Firestone’s defective-tire crisis and the mass recall (2000)
How far to fold an acquired company into your own control
The heart of this episode lay less in the product accident itself than in a gap in consolidated governance: the authority delegated to an overseas subsidiary, and the risk information held within it, never reached the top of the company. Bridgestone had been held up as a success story of Japanese globalization, but ruling a subsidiary through capital and gripping the risks buried on its shop floor from headquarters were two different problems. Twelve years after the acquisition, the disconnection of information that had piled up behind local autonomy dulled the company’s response in the crucial early days.
President Kaizaki wielded a strong hand to contain the situation — ordering the voluntary recall and dispatching directors — yet stepped down while denying that he was taking responsibility for it. His forceful rebuttals of Ford were needed to dispel suspicion, but they also carried the cost of losing a long-standing customer. How far to fold an acquired company into your own control — Firestone’s defective-tire crisis remains a case that showed, painfully, that the success or failure of a large acquisition is decided by the depth of integration.
Revenue and net margin, FY1995–FY2005
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY2000 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Bridgestone
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
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Data API
Bridgestone’s history, financials, executives and
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| Method | Endpoint | Returns |
|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/companies.json | All companies |
| GET | /api/5108/manifest.json | Resource index |
| GET | /api/5108/history.json | History overview |
| GET | /api/5108/timeline.json | Chronology |
| GET | /api/decisions.json | All management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/5108/decisions.json | Management decisions (index) |
| GET | /api/5108/decisions/{slug}.json | One decision (full dossier) |
| GET | /api/5108/executives.json | Executives |
| GET | /api/5108/shareholders.json | Major shareholders |
| GET | /api/5108/financials.json | Financial statements |
| GET | /api/5108/financials-longterm.json | Long-term results |
| GET | /api/5108/segments.json | Business segments |
| GET | /api/5108/regions.json | Sales by region |
| GET | /api/5108/workforce.json | Workforce |