term plan — e-commerce, directly operated stores, own brands — was not itself misdirected. The problem is better read as one of timing. In the five-odd years between Burberry signalling a review in 2009 and the licence expiring, the company prioritised preserving its star division and failed to shift resources into brands of its own; that unpaid bill came due at the same moment the main brand disappeared. The reformer took the wheel only after the wound was deep.
For a wholesale apparel firm the department store was both a shortcut to affluent customers and a constraint — the cost of holding floor space, and a trade custom that measures everything by counter sales. That Sanyo Shokai went through two rounds of voluntary redundancy and withdrew from sales floors without reaching profit suggests that rebuilding a distribution model is not completed by cutting headcount and stores. How that unfinished problem was handed to the next administration has to be read alongside the rebuild under Shinji Oe.
Revenue and net margin, FY2012–FY2022
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY2017 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
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Other key decisions at Sanyo Shokai
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
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