Letting go of resale-price maintenance (1997)
The courage to let go of 70 years of price control, and the void it left
The heart of this decision lies less in complying with a regulation than in the fact that, with the option of fighting the Fair Trade Commission open to him, President Fukuhara chose not to fight — deciding instead to turn the strength he would have spent on defence toward reform. Like the 1987 sweep that recalled the sales companies’ stranded inventory and severed the high-growth model of volume expansion, it was a decision to face the reality of distribution head-on rather than defer the pain. By letting go of seventy years of price control, Shiseido at last stood on the ground of open-market competition.
Yet the very length of the years spent protected by the system rebounded as a poverty of adaptability to competition. An organization with no experience of moving prices fell behind the normalization of discounting and the rise of low-price brands, and was struck through the void of a price band it had left thin. The competition the abolition made possible also summoned the next problems — a proliferation of brands and a worsening of profit efficiency — and led straight into the brand consolidation and chain-store revival of the 2000s. The courage to choose reform over a fight was right, but the substance of the reform would need more time yet to catch up with the competition.
Revenue and net margin, FY1990–FY2000
Revenue in ¥ bn (bars) and net margin in % (line), for the years around the decision. Shaded columns are FY1995 onwards — after it was taken.
Source: securities reports
Read the full dossier in Japanese →
The Japanese edition carries the complete record of this decision — the situation that forced it, the options weighed, what actually followed, and the sources behind every claim.
Other key decisions at Shiseido
- 1923 Building the chain-store / sales-company system (1923)
- 2001 Brand consolidation and chain-store revival (2001)
- 2006 The megabrand strategy and the bet on Tsubaki (2006)
- 2014 Recruiting an outside professional manager, Masahiko Uotani, and “VISION 2020” (2014)
- 2021 Selling the personal-care business (2021)
- 2025 Record-scale losses and structural reform (2025)
Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; the revenue chart is shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →
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