JustSystems

Company history

Financial history 2006–2025 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
1979
Head office
Tokushima, Japan (dual with Tokyo)
Listed
1997 (JASDAQ)
Founders
Ukigawa Kazunori · Ukigawa Hatsuko
Revenue · FYE Mar 2025
$298M (¥45bn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2025
$82.2M (¥12bn)
JustSystems: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

1979The problem only Japan had

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
  1. 1979Founded in a converted sitting room in Tokushima
  2. 1982KTIS announced — the ancestor of ATOK
  3. 1985Ichitaro ships and takes the market lead
  4. 1991Revenue near ¥9.7bn; headcount about 500

In July 1979 Ukigawa Kazunori quit the marine electrical maker where he had spent six years — “a salaryman can’t support a family” — and started a business in Tokushima with his wife Hatsuko, in an office converted from her family’s sitting room. They began as a dealer for Toshiba office computers, chosen specifically because Toshiba’s kanji handling was the most advanced available. The premise was already the company’s whole strategy: when every Japanese person eventually uses a computer, the thing that will matter is Japanese, and above all kanji. Two founders in a provincial city, in an industry that lived in Tokyo and Osaka, was an unusual starting point. They incorporated in June 1981.

Early revenue came from business software for narrow trades — feed-formulation management for dairy farmers, a sales system for greenhouse film, which Hatsuko specified so thoroughly by listening to the customer that it needed no revision for seven years and made the firm’s local reputation. The 1983 word processor that preceded Ichitaro was released under ASCII’s brand, because ASCII held the trademark, and the staff took it badly. But in October 1982 the company had already announced KTIS, the kana-kanji conversion system that became ATOK — “Advanced Technology Of Kana-kanji transfer” — turning romaji and kana keystrokes into mixed kanji text at a genuinely usable standard. It was the hard, specifically Japanese problem that Western word processors did not have to solve, and it made a small Tokushima developer technically conspicuous.

In August 1985 Ichitaro shipped with ATOK inside it, and took the leading share of Japan’s PC word-processor market — government offices, schools, ordinary companies — a position it held until Microsoft Office arrived in earnest in the late 1990s. Revenue went from ¥900m in the year to April 1986 to a projected ¥9.7bn five years later, and headcount from 28 to about 500. It was not smooth: the fourth version slipped twice, then shipped with a defect that forced a recall of 160,000 copies. Ukigawa took the blame publicly as his own misjudgement of the release date, and the honesty, plus the ambition of the revision itself, ended up raising Ichitaro’s standing rather than damaging it. Sales offices followed in Osaka, Tokyo and Nagoya while development stayed in Tokushima.

Read the full history in Japanese →


1997Sizing the company against Microsoft

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2006 · unconsolidated
Revenue$105M
Net income-$8M
Net margin-7.4%
FY2008 · unconsolidated
Revenue$141M
Net income-$46M
Net margin-32.9%
  1. 1997New Tokushima head office; JASDAQ listing
  2. 1998Ichitaro Office 8 misses badly — the first loss
  3. 1998Sony invests $9.7M (¥1bn) for 6.7%
  4. 1999Ichitaro Smile — the first product for schools

In June 1997 JustSystems completed a $86.8M (¥11bn) head office in Tokushima, and in October it listed on JASDAQ after nearly six years of preparation. The two events were connected in a way that proved fatal: bank borrowings had gone from ¥3.1bn to ¥11.1bn in a single year to fund the building, and the repayment plan rested on the listing plus the September launch of Ichitaro Office 8, an office suite built to meet Microsoft head-on. The listing raised only ¥7.5bn at a book-built opening price of ¥2,500, most of which went straight to debt. Office 8 was planned at 1.8 million copies and ¥17.0bn; it sold 800,000 and ¥7.4bn.

The year to March 1998 produced the first loss in the company’s history — revenue of ¥24.0bn against a ¥36.4bn forecast, and a ¥4.5bn loss where ¥3.0bn of profit had been expected. Ukigawa’s own verdict was that “the wish to beat Microsoft, our greatest rival, grew too strong,” and that in fighting a campaign explicitly aimed at killing Ichitaro he had lost sight of what made Ichitaro good. The company cut headcount from 1,700, contractors included, to around 1,000 and stripped ¥7.5bn of costs. In January 1998 Ukigawa went to see Sony’s Idei Nobuyuki personally and came away with $9.7M (¥1bn), making Sony the fourth-largest shareholder at 6.7% — a stake small enough that independence survived.

The market went anyway. Ichitaro peaked at 3.94 million copies in fiscal 1996; PC bundling deals fell from 1.4 million units to zero, and losses ran three years straight. The company hunted for replacements — an internet access business spun out in 2000, the ConceptBase natural-language search product that had been conceived nearly twenty years earlier and only shipped in late 1997 (“the stronger Ichitaro was, the harder it was to germinate the next business,” Ukigawa said), the Just MyShop direct e-commerce site in 2001, online storage in 2003, and the XMetaL XML editing business bought from Canada in 2006. One of these mattered more than it looked: Ichitaro Smile, a word processor for primary-school children released in June 1999, put the company inside the classroom.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2009Everything changes except the name

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2009 · unconsolidated
Revenue$153M
Net income-$19M
Net margin-12.6%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$298M
Net income$82M
Net margin27.6%
  1. 2009Keyence takes ~44%; the founders leave
  2. 2012Smile Zemi launches on a dedicated tablet
  3. 2014Moves from JASDAQ to the TSE First Section
  4. 2025¥18.0bn operating profit; Smile Zemi launches in the US

In April 2009, facing another loss and without the cash to rebuild alone, JustSystems allotted $48.1M (¥5bn) of new shares to Keyence, which became the largest shareholder with about 44% and the majority of the board. The Ukigawas left that year — the sticking point was not the shareholding but the basic-research team, which Kazunori would not release — and Fukura Tomoaki, then a managing director, became president. Thirty years in, the company left the founding family’s hands, and Keyence alumni, including Sekinada Kyotaro, took over the running of it.

What the new management did was change what the company sold. In December 2012 it launched Smile Zemi, a correspondence-learning service delivered on a dedicated tablet, extended to middle-school students the next year. The move worked because the foundation already existed: after thirteen years of making the learning software used in roughly 80% of Japan’s public primary schools, the company knew how children handle a screen. What it lacked was a customer — the household — and a way to bill every month, and building its own tablet rather than shipping an app on a general-purpose one solved both at once. Tokyo became a second head office in 2013, and in February 2014 the shares moved from JASDAQ to the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.

The result is a company whose contents have been swapped out while nothing on the outside moved. In the year to March 2025 operating profit was ¥18.0bn on a margin above 30%, earned not by Ichitaro or ATOK — both of which still exist — but by subscription education. In May 2025 Smile Zemi opened in the United States at kindergarten level, the first serious overseas service in the company’s history and the first real test of whether a system built for Japanese households transfers to a different language and school system. Forty-six years after two people started selling office computers in Tokushima, the name, the listing and the head office are the same, and the product is not.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY1998

The first loss after Ichitaro Office 8, the job cuts and Sony’s investment (1998)

A repayment plan entrusted to 1.8 million copies

What was put in question in 1998 was not how to rebuild a product but how to decide the size of a company. The new head office completed in June 1997 cost ¥10.5bn, bank borrowings rose in one year from ¥3.1bn to ¥11.1bn, and their repayment had been entrusted to the over-the-counter listing that October and to the sales of Ichitaro Office 8, launched in September. The listing brought in ¥7.5bn; Office 8, against a target raised in November to 1.8 million copies, reached 770,000. When two premises failed at the same time, what collapsed was not the product’s economics but the path of repayment.

That said, placing Microsoft at the centre of its reckoning was also what gave the company the strength to field a full line. It could enter the office-suite market as the last arrival only because it had built everything itself down to the Sanshiro spreadsheet, and that line-up had been added to for the reason that the opponent had one. What president Ukigawa Kazunori regretted about the intensity of his rivalry concerned the products — but the same rivalry had also set the size of the company at 1,700 people including contractors. What remained after the cut to a little over 1,000 and ¥7.5bn of cost reduction was a yardstick the company had not previously possessed: measuring its own scale by the number of copies it could sell, rather than by another company’s catalogue.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2009

Allotting ¥4.5bn of shares to Keyence — 40% of the votes and control (2009)

What ¥4.5bn bought

The ¥4.5bn of 2009 was sufficient as a sum to fill the funding gap. What was handed over in exchange, however, was 40% of the shares and a majority of the board. The investment the same company received from Sony in 1998 was about ¥1.2bn, the shareholding stayed at 6.7%, and independence was preserved. That eleven years later it could not extract the same terms was because several years of development spending on xfy had gone unrecovered when it ran into the funding environment after the financial crisis. The depth of the crisis, one may read, simply set the terms.

For the founder, the fork in the road was not the shareholding ratio but the treatment of the basic-research team. Ukigawa Kazunori, believing he could not let his engineers go, left the company, and set up a new one the day after resigning. The JustSystems left behind squeezed its costs back to profit and over the following decade grew correspondence education and corporate cloud services until revenue had tripled. The company that stepped down from carrying basic research in-house grew; the man who decided to carry it rebuilt it at another company. What ¥4.5bn bought and sold was shares, not a verdict on which of the two choices was right.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2012

Smile Zemi: putting a dedicated tablet in the home and ending the packaged-software business (2012)

Choosing to make the device yourself

What makes the Smile Zemi decision different from an ordinary new venture is that the foundation already existed inside the company. For a firm that had spent thirteen years making the learning software used by roughly 80% of Japan’s public primary schools, the grammar of a screen a child operates was not borrowed. What was missing were two things — the household as a customer, and a mechanism for receiving payment every month — and a dedicated tablet filled both at once. The outline of this judgment lies in not choosing to put an app on a general-purpose tablet, and instead taking on the burden of supplying the device itself.

A company that could not defend Ichitaro earned the largest profits in its history from a business that does not use it. One could also say that a company which lost its basic-research corps in 2009 recovered on the unglamorous accumulation of thirteen years in classrooms. JustSystems as a packaged-software company reached a dead end once in the 2000s, and walked through the 2010s as a company selling correspondence education and corporate cloud services. The name, the listing and the Tokushima head office have not moved; only what it sells has been replaced.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— JustSystems full history in Japanese →

  1. JustSystems Corporation — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Nikkei Business — 日経ビジネス (Nikkei BP): 15 Jul 1991 (Ukigawa Kazunori profile); 13 Sep 1993 (Ukigawa Hatsuko on developing Ichitaro); 9 Mar 1998 (“the defeated general speaks” — Ukigawa on the first loss).
  3. Weekly Toyo Keizai — 週刊東洋経済: 1 Nov 1997 (will Ichitaro Office 8 sell?); 13 Jun 1998 (on the Sony investment); 4 Jul 1998 (company analysis — the choices for rebuilding).

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

JustSystems’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/4686/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/4686/history.json History overview
GET /api/4686/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/4686/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/4686/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/4686/executives.json Executives
GET /api/4686/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/4686/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/4686/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/4686/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/4686/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/4686/workforce.json Workforce