Mitsubishi Materials

Company history

Financial history 1971–2026 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1918
Head office
Tokyo, Japan
Listed
1950
Founder
Mitsubishi zaibatsu
Revenue · FYE Mar 2026
$11.7B (¥1.84tn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2026
$256.7M (¥41bn)
Mitsubishi Materials: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1873The resource arm of a zaibatsu

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1873Mitsubishi Shokai buys the Yoshioka mine in Okayama
  2. 1887Acquires the Osarizawa mine
  3. 1896Acquires the Ikuno and Akenobe mines
  4. 1918Mining division spun off as Mitsubishi Mining
  5. 1942Tokyo Metal Industry — the first fabrication plant
  6. 1948Designated under the Deconcentration Law

The company begins in a policy, not a hunch. As the Meiji government sold its state-run mines into private hands, Mitsubishi Shokai bought the Yoshioka mine in Okayama in 1873 and entered metal mining; Osarizawa followed in 1887, Ikuno and Akenobe in 1896. Coal came with it — Oyubari, Takashima, Hashima — and by the early twentieth century Mitsubishi held one of the largest non-ferrous mining networks in Japan. In 1918 the mining division was spun out as Mitsubishi Mining, a core company of the zaibatsu whose metals and coal fed the state as much as the market.

War pulled it downstream. To meet military and heavy-industry demand, Mitsubishi Mining built metal-processing plants in quick succession — Tokyo Metal Industry in February 1942 (today the Oi works), Niigata Metal Industry in January 1944, a non-ferrous works in April 1945 (today Okegawa). These fabrication sites, not the mines, would become the operating base of the postwar company.

Then the zaibatsu was taken apart. Mitsubishi Mining was designated under the Deconcentration Law in February 1948, and in 1950 the company was split along its two materials: coal stayed with Mitsubishi Mining, while the non-ferrous business — mines, smelters and fabrication together — was cut loose as a successor firm. It was a separation that would take forty years to reverse.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1950Three pillars: mines, smelters, fabrication

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1971 · unconsolidated
Revenue$419M
Net income$8M
Net margin1.8%
FY1971 · unconsolidated
Revenue$419M
Net income$8M
Net margin1.8%
  1. 1950Non-ferrous business separated as Taihei Mining
  2. 1952Renamed Mitsubishi Metal Mining
  3. 1953Akita smelter opens
  4. 1962Mitsubishi Reynolds Aluminium, with Reynolds Metals
  5. 1963Onahama Smelting founded
  6. 1968Sales of $133M (¥48bn); a 10% dividend held

The non-ferrous successor started in 1950 as Taihei Mining, capitalised at $1.9M (¥700m) and carrying the whole of the mining, smelting and fabrication assets. It was renamed Mitsubishi Metal Mining in December 1952 and later simply Mitsubishi Metal, running on prewar technique and prewar mining know-how. Its four principal mines — Osarizawa, Hosokura, Ikuno, Akenobe — each employed thousands of people and each anchored a company town. That was the strength of the business, and the thing that would make shrinking it so slow.

Through the 1950s and 1960s the company thickened all three pillars: the Akita smelter in December 1953, the Myoho mine bought in October 1954, Mitsubishi Reynolds Aluminium with the American Reynolds Metals in January 1962, Onahama Smelting in December 1963. It also stepped outside non-ferrous metals for the first time, tying up with Germany's Walter to form Mitsubishi Walter Tools and entering cemented-carbide cutting tools — at the time a minor complement to a business still built on mines.

By the year to March 1968, with the loss-making mining division pared back and the Okegawa plant out of the red, sales reached $133M (¥48bn) and after-tax profit $2.3M (¥830m), enough to sustain a 10% dividend. The carbide-tool investment looked marginal then. It was in fact the hedge that would carry the company once the mines went.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1972Fifteen years of closing the mines

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1972 · unconsolidated
Revenue$420M
Net income$4M
Net margin1%
FY1989 · consolidated
Revenue$6.2B
Net income$83M
Net margin1.3%
  1. 1972Phased closure of the domestic mines begins
  2. 1973Ikuno mine closes
  3. 1978Osarizawa mine closes
  4. 1985Plaza Accord accelerates the yen
  5. 1987The last four mines close — the retreat completed

The 1971 Nixon shock pushed the yen up while ore grades fell, and Japanese mines stopped paying. Mitsubishi Metal began closing them in 1972 — first hiving off Shimokawa, Furutobe, Matsuki, Hosokura and Akenobe as subsidiaries, then shutting Ikuno in 1973 and Osarizawa in 1978. After the 1985 Plaza Accord drove the yen higher still, the last four mines closed across 1986 and 1987. The retreat had taken fifteen years.

