Diversifying into electronics with shadow masks and photomasks (1958)
Printing technology off paper — a bet on growing the next pillar
The heart of this decision can be read not as a defensive move forced by financial crisis but as an offensive one — stepping deliberately into electronic components, an unrelated field, at a time when the core business was still growing. Kitajima Orie applied his conviction that “one or two pillars is dangerous” not only to paper containers and packaging but to colour television and semiconductors, the most advanced markets of the day. The company’s technical bent shows in its willingness to stake a laboratory and capital on the judgment that the fine plate-making skills honed in printing would also work on metal and glass.
Granted, yields were low in the early days of mass production, and the toil that comes with being a pioneer was no small thing. Even so, this pillar set outside paper grew into one of the great trunks supporting the company in an age when print media would shrink. That a printing house is today also a major supplier of electronic components and battery materials lies on a line running straight from that sequence of choices — joining MITI’s trial production more than half a century ago and building a dust-free plant at Kamifukuoka. How to grow the next pillar alongside the core business — for having faced that question so early, this is an instructive decision.
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Dai Nippon Printing
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
Disclaimer
- This page is provided for general information only and is not investment advice, nor a recommendation to buy or sell any security.
- Figures are compiled independently and include our own estimates, approximations and machine-processed data; we make no warranty as to their accuracy or completeness.
- Sources are primarily each company’s securities reports and other public filings, but errors and omissions may remain.
- Any use of this information is at the reader’s own risk. Past performance does not indicate future results.
- Company names, logos and other marks belong to their respective owners.
Data API
Dai Nippon Printing’s history, financials, executives and
shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.
Full specification →
| Method | Endpoint | Returns |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/companies.json | All companies |
| GET | /api/7912/manifest.json | Resource index |
| GET | /api/7912/history.json | History overview |
| GET | /api/7912/timeline.json | Chronology |
| GET | /api/decisions.json | All management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/7912/decisions.json | Management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/7912/decisions/{slug}.json | One decision (full dossier) |
| GET | /api/7912/executives.json | Executives |
| GET | /api/7912/shareholders.json | Major shareholders |
| GET | /api/7912/financials.json | Financial statements |
| GET | /api/7912/financials-longterm.json | Long-term results |
| GET | /api/7912/segments.json | Business segments |
| GET | /api/7912/regions.json | Sales by region |
| GET | /api/7912/workforce.json | Workforce |