The full mining lineup: acquiring America’s Joy Global (2016)
Two pillars — construction and mining equipment
At the centre of this acquisition was a sense of timing: to buy into a domain it did not hold precisely at the trough of the resource cycle. Demand for mining equipment swings with resource prices, and when the market runs high, acquisition prices swell with it. To commit about $2.8B (¥300bn) at a time when the market had sunk and Joy Global’s sales were below the prior year carried the colour of a contrarian bet — buying with the trough of demand priced in. The aim — assembling all at once the ultra-large machines it had lacked and standing on the same ground as Caterpillar — showed up, for the time being, in results once the market recovered.
That said, taking on mining equipment whole was also a choice to hold, alongside construction equipment, a business that swings in step with resource prices. How to divide limited capital and managerial attention between the two pillars of construction and mining equipment, and how to smooth the troughs and peaks of the market, remains a question even after the full lineup was achieved. Seen together with the move to raise the weight of parts and services to soften the market’s swings, absorbing Joy Global brought Komatsu two sides at once — an expansion of scale and a widening of the swing in earnings.
Revenue and net margin, FY2011–FY2021
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY2016 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Komatsu
- 1956 Breaking the dependence on artillery shells: the pivot to bulldozers (1956)
- 1961 The Maru-A campaign: meeting Caterpillar on quality alone (1961)
- 1968 A late entry into hydraulic excavators, and Komatsu-Bucyrus (1968)
- 1993 The “beyond construction equipment” diversification and the first consolidated loss (1993)
- 2001 Sakane’s “Dantotsu” reform and the V-shaped recovery (2001)
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
Disclaimer
- This page is provided for general information only and is not investment advice, nor a recommendation to buy or sell any security.
- Figures are compiled independently and include our own estimates, approximations and machine-processed data; we make no warranty as to their accuracy or completeness.
- Sources are primarily each company’s securities reports and other public filings, but errors and omissions may remain.
- Any use of this information is at the reader’s own risk. Past performance does not indicate future results.
- Company names, logos and other marks belong to their respective owners.
Data API
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Full specification →
| Method | Endpoint | Returns |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/companies.json | All companies |
| GET | /api/6301/manifest.json | Resource index |
| GET | /api/6301/history.json | History overview |
| GET | /api/6301/timeline.json | Chronology |
| GET | /api/decisions.json | All management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/6301/decisions.json | Management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/6301/decisions/{slug}.json | One decision (full dossier) |
| GET | /api/6301/executives.json | Executives |
| GET | /api/6301/shareholders.json | Major shareholders |
| GET | /api/6301/financials.json | Financial statements |
| GET | /api/6301/financials-longterm.json | Long-term results |
| GET | /api/6301/segments.json | Business segments |
| GET | /api/6301/regions.json | Sales by region |
| GET | /api/6301/workforce.json | Workforce |