The length was the policy. Closing all of them at once would have destroyed the local economies the mines supported, so the company built processing plants on the vacated sites and let the transition run slowly. What the organisation learned in the process — how to wind down an unprofitable business on a decade-long clock rather than a quarterly one — became a permanent habit of management.

It also, paradoxically, made a merger possible. Only once the mines and the collieries were finally settled did the two halves separated in 1950 fit back together. President Fujimura Masaya later observed that earlier generations of leaders had always wanted to reunite the companies but had never had the conditions for it. Contraction, not growth, supplied them: in February 1990 Mitsubishi Metal and Mitsubishi Mining & Cement merged.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1990A materials conglomerate, and what it hid

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY1990 · consolidated
Revenue$5.4B
Net income$104M
Net margin1.9%
FY2017 · consolidated
Revenue$11.6B
Net income$252M
Net margin2.2%
  1. 1990Mitsubishi Metal and Mitsubishi Mining & Cement merge
  2. 1992Consolidated sales of $9.2B (¥1.17tn)
  3. 2002Silicon wafers merged with Sumitomo Metal — today SUMCO
  4. 2004A third straight year of net losses
  5. 2017Falsified quality data disclosed at group companies

The merger of February 1990 created Mitsubishi Materials and put the non-ferrous metals and cement of the old Mitsubishi Mining back under one roof after some forty years apart. Consolidated sales reached $9.2B (¥1.17tn) in the year to March 1992, on three main legs — smelting, cement and cemented-carbide tools — and the long-range plan “MAX21” set a ten-year target of ¥1.8 trillion. The direction was addition.

Some of it worked and some did not. Silicon wafers were merged with Sumitomo Metal Industries in 2002 to create what is now SUMCO, giving the company real weight in large-diameter wafers; a planned copper smelter in Texas was killed by local environmental opposition. Three consecutive years of net losses through the year to March 2004 showed how heavily commodity prices and portfolio weight bore on results.

Underneath, the group had grown to roughly 200 companies — smelting, cement, carbide tools, electronic materials, components, energy. Breadth cushioned the swings of any one market, but it also put more distance between the executive floor and the edges of the business than the executive floor could see across. In December 2017 that distance surfaced as falsified quality data at group subsidiaries; in 2019 a subsidiary, Universal Can, was fined $94.5M (¥10bn) for antitrust violations, and the year to March 2020 carried an extraordinary loss of $97.4M (¥10bn). The conclusion drawn inside the company was not that individual controls had failed but that the portfolio itself had to be cut back.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2018Narrowing to copper and carbide

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2018 · consolidated
Revenue$14.5B
Net income$313M
Net margin2.2%
FY2026 · consolidated
Revenue$11.7B
Net income$257M
Net margin2.2%
  1. 2018Ono Naoki becomes president
  2. 2020Mid-term strategy; Mitsubishi Hitachi Tool acquired; Diamet sold
  3. 2022Cement moved into UBE Mitsubishi Cement; Universal Can sold
  4. 2025Tanaka Tetsuya becomes president; copper smelting to be consolidated into Pan Pacific Copper

Ono Naoki became president in 2018 and published a three-year mid-term strategy in March 2020 that named four businesses to be shrunk — sintered parts, copper tube, cement and aluminium. The sintered-parts maker Diamet was sold in December 2020 against a restructuring loss of $196.7M (¥21bn); Universal Can went in 2022, ending the can business outright. Resources came back the other way into cemented-carbide tools, where the acquisition of Mitsubishi Hitachi Tool was settled in April 2020, adding end mills and die-machining tools to the range. Tungsten supply was managed the same way: the recycled-feedstock share of about 70% inherited with H.C. Starck became the lever for reducing dependence on China.

