Konami Group

Company history

Founded
1969
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
1984 · TSE 9766
Founder
Kagemasa Kozuki
Revenue · FYE Mar 2025
$2.8B (¥422bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2025
$498.5M (¥75bn)
Konami Group: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1969From jukebox repair to the Famicom

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
  1. 1969Kagemasa Kozuki starts a jukebox repair-and-rental business in Osaka
  2. 1973Konami Industry Co. established to build amusement machines
  3. 1981Scramble and Frogger become North American arcade hits
  4. 1984Listed on the Osaka Securities Exchange
  5. 1985Enters the Famicom with Yie Ar Kung-Fu; Gradius follows
  6. 1988First sections of the Tokyo and Osaka exchanges

Konami began in March 1969 as a jukebox repair-and-rental business that Kagemasa Kozuki set up in Osaka. The electronics know-how earned by fixing those machines carried straight into manufacturing: in 1973 he founded Konami Industry Co. to build amusement machines, and by the late 1970s the firm was developing its own arcade games. In 1981 Scramble and Frogger became hits in North America and won Konami its first international name as an arcade maker; it opened Konami of America in 1982 and UK and German offices by 1984, turning a domestic machine maker into an export-driven developer in little more than a decade.

A 1984 listing on the Osaka Securities Exchange — the first sections of both Osaka and Tokyo by 1988 — funded a push onto Nintendo’s Family Computer. From Gradius (1985) through Castlevania (1986), Ganbare Goemon and Contra, Konami redeployed the development muscle it had built in the arcades as a third-party publisher on someone else’s platform. The franchises minted in the late 1980s became intellectual property that would outlast the hardware they were born on — the reusable assets on which every later pivot would depend.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1991PlayStation, Metal Gear Solid and diversification

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY1992 · consolidated
Revenue$178M
Net income$3M
Net margin1.8%
FY2006 · unconsolidated
Revenue$2.3B
Net income$198M
Net margin8.8%
  1. 1991Renamed from Konami Industry to Konami
  2. 1995Jikkyō Powerful Pro Baseball and Winning Eleven on PlayStation
  3. 1997Konami Gaming, Inc. set up in Las Vegas (casino cabinets)
  4. 1998Metal Gear Solid — 7 million-plus copies worldwide
  5. 1999Yu-Gi-Oh! Official Card Game launches
  6. 2001Acquires fitness operator People; buys into Hudson
  7. 2006Becomes a pure holding company (Konami Digital Entertainment split out)

In 1991 the firm dropped “Industry” from its name to become simply Konami, signalling a move beyond machine-making into entertainment, and in 1993 shifted its head office from Osaka to Tokyo. The PlayStation generation lifted it to a new scale: Jikkyō Powerful Pro Baseball and Winning Eleven (from 1995) anchored a sports-game line, and in January 1998 Metal Gear Solid, directed by Hideo Kojima, sold more than seven million copies worldwide, fusing cinematic staging with stealth action and carrying Konami’s name across borders. In 1999 it opened a wholly separate front: the Yu-Gi-Oh! Official Card Game took a game character onto paper trading cards, a business with no console in it at all.

The same years brought a deliberate diversification. Konami listed in London (1999) and New York (2002) to widen its access to capital, and used it — in 2001 it took the fitness-club operator People (today Konami Sports) private through a friendly tender offer and bought into Hudson. In 1997 it had already set up Konami Gaming in Las Vegas, carrying arcade engineering into casino cabinets: the same reflex of reusing an existing technology in a new, differently regulated market. By 2006 Konami had split its digital-entertainment business into Konami Digital Entertainment and become a pure holding company, running games, fitness and casino gaming as three separately managed businesses with very different economics.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2007The mobile shift: falling revenue, rising profit

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2007 · consolidated
Revenue$2.2B
Net income$138M
Net margin6.2%
FY2020 · consolidated
Revenue$2.5B
Net income$185M
Net margin7.5%
  1. 2012Takuya Kozuki becomes president; Hudson absorbed into Konami Digital Entertainment
  2. 2013Mobile Powerful Pro Baseball (Pawapuro app) launches
  3. 2015Development reorganization; Hideo Kojima leaves. Renamed Konami Holdings
  4. 2019Konami Creative Center Ginza opens
  5. 2020Kimihiko Higashio becomes president; esports Ginza studio starts

In the early 2010s Konami rebuilt where its profit came from, moving the centre of gravity from packaged console games to free-to-play mobile. It fed proven franchises — the Powerful Pro Baseball app (2013), Yu-Gi-Oh! Duel Links — into a model that earns continuously through in-app spending rather than in a single sale, and the economics inverted: consolidated revenue shrank to about $2.2B (¥218bn) in the year ended March 2013, yet digital-entertainment segment profit climbed from $159.7M (¥17bn) to $396.7M (¥44bn). In June 2012 the founder’s son Takuya Kozuki became president and led the shift; the company renamed itself Konami Holdings in 2015.

The other two businesses framed the trade-off. The fitness-club arm carried heavy fixed costs and posted years of losses — a segment loss of $79.4M (¥8bn) as late as the year ended March 2008 — never approaching digital margins, while Konami Gaming held a stable North American casino business behind licensing barriers that keep rivals out. And in 2015 the efficiency drive turned visible: a development reorganization pushed star creator Hideo Kojima out, a break widely reported abroad that fixed a lasting image of Konami as a company indifferent to its creators. In December 2019 it consolidated scattered studios into the Konami Creative Center Ginza, with an attached esports arena, betting that concentrating developers in central Tokyo would answer both its development efficiency and its recruiting at once.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2021Digital entertainment leads: record profits

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports & corporate yearbooks
FY2021 · consolidated
Revenue$2.5B
Net income$293M
Net margin11.8%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$2.8B
Net income$498M
Net margin17.7%
  1. 2022Renamed Konami Group; Tokyo Studio opens at GINZA SIX
  2. 2023Konami Osaka Studio opens
  3. 2025Record results; Konami Arcade Games established

The pandemic settled which business was more resilient. In the year ended March 2021, lockdowns pushed the sports arm to a loss and constrained casino gaming, while digital entertainment surged on stay-at-home demand — and by the year ended March 2025 that division’s segment profit reached about $589.4M (¥88bn), roughly seven times its level a decade earlier. Group revenue hit a record $2.8B (¥422bn) with net profit of $498.5M (¥75bn), the best results in Konami’s history, and all three segments were profitable.

The growth rests on reusing intellectual property across media. Long-lived series — Yu-Gi-Oh!, Powerful Pro Baseball, eFootball (the renamed Winning Eleven), Pro Baseball Spirits — generate recurring spending that funds new development, and a single property is monetised across mobile, console, esports and trading cards at once. Behind it sits an unusually strong balance sheet: at the year ended March 2025, group equity of about $3.2B (¥482bn) gave an equity ratio above 70%, room to move on development and acquisitions. On that base Konami opened studios at GINZA SIX (2022) and in Osaka (2023), broke ground on a Tokyo Bay creative front, renamed itself Konami Group in 2022, and in 2025 set up Konami Arcade Games — the jukebox-repair shop of 1969 remade, over half a century, into an entertainment group built on creating and running IP.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1985

From arcade specialist to the home console: expanding on Nintendo’s platform (1985)

A bet from a market with a ceiling to a growing one

The crux of this decision was that Konami did not abandon its arcade business, already internationally recognised, but redeployed that development strength into a fast-growing new market. Arcade machines, which sell only by the location, have limited room for revenue to grow even when they are hits. Riding on another company’s platform — Nintendo’s — can be read as a bet that traded away part of the initiative over development in exchange for the fruit of sales volumes on an entirely different order. It was a judgment that chose the growth of market size over pride as a specialist maker.

In the end this bet defined the skeleton of Konami as an IP company. The series born in the late 1980s became assets to be monetised again and again, across generations of hardware and shifts in business model, connecting all the way to today’s revenue structure centred on mobile, operated IP. The 1985 entry can be called the first turning point at which a company that had begun as a specialist maker started to change its character into an “IP-centred company” bound to no particular hardware or line of business.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1999

Launching the Yu-Gi-Oh! Official Card Game: a new axis of IP revenue in paper cards (1999)

Konami’s lightness in carrying IP outside its core business

The core of this decision was that Konami left its main battlefield of video-game software and monetised its IP in an entirely different medium — paper cards. Stepping into the “Carddass” market that Bandai had commercialised first, as an official card game backed by its relationship with Shueisha, the original work’s publisher, showed a lightness that does not cling to the core business of a game maker. Just as with the 1985 move from the arcade to the home console, Konami used this entry to sharpen one more degree its character as a company that carries IP without fixating on any particular medium.

That said, primary sources showing who inside the company drove this decision, and how far, are scarce for 1999, and the decision-making process itself is still not fully documented today. Even so, the path by which a small new business in paper cards grew, over a quarter of a century, into one of the world’s largest trading-card-game brands — digital versions included — is the earliest embodiment of Konami’s management style of monetising a hit IP repeatedly, across the walls between media.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2015

Hideo Kojima’s departure and the mobile-first reallocation (2015)

Revenue efficiency versus the creator as a brand asset

The heart of this decision was not a response to a financial crisis but a reorganization of the development structure itself, measured by the yardstick of revenue efficiency. Against an operated mobile business earning tens of billions of yen a month, big-budget console development — heavy in cost and time, however high its critical acclaim — was forced into retreat in management’s order of priorities. Placing a flagship creator and his production organization outside the structure can be read as the most visible consequence of the mobile shift that advanced under president Takuya Kozuki, a member of the founding family.

Yet what this judgment produced cannot be measured by financial indicators alone. Hideo Kojima’s departure was widely reported by overseas media as well, and long shaped an image, within the games industry, of Konami as a company that makes light of its creators. How great a price the reorganization — a success in the numbers, in the profit growth of the digital-entertainment business — exacted on a different asset, the brand: that question still clings to any assessment of Konami’s thoroughly efficiency-driven management style today.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Konami Group full history in Japanese →

  1. Konami Group Corporation — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Nikkei — 日本経済新聞 (Nikkei Inc.), 2020.
  3. Nikkei — 日本経済新聞 (Nikkei Inc.), 30 January 2020. Nikkei online.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →