Iida Group Holdings

Company history

Financial history 2014–2025 — revenue, cost structure, balance sheet, cash flow and key ratios, year by year →

Founded
2013
Head office
Nishitokyo, Tokyo, Japan
Listed
2013
Formed by
Joint share transfer of six power builders
Revenue · FYE Mar 2025
$9.8B (¥1.46tn)
Net profit · FYE Mar 2025
$338.8M (¥51bn)
Iida Group Holdings: long-term performance & turning pointsSales (revenue) and profit-margin ratio
Sales (¥ bn)Net margin (%)

2013Six buyers become one

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2014 · consolidated
Revenue$7.1B
Net income$319M
Net margin4.5%
FY2017 · consolidated
Revenue$11.0B
Net income$684M
Net margin6.2%
  1. 2013Six power builders combine into Iida Group Holdings; TSE listing
  2. 2014First Wood acquired — vertical integration begins
  3. 2014Revenue up 57.6% to ¥1.19tn in the first full year
  4. 2017Six segments still reported separately; Hajime the largest at ¥372.9bn

The six companies that formed Iida Group had all descended from a single carpentry firm founded in 1967, gone public separately, and spent years bidding against each other for the same suburban land. They were the “power builders,” whose trade was cheap, mass-produced detached houses for people who could not otherwise buy one. Ranked together they were the largest supplier of homes in Japan, and individually each was losing the same margin to the same two costs: land acquisition and building materials. In June 2013 Hajime Construction, Iida Sangyo, Toei Housing, Tact Home, Arnest One and ID Home signed a joint share-transfer agreement, and in November Iida Group Holdings was created in Nishitokyo and listed on the TSE First Section the same day.

The logic was arithmetic. Reduce the number of buyers of land and lumber from six to one and the terms improve without a single extra house being built. What the merger deliberately did not do was dissolve the six: each kept its own corporate identity, brand, sales network and segment accounts, and the holding company took only the shared functions — land sourcing, procurement, hiring. The federal structure preserved the speed of on-site decisions that a fast-turnover volume model depends on, at the price of limiting the synergy to purchasing power. Founder Iida Kazuo became chairman at the formation but died on 29 November 2013, within weeks of it; Mori Kazuhiko took the chair in February 2014, with Nishikawa Yoichi as the first president.

Then came the second move, the one that would define the company. In May 2014 the group bought First Wood, a timber and building-materials trading house — the first step of walking up its own cost structure. Materials run to several million yen per house; owning the flow from log to site beat buying through a contractor or trading company. Alongside it, the group began building a timber-sourcing base in the Russian Far East, whose SPF lumber already framed much of Japanese housing. Revenue went from ¥753.8bn in the year to March 2014 to ¥1.34tn by March 2018, and net profit roughly doubled to ¥69.5bn.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2018Forty-six thousand houses a year

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2018 · consolidated
Revenue$12.1B
Net income$630M
Net margin5.2%
FY2021 · consolidated
Revenue$13.3B
Net income$759M
Net margin5.7%
  1. 2019First Plus acquired — fixtures and fittings brought in-house
  2. 2020Around 46,000 houses a year; pandemic demand for suburban homes
  3. 2021Kanei Masashi succeeds Nishikawa; Mori retires from management
  4. 2022Record ¥153.3bn operating profit, an 11.1% margin

By early 2020 the group was supplying about 46,000 detached houses a year — more homes than any other company in Japan, and a scale that put it in a category apart from both the trading-house developers and the branded housemakers. Nishikawa had framed the business from the start as housing for people locked out of ownership, and paired the price with specification: earthquake resistance at 1.5 times the standard, a housing-performance evaluation certificate on every unit.

The integration kept climbing the cost line. First Plus, acquired in October 2019, brought water heaters, bathrooms and kitchens in-house — another ¥2–3m per house of components. Window frames and materials distribution followed. Then the pandemic pushed demand toward suburban houses at exactly the moment those costs were under control: the year to March 2021 delivered revenue of ¥1.46tn, operating profit of ¥121.3bn and net profit of ¥83.3bn, with an 8.3% operating margin and ROE around 18%.

