Into polymer separation membranes — and the Hydranautics acquisition (1987)
The accounts of a business begun before its market
When membrane production began in 1976, the seawater desalination market did not exist. Evaporation was the mainstream, and membranes were inferior both in salt rejection and in the cost of the water produced. What allowed it to continue was a high-priced application — ultrapure water for semiconductors and LCDs — that made an immature membrane pay, and it appears that being a company with electronic materials is what supported the water business. Vice-president Hijikata Saburo’s 1973 view that a thin membrane could serve medicine, pollution control and electronics alike proved right in the sense that breadth of application bought time.
That said, the company it bought was not ready for duty. Hydranautics was tied down in sales by a patent dispute and was still losing money in 1993, six years after the acquisition. Given that its American connections told in a large Australian project only once the constraints lifted, it took more than twenty years for the value of that purchase to appear. Reverse-osmosis membranes came off basic patent in 1999, and their dimensions are set by an industry standard — a commodity form. Set against the fact that China’s Vontron has claimed comparable salt-rejection figures, leadership in desalination looks less like technical superiority itself than something preserved by never stopping the updates.
Revenue and net margin, FY1982–FY1992
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY1987 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Nitto Denko
- 1948 Accepting full Hitachi ownership — and the 1948 dissolution of the tie (1948)
- 1961 Spinning off batteries and magnetic tape as Maxell — and selling it to Hitachi (1961)
- 1975 The “three-new” programme: a permanent 30% new-product rule (1975)
- 2017 Licensing large-panel polarizer technology to Hangzhou Jinjiang — leaving the volume zone (2017)
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
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- Sources are primarily each company’s securities reports and other public filings, but errors and omissions may remain.
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Data API
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| Method | Endpoint | Returns |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/companies.json | All companies |
| GET | /api/6988/manifest.json | Resource index |
| GET | /api/6988/history.json | History overview |
| GET | /api/6988/timeline.json | Chronology |
| GET | /api/decisions.json | All management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/6988/decisions.json | Management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/6988/decisions/{slug}.json | One decision (full dossier) |
| GET | /api/6988/executives.json | Executives |
| GET | /api/6988/shareholders.json | Major shareholders |
| GET | /api/6988/financials.json | Financial statements |
| GET | /api/6988/financials-longterm.json | Long-term results |
| GET | /api/6988/segments.json | Business segments |
| GET | /api/6988/regions.json | Sales by region |
| GET | /api/6988/workforce.json | Workforce |