The largest reversal was cement. In April 2022 the business acquired in the 1990 merger was moved into UBE Mitsubishi Cement, a 50-50 venture with Ube Industries — the end of a separation that had run in stages since the 1998 sales tie-up, twenty-four years in all. Closing the Aomori plant and idling kilns cost Mitsubishi Materials an equity-method loss of $59.1M (¥8bn) in the year to March 2023. Giving up cement rewrote the company's own definition of itself.

Copper is now going the same way. Terms of trade for smelters — the treatment and refining charges paid when buying concentrate — deteriorated badly, and a company carrying that purchasing risk alone could not hold its margins. On 11 November 2025 Mitsubishi Materials agreed in principle with JX Metals, Mitsui Mining & Smelting and Marubeni to consolidate concentrate purchasing and electrolytic copper sales into Pan Pacific Copper; on the 26th, President Tanaka Tetsuya, appointed that April, set out a mid-term strategy built on resource circulation and the expansion of secondary-feedstock smelting. Thirty-five years after a merger meant to make it comprehensive, the company is deliberately becoming a specialist.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2017

Falsified quality data at subsidiaries comes to light (2017)

What tampering at the periphery put in question

At the centre of this affair was a slackening of quality that had settled at the edge of a group grown by addition in pursuit of scale. Measured against a parent approaching ¥1.5 trillion in consolidated sales, a subsidiary with ¥30 billion of revenue was a small thing. But what customers were paying for was the reliability of Japanese manufacturing itself, and when the rot was found at the periphery, size appeared less as strength than as the flip side of control that did not reach. The dullness of continuing to ship for eight months after the tampering was known reflects how far management had held the periphery at arm's length.

There is an irony in what followed, since the crisis is what prompted the narrowing. Without the quality scandal, the review of an overgrown portfolio might not have moved nearly so fast. Through a change at the top and a governance overhaul, Mitsubishi Materials moved toward questioning its own definition as a comprehensive materials maker. That misconduct became the trigger for reform leaves a question common to every diversified company: how far the periphery is something you take on as part of yourself.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2020

A mid-term strategy that swaps out the business portfolio (2020)

Not scale, but which mix of businesses lets its strengths work

The heart of this decision lies not in the skill of any single disposal or acquisition but in reworking the yardstick by which businesses were judged. Since the 1990 merger, Mitsubishi Materials had expanded under the banner of scale into a comprehensive materials maker, and that expansion had bred two distortions at once — earnings that swung with commodity markets, and control that did not extend to the edges. The quality scandal was the crisis that pushed those distortions out into the open, and the mid-term strategy can be read as the moment the company switched to choosing businesses by capital efficiency and manageability rather than by size. In that the crisis catalysed the reform, misconduct response and growth strategy were inseparable in this decision.

The swap was not painless. Diamet, the sintered-parts subsidiary it exited, filed for civil rehabilitation shortly after the sale, and the fact that the buyer was an investment fund said something about the weight of the aftermath. Aluminium and cement meant handing outside businesses run for nearly half a century, or acquired in the merger itself, with real consequences for customers and employees. Even so, the posture of narrowing to focus businesses and asking what capital efficiency they earn carried forward into “Mid-term Management Strategy 2030,” the shift to an in-house company system, and the convergence toward a specialist firm built on metals, copper processing and electronic materials. Rather than chase scale, ask which composition of businesses actually lets your strengths work — the significance of this decision is that it stepped into that question from a starting point of crisis.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Mitsubishi Materials full history in Japanese →

  1. Mitsubishi Materials Corporation — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Kigyo no Rekishi: Meiji Hyakunen『企業の歴史 : 明治百年』, the chapter on Mitsubishi Metal Mining (三菱金属鉱業); Keizai Shunjusha, 1968.
  3. Mitsubishi Materials Corporation — mid-term management strategy briefings (中期経営戦略), March 2020 and 26 November 2025.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Mitsubishi Materials’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/5711/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/5711/history.json History overview
GET /api/5711/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/5711/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/5711/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/5711/executives.json Executives
GET /api/5711/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/5711/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/5711/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/5711/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/5711/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/5711/workforce.json Workforce