March 2021 brought both the peak and the handover. Orient was acquired in January to strengthen land sourcing in the Tokyo area; the year to March 2022 set the record — ¥153.3bn of operating profit on an 11.1% margin, with every one of the six segments in double digits. Nishikawa stepped down at the end of his term and vice-president Kanei Masashi took over in April 2021, charged with raising the degree of integration the federation had so far avoided. Mori Kazuhiko retired to honorary chairman, ending the founding family’s role in management.

Read the full history in Japanese →


2022The forest, the war, and the margin

Revenue (¥ bn, bars) · net margin (%, line)
Source: securities reports
FY2022 · consolidated
Revenue$10.6B
Net income$787M
Net margin7.5%
FY2025 · consolidated
Revenue$9.8B
Net income$339M
Net margin3.5%
  1. 2022RFP Group (19 Russian forestry companies) acquired
  2. 2022Russia invades Ukraine; sanctions strand the assets
  3. 2024Operating margin bottoms at 4.1%; progressive dividend adopted
  4. 2025Nishino Hiroshi becomes president; US housebuilder acquired

In January 2022 the group acquired RFP Group — Russia Forest Products (BVI) and eighteen subsidiaries including Dallesprom and ALK, forestry and sawmilling companies in the Russian Far East. It was the terminus of the strategy begun with First Wood: not just buying timber but owning the forest it comes from. Five weeks later Russia invaded Ukraine. Sanctions and Japanese import restrictions followed, and the group found itself holding assets it could neither use as intended nor easily leave. Impairments began in the year to March 2023; operating profit fell to ¥102.3bn.

The following year was worse and the cause was domestic. Material costs, competition for Tokyo-area land, wages and mortgage rates all pressed at once, and the year to March 2024 closed at ¥1.44tn of revenue with operating profit of ¥59.1bn — a 4.1% margin, the group’s first real contraction in ten years, with ID Home posting the first segment loss. Having bought four materials makers, the group discovered that internalizing a process does not abolish the market it is exposed to; it only moves the exposure onto its own books.

The answer has been to promise stability where the business cannot supply it. From 2024 the group adopted a progressive dividend — unusual in volume housebuilding — committing to maintain or raise the payout regardless of earnings, alongside opportunistic buybacks. Margins have recovered to 5.5% and then 6.3%, on ¥1.51tn of revenue, while the group absorbed roughly ¥5bn for an Expo 2025 Osaka pavilion and added goodwill from a US housebuilding acquisition in Houston, Atlanta and Fort Worth. Nishino Hiroshi, who ran the Expo project, became the third president in April 2025 with three problems inherited intact: unwinding Russia, making America pay, and getting the Japanese margin back.

Read the full history in Japanese →


Key decisions — the author’s view

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2012

Combining six power builders into one holding company (2013)

Six companies out of one carpentry firm, back under one holding company

Companies that had branched off from a single carpentry firm in 1967, each gone public independently, and competed against one another in auctions for the same land, came back forty-six years later under a single holding company. The logic of the merger was plain: cut the number of buyers of land and materials from six to one and the terms improve for the same number of houses. Revenue and operating profit crossed the target line within three years, and unit supply and market share rose to a level none of the six could have reached alone. Yet the character of this merger shows most clearly in the fact that the six never gave up standing side by side, each keeping its own trade name and brand.

Melting the six into one company would have cut the overlapping sales networks and the duplicated channels for land information. That it was not done is because a fast-turnover volume model rests on the speed of judgment at each site, so the merger’s effect was confined to bargaining power on the buying side. Meanwhile the practice of marking down unsold stock at the fiscal year-end and clearing it survived the merger, and in the spring of 2015, with the accounting periods now aligned, new detached houses in the ¥10-million range lined the suburbs. Having pooled the machinery for building cheap and in volume across six companies, the downward pressure on prices reached the market at six companies’ scale as well.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2014

Vertical integration in materials and timber, beginning with First Wood (2014)

Buying the people who send you invoices

Volume housebuilding is a trade in which the seller does not set the price. Local comparables fix the ceiling, and auctions fix what the land costs. What is left is the cost of building, and what Iida Group Holdings has been doing since 2014 is walking, company by company, into the inside of that cost. The firm that mills the timber, the firm that assembles the glass, the firm that makes the kitchens, the firm that makes the doors and flooring — every one of them had, until then, been sending it invoices. It was shopping that replaced negotiating terms with managing them internally.

