JTEKT

Company history

Financial history 1958–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1921
Head office
Kariya, Aichi (Osaka until 2021)
Listed
1949
Founders
Ikeda Zenichiro (Koyo Seiko) · Toyoda Kiichiro (Toyoda Machine Works)
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$12.2B (¥1.93tn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$75.9M (¥12bn)
JTEKT: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1921Two origins: an independent and a captive

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1958 · unconsolidated
Revenue$13M
Net income
Net margin
FY1979 · unconsolidated
Revenue$412M
Net income-$38M
Net margin-9.3%
  1. 1921Ikeda Zenichiro starts ball bearing production in Osaka
  2. 1923Japan’s first domestic tapered roller bearings
  3. 1941Toyoda Machine Works separated from Toyota Motor
  4. 1949Koyo Seiko lists in Osaka, Tokyo and Nagoya
  5. 1960Koyo begins steering development at Kokubu
  6. 1968Toyoda Machine Works starts power steering production
  7. 1979Koyo’s ¥6.9bn loss; board resigns, Toyota steps in

Ikeda Zenichiro, born on Shodoshima in 1896, went to Osaka at seventeen, studied design at night school, and around 1916 hung out the sign of Koyo Seiko in a small workshop to experiment with bearings. In January 1921, aged twenty-five, he built a plant in Ikuno, Osaka, and began producing ball bearings in earnest — the date JTEKT dates itself from. In 1923 the company mastered tapered roller bearings, then said to be impossible outside Timken, by switching to imported bearing steel and importing and modifying American grinders ahead of rivals; by 1927 it led domestic bearing output. It incorporated in 1935 and listed in Osaka, Tokyo and Nagoya in 1949 — an independent bearing specialist with no parent behind it.

Toyoda Machine Works began the opposite way. Mass-producing cars requires purpose-built machine tools, and Toyoda Kiichiro judged that Toyota had to make its own rather than wait for outside suppliers — accepting, as the company history records, that machine tools were a business that "does not make money" but was indispensable. Legislation forced the timing: a single company could not be covered by both the 1936 automobile law and the 1938 machine tool law, so the machine shop division had to be cut out. Toyoda Machine Works was separated from Toyota Motor in May 1941 and built its plant at Kariya. Where Koyo moved into car parts on its own initiative — prototyping steering at its Kokubu plant from 1960 — Toyoda Machine Works was inside its parent’s production plan from the first day, and reached steering from the other side, developing power steering in 1968.

Koyo’s independence broke at the end of the 1970s. Where NTN Toyo Bearing cut output 40% as soon as it fell into loss in FY1976, Koyo held profits and dividends a year longer and cut late — and in the year to March 1979 posted a net loss of ¥6.882bn against ¥8.869bn of accumulated deficit. The entire board resigned, and the company turned to Toyota Motor, its largest customer and a major shareholder. Toyota sent five executives including a new president, and a restructuring plan sold over ¥10bn of assets, closed the Tokyo and Takamatsu plants and cut some 1,200–1,300 jobs.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1980Inside the keiretsu, and the case for merging

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1980 · unconsolidated
Revenue$491M
Net income-$158M
Net margin-32.1%
FY2005 · consolidated
Revenue$5.2B
Net income$149M
Net margin2.9%
  1. 1980Capital reduction and share issue; Toyota becomes largest shareholder
  2. 1988TRW Koyo Steering Systems in North America
  3. 1993French steering operations at Irigny acquired
  4. 2002Favess founded for electric power steering
  5. 2005Koyo Seiko and Toyoda Machine Works agree to merge

In August 1980 Koyo Seiko wrote down three quarters of its capital, then issued 76 million new shares to Toyota Motor at ¥600 — making Toyota its largest shareholder. The Osaka independent became a keiretsu supplier, its decisions folded into Toyota’s procurement strategy. That capital tie is what later made the merger conceivable at all.

It also produced a duplication that grew for two decades. Koyo formed a North American steering joint venture with TRW in 1988; Toyoda Machine Works set up its own Tennessee steering venture in 1989. Koyo bought French steering operations at Irigny in 1993 and Dijon in 2000. Two Toyota-group companies were building parallel plant networks in the same regions for the same products, for the same customers.

The consolidation began in 2002, when Toyoda Machine Works, Toyota, Denso and Koyo jointly founded Favess to develop and sell electric power steering — an experimental merger in which engineers from both sides worked under one roof as hydraulic gave way to electric. The two companies agreed in principle to merge in February 2005 and combined in January 2006 as JTEKT, bringing bearings, machine tools and steering into one company, restoring a domestic bearing player alongside NSK and NTN, and settling the group’s steering business into a single firm.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2006JTEKT: scale first, integration later

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2006 · consolidated
Revenue$6.2B
Net income$234M
Net margin3.8%
FY2020 · consolidated
Revenue$13.3B
Net income-$62M
Net margin-0.5%
  1. 2006Merger completed; the company becomes JTEKT
  2. 2008Revenue ¥1,157.6bn — the post-merger peak
  3. 2009Timken’s needle bearing business acquired
  4. 2017Sona Koyo (India) and Fuji Kiko acquired
  5. 2018Revenue peaks at ¥1,441.2bn
  6. 2020Second post-merger net loss; Sato Kazuhiro becomes president

The merged company hit ¥1,157.6bn of revenue and ¥77.6bn of operating profit in the year to March 2008, then took the full force of the financial crisis: FY2009 operating profit fell to ¥22.4bn with a ¥12.0bn net loss, and FY2010 brought ¥769.7bn of revenue, ¥0.4bn of operating profit and a ¥19.4bn net loss. Fixed costs and overseas plants built for an expanding market became the problem when demand halved.

In the middle of those two loss years, JTEKT agreed to buy Timken’s needle bearing business, closing in December 2009 — twelve plants in seven countries and 3,400 people, in the one product category it lacked for world leadership in automotive bearings. Recovery validated the arithmetic: ¥955.4bn of revenue and ¥39.9bn of operating profit in FY2011, ¥1,355.9bn and ¥74.1bn by FY2015.

Under Agata Tetsuo, president from 2013, acquisition continued — Sona Koyo Steering Systems in India in 2017, Fuji Kiko for steering columns the same year, Daibea in 2019, Yutaka Seimitsu in 2020. Revenue peaked at ¥1,441.2bn in FY2018 before global auto adjustment and trade friction pulled operating profit down to ¥37.6bn and a ¥3.8bn net loss in FY2020, and further to ¥15.9bn of operating profit in FY2021. What had not been resolved through all of it was how three asset-heavy businesses — bearings, machine tools, steering — were supposed to be run as one.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2021One name, three businesses, one unanswered question

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2021 · consolidated
Revenue$11.4B
Net income$7M
Net margin0.1%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$12.6B
Net income$92M
Net margin0.7%
  1. 2021Head office moves from Osaka to Kariya
  2. 2022KOYO and TOYODA brands unified as JTEKT
  3. 2024Kondo Yoshito becomes president
  4. 2024Revenue ¥1,891.5bn — a post-merger high
  5. 20242030 vision: ROE/PBR targets, US and European restructuring

In June 2021 the registered head office moved from Osaka to Kariya, Aichi — fifteen years after the merger — and in April 2022 the KOYO and TOYODA brands were unified as JTEKT, sixteen years after. The external traces of the two predecessor companies were finally gone, which had the effect of exposing the internal question that remained.

Results recovered: ¥1,678.1bn of revenue and ¥62.6bn of operating profit in FY2023, ¥1,891.5bn and ¥72.8bn in FY2024, the highest revenue since the merger, with automotive at ¥1,344.4bn against ¥358.0bn in industrial and bearings and ¥188.9bn in machine tools. But high turnover at North American plants kept production unstable, and the company said publicly it would plan on that continuing and build systems that depend less on people.