What the substitution revealed is that the inside of the cost line still contains things you cannot read. The surge in timber prices hit its own procurement directly in 2021, and the Russian forests it obtained the following year were made hard to use by war. The 4.1% operating margin in the year to March 2024 is the figure recorded after taking four materials makers in-house. Vertical integration transfers the economics of a process onto your own ledger; it does not erase the market that process is exposed to. What Iida Group Holdings is now reaching for is neither processing nor raw material, but the selling side that faces the customer directly.

Revenue (¥ bn) · net margin % · around FY2021

Buying 19 Russian Far East forestry companies — and the invasion five weeks later (2022)

Four million hectares cannot be brought home

At the core of this investment was not the question of where to buy timber but of whose hands to leave the swing in costs in. Since taking First Wood as a subsidiary in May 2014, Iida Group Holdings had widened the scope of in-house supply to window frames, fixtures and materials distribution. In the year after being shaken by the wood shock, the decision to put some four million hectares in Khabarovsk on its own books follows as an extension of that. Even the terms — a 75% stake — were secured over more than two years in order to hold the decisions from felling through milling in-house. The only difference from what had gone before was that the volatility it had been leaving to the market was moved inside a single country.

Taking control, however, also means carrying the decision of when to get out once conditions change. Trade with RFP amounts to only some ¥2bn a year, so stopping it would have little effect on consolidated results. Even so, the party that has committed roughly $546.5M (¥60bn) cannot simply let go of the holding, and this investment first moved as a number four years later, in the impairment for the year to March 2026. Procurement that walks back up the supply chain works only while the upstream and the downstream sit inside the same institutional order. What Iida Group Holdings now holds is not the volatility of timber prices but an asset whose timing and manner of exit it cannot decide for itself.

Each heading links to the full Japanese analysis — background, decision and outcome, with sources.


References & sources

This is a condensed English edition. The full, source-by-source history — with the detailed narrative, financial tables, shareholders and executives — is maintained in Japanese: 日本語版(詳細)— Iida Group Holdings full history in Japanese →

  1. Iida Group Holdings Co., Ltd. — 有価証券報告書 (annual securities reports).
  2. Iida Group Holdings Co., Ltd. — share-transfer agreement and integration disclosures, June–November 2013.
  3. Iida Group Holdings Co., Ltd. — earnings briefing materials (決算説明会資料), including segment results by operating company.
  4. Iida Group Holdings Co., Ltd. — announcement of the acquisition of Russia Forest Products (BVI) Limited and subsidiaries, January 2022.

Yen amounts are converted at the average rate of each figure’s own year — not today’s rate; revenue charts are shown in yen. Exchange rates & sources — the full ¥/US$ table →


Disclaimer


Data API

Iida Group Holdings’s history, financials, executives and shareholders are published as static JSON — no key, plain GET.

Method Endpoint Returns
GET /api/companies.json All companies
GET /api/3291/manifest.json Resource index
GET /api/3291/history.json History overview
GET /api/3291/timeline.json Chronology
GET /api/decisions.json All management decisions (index)
GET /api/3291/decisions.json Management decisions (index)
GET /api/3291/decisions/{slug}.json One decision (full dossier)
GET /api/3291/executives.json Executives
GET /api/3291/shareholders.json Major shareholders
GET /api/3291/financials.json Financial statements
GET /api/3291/financials-longterm.json Long-term results
GET /api/3291/segments.json Business segments
GET /api/3291/regions.json Sales by region
GET /api/3291/workforce.json Workforce