Kondo Yoshito, appointed president in 2024 and the first career production-engineering insider in the role, opened by saying plainly that he could not find a single phrase expressing the company’s value to society — that holding too many technologies had left it without one face. His 2030 vision names that problem directly: shift from a reactive to an active business model, improve ROE and PBR after years of trading below book, sell down cross-shareholdings, and restructure the North American and European operations whose duplicated footprints date back to the years before the merger.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1979

Koyo Seiko’s huge loss, the appeal to Toyota, and the share issue (1979)

What was gained in exchange for letting independence go

At the centre of this decision was not the loss itself but the fact of delay. Where a competitor moved to cut output 40% at the same time as its loss in the year to March 1976, Koyo Seiko stayed in profit until the year to March 1977 and was a year late in suspending its dividend. The longer it managed without letting the deterioration show, the less room it had left to right itself once it did act. The resignation of the entire board and the appeal for support were also an act of disclosing management failure to the outside world — a painful choice for a distinguished independent.

That said, looking at the quarter-century that followed, what this choice gave Koyo Seiko was more than rescue. With Toyota’s capital and production management inside it, the company grew more firmly into an auto parts maker and became the side that expanded steering operations into Europe and North America. Entering the keiretsu came at the cost of reduced autonomy, but without that capital relationship the 2006 merger would not have been possible either. How far to go on one’s own in a crisis, and from what point to accept another company’s capital and methods — that question remains exactly as it was in a parts industry where keiretsu restructuring continues today.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2005

Merging Koyo Seiko and Toyoda Machine Works into JTEKT (2005)

A merger to remove duplication, and a company that never fully mixed

The logic of this merger was clear. Two companies were making the same products on separate equipment and delivering them to customers through separate overseas sites — erase that duplication and development, purchasing and production could all be unified. Sharing a single parent in the Toyota group can be seen as having accelerated the decision. In fact the top position worldwide in steering continued, and the ¥1 trillion revenue target was reached ahead of its deadline. Measured in numbers, the effect of integration appeared in a form that can be explained.

But a company becoming one and businesses mixing into one were different things. It took sixteen years for the domestic business brands to be unified and fifteen for the head office to move to Kariya, and even after that the fusion of the three businesses remains a theme of the management plan. The difference in origin between a 1921 Osaka bearing specialist and a 1941 machine tool maker directly descended from Toyota does not appear to have vanished merely by aligning the corporate name. Removing duplication is complete on the day of the merger; the question of how to run different businesses as one body may be the thing that begins that day.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2009

Buying Timken’s needle bearing business during two loss years (2009)

Buying at the bottom, and making what you bought work

Committing ¥29bn in the middle of two consecutive years of net loss is hard to explain from the results alone. That the acquisition went ahead can be read as reflecting the position of needle bearings — the missing item, unavoidable if the company was to aim for the top of the world in automotive bearings. Chasing a field growing with fuel-efficient vehicles through its own investment would have meant building plants and engineers from scratch. Taking on twelve operating plants and 3,400 people in a single package fitted the price conditions of a demand trough.

What you get by buying, however, is assets and people, not the ability to run them. JTEKT had merged two companies only three years earlier and already carried a doubled network of sites in North America and Europe. Adding twelve plants in seven countries meant that the objects requiring integration in fact increased. That instability in North American production was still being discussed at earnings briefings more than ten years later shows that, quite apart from whether the acquisition was well or badly executed, a decision to add sites leaves a long-lasting load on operating capability on the shop floor. Rather than whether it was bought cheaply, the question this decision left behind may be how many years it takes to put what was bought onto the company’s own production system.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— JTEKT full history in Japanese →

  1. JTEKT Corporation — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Twenty Years of Toyoda Machine Works『豊田工機二十年』, Toyoda Machine Works, 1961.
  3. Fifty Years of Koyo Seiko『光洋精工50年史』, Koyo Seiko, 1969.
  4. Keizai Tenbo — 経済展望, July 1979; Ginko Jihyo — 銀行時評, September 1979.
  5. JTEKT — earnings briefings (決算説明会), FY2023.
  6. Full Japanese edition, with fuller detail and per-decision pages: the-shashi.com/tse/6473/.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

JTEKT’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/6473/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/6473/history.json History overview
GET /api/6473/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/6473/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/6473/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/6473/executives.json Executives
GET /api/6473/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/6473/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/6473/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/6473/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/6473/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/6473/workforce.json